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Abstract 
This research investigated the potential effects of managerial overconfidence and 
regret aversion in a corporate capital investment context. Three fundamental decision 
problems are analysed: Project selection (accepting or rejecting a proposed 
investment), managerial effort, and project evaluation (continuing or abandoning a 
failing investment). Very little previous research has looked at the role of 
psychological biases in corporate finance decisions, and the joint analysis of the two 
studied biases within one model is also a fairly novel contribution. 
Solving by backward induction a theoretically derived model integrating these 
decisions as well as overconfidence and regret aversion, I outline the conditions under 
which a biased manager will make choices that are inefficient from a shareholder value 
perspective; however, the model also reveals that, in combination, the two 
psychological phenomena may off-set such that the optimal outcome can be obtained.  
I further demonstrate how my theoretical propositions can be supplemented with 
empirical data by means of a survey and two different experiments. The survey of UK 
managers with capital investment responsibility exposes the pervasiveness of 
overconfidence and regret aversion within the sample group. In addition, indications 
for potential associations between these biases and certain capital investment decision 
choices are found. To my knowledge, no such empirical study exists so far. 
To explore potential causal relationships between overconfidence and effort, 
overconfidence and project selection, as well as regret aversion and project evaluation 
choices, two experiments were designed and conducted. The experimental data 
provides tentative support for the model and indicates the potential value of larger-
scale future research.  
I close by discussing the implications of my results for corporate governance and 
suggesting avenues for future work in this area. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Companies can invest money in physical, financial or intangible assets (Seitz & 
Ellison, 2004:14). In this research, I focus on investments in physical assets. Such 
capital investments have the purpose of achieving and sustaining a competitive 
advantage, which is essential to making profits; in turn, the generation of value by 
making profits is the reason why companies exist because shareholders will only 
provide equity to fund enterprises that pursue growth in value. In general terms, any 
form of corporate investment should thus be driven by the expectation that the "future 
flow of satisfactions [...] when appropriately discounted [...] will [...] exceed the 
satisfaction presently obtainable" (Smith, 1971:69). However, since human beings lack 
complete foresight, the future and hence investment decisions are clouded by 
uncertainty. 
Research in Psychology has shown that human decision making under uncertainty may 
be influenced by several cognitive and emotional factors. The potential relevance of 
these phenomena for research in finance was first recognized by only a limited number 
of academics about 25 years ago. For a long time, their work has been somewhat 
marginalised as allegedly being concerned only with rare anomalies in the functioning 
of the human brain. The main reason why this young discipline encountered relatively 
strong opposition was that the core of its propositions seemed irreconcilable with the 
foundations of the existing financial theory. In particular, the claim that stock market 
investors could have systematically biased expectations was heavily criticised by the 
more established scholars in this field.  
Under the dominant paradigm in Finance, investors are assumed to be instrumentally 
rational and hence free of any systematic bias. Any less-than-rational individuals 
would be driven out of the market by the rational investors taking advantage of their 
biased expectations. This process of arbitrage was hence seen as a guarantee for 
efficient markets in which nothing but fully rational behaviour could persist. In spite of 
research showing that there may be limits to full arbitrage (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) 
and the famous remark by Alan Greenspan (1996), former Chairman of the US Federal 
Reserve Board, that stock market valuations were at the time driven by "irrational 
exuberance", the idea that psychological factors could have anything more than a 
Introduction 
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short-term effect on stock prices is still met with considerable scepticism by most 
academics in Finance. 
However, irrespective of whether one believes that stock markets are efficient or not, 
an area where the forces of arbitrage are very likely to be limited for several reasons is 
within corporations (Heaton, 2002). Consequently, the capital investment decisions of 
individual managers should  be even more likely to be subject to psychological biases 
than those of market investors; in particular, since capital investments are characterised 
by uncertainty just like stock investments. Surprisingly though, most of the existing 
literature on the role of psychological phenomena in financial decisions has focused on 
stock market related topics, with issues of corporate finance having been neglected. A 
general aim of my research is thus to contribute to this largely deficient body of 
knowledge.  
Specifically, I concentrate on three (consecutive) decision problems of the capital 
investment decision process: Selection of an investment, managerial effort level 
choice, and evaluation of an ongoing investment. Within this framework, I investigate 
theoretically and empirically the role of two robust and well-documented 
psychological phenomena, overconfidence and aversion to regret. Adopting a 
shareholder-value perspective, I seek to find out how managerial overconfidence and 
regret aversion might affect decision behaviour at each of the three capital investment 
decision problems. In doing so, my research will address the following questions: 
 
• What characterises overconfidence and regret aversion? 
• Which predictions for the behavioural effects of overconfidence and regret aversion 
can be made for the chosen capital investment decision framework? 
• Is either of the two biases relevant in the chosen context? Hence, are managers who 
make capital investment decisions affected by overconfidence or regret aversion? 
• Can the predicted behaviour be observed in practice? 
• Is there empirical support for the hypothesized behavioural effects? 
• Are the predicted effects good or bad with regard to shareholder value? 
• What are the implications of this research? 
 
My analysis will relate to individual rather than group decision-making, and also 
ignore any other organizational aspects that may in reality affect corporate investment. 
A further delimitation is that I consider the effects of overconfidence and regret 
Capital investment decisions with managerial overconfidence and regret aversion 
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aversion exclusively. Given the importance of corporate capital investment for 
companies but also for the economy as a whole, it would seem a worthwhile pursuit to 
gain a better insight into how the individual managers in charge make these decisions. 
My research adds to the literature by proposing a formal model of the identified capital 
investment decisions, from which testable predictions on the effects of overconfidence 
and regret aversion are derived, and empirically evaluated. The account of this 
research proceeds as follows. 
 
Chapter 1 contrasts different theories about decision-making. First, I show how the 
project selection, effort level and project evaluation decisions should be made 
according to textbook Finance. Specifically, an individual's investment decisions are 
optimal if they are consistent with the theory of rational choice. The cornerstones of 
rational choice theory are thus introduced prior to outlining optimal decision making at 
each of the three stages of the capital investment decision process to be studied here. In 
a second step, evidence from Psychology that people sometimes make decisions in a 
non-rational way is presented. It is this dialectic which drives the further research, and 
out of which also the existing literature in Behavioural Finance has arisen, to which 
my work can be attributed. 
This literature, which relates psychological phenomena to financial decisions, is 
reviewed in Chapter 2; the focus hereby is on contributions that are most relevant to 
the role of overconfidence and regret aversion in capital investment decision making. 
The literature review is structured according to the two biases. Its general purpose is to 
identify previous attempts to model and otherwise investigate overconfidence and 
regret aversion in financial decision making, so as to place the proposed research in 
context, and build on what has already been achieved. It is shown that there are large 
gaps in the literature, and that the proposed research will consequently be a novel 
contribution in several ways.  
In Chapter 3, I present my own model of the capital investment decision process based 
on the theoretical background provided in the preceding chapters. Following a general 
outline of the standard model, I demonstrate how overconfidence and regret aversion 
may formally be integrated into this model consistent with the literature. Following the 
logic of backward induction, the model is solved by consecutive analysis of the project 
evaluation, managerial effort, and project selection decisions, with and without 
consideration of the two biases. Based on the contrast to optimal (unbiased) decision 
Introduction 
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behaviour, I derive testable propositions for the effects of overconfidence and regret 
aversion on the identified stages of the capital investment decision process. 
In Chapter 4, I outline how the empirical data in this research was collected. The 
chapter first explores how previous research has addressed the task of data collection. 
From this review, it appears that most related studies in Finance used an experimental 
or survey design. The methodological considerations reveal considerable weaknesses 
of either approach taken by itself; these may, however, be offset when both methods 
are applied in combination. Following these reflections, a two-method design is 
retained, combining an internet-based survey questionnaire and two experiments. The 
remainder of that chapter then details the structure and underlying rationale of the 
questionnaire and the experiments. 
The collected data for both the survey and the experiments is presented and analysed in 
Chapter 5. A discussion of the findings of this research, including potential limitations, 
is provided in Chapter 6. I also discuss whether overconfidence and regret aversion are 
desirable for shareholders, and what might be done in terms of corporate governance to 
reduce the impact of the two biases. The chapter closes with suggestions for further 
research and a conclusion on the role of managerial overconfidence and regret aversion 
in capital investment decisions. 
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CHAPTER 1: DECISION MAKING THEORY  
This chapter provides the theoretical background for the unbiased (optimal) solution of 
the model later on. Capital investments were shown to be important in the corporate 
value creation process. Given this importance, research in economics and finance has 
come up with recommendations on how best to make the associated decisions. That 
theory is hence normative because it prescribes behaviour for a given choice problem. 
Normative theory is about how people should behave based on certain assumptions 
about their objectives and is to be distinguished from descriptive theory which is an 
account of how people actually behave, irrespective of whether such behaviour is 
optimal or not (Bell, Raiffa, & Tversky, 1988:16). Given their differing intentions and 
assumptions, normative and descriptive theories cannot be compared for the purpose of 
determining which is superior.  
However, and this is the intention of the presented research, normatively optimal 
behaviour can serve as a benchmark for assessing observed behaviour. In this way, it is 
not the optimality of normative behaviour that is tested but rather its descriptive 
accuracy1, hence the optimality of the observed behaviour. The purpose of this chapter 
is therefore to outline how each of the three studied capital investment decision 
problems – project selection, managerial effort, and project evaluation – should 
theoretically be made. The normative status of modern corporate finance theory is 
derived from its assumption of a rational decision maker. However, there is also 
evidence of human choice behaviour that is inconsistent with some of the axioms of 
rational choice.  
1.1 Optimal choice behaviour  
Standard textbook corporate finance theory assumes rational decision making. Prior to 
the review of what constitutes optimal capital investment decision behaviour, an 
outline of the core elements of the theory of rational choice is thus offered. 
                                                 
1 Yet since normative theory is not meant to be descriptively accurate, such testing does nothing to 
question its validity. 
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1.1.1 Basics of rational choice theory 
Rational choice theory was developed as a prescriptive theory for making decisions 
when the outcomes of the choice alternatives are risky or uncertain2. Resources in the 
economy are scarce and choices need to be made. The theory of rational choice details 
how these choices should be made optimally. It consists of three theoretical pillars.  In 
order to define optimality, rational choice theory draws on utility theory; hence, an 
outcome is optimal if it maximizes individual utility. The second pillar of rational 
choice theory is a set of logical decision rules (choice axioms), which specify 
individual preferences over different outcomes. Third, the theory of rational choice 
assumes that under conditions of uncertainty, forecasts are made according to the 
rational expectations hypothesis. Optimal behaviour then consists of maximizing 
subjectively expected utility. In this section, I introduce all of these elements.  
Utility theory 
In the late 18th century, a philosophical debate was being conducted in Economics 
about what motivates people’s behaviour. This research is today known as the 
utilitarian literature, with Jeremy Bentham as a leading figure3. Under this approach, 
people are believed to pursue the satisfaction of their desires so as to achieve 
happiness. This notion of happiness, derived from the consumption or possession of a 
good was termed utility. Original definitions of the term utility interpret it as an 
immaterial benefit of owning or consuming a good or service. For instance, Adam 
Smith (1776) defines utility as ‘value in use’:   
"The word value […] has two different meanings, and sometimes expresses the utility 
of some particular object, and sometimes the power of purchasing other goods which 
the possession of that object conveys. The one may be called value in use; the other, 
value in exchange..." (Book 1, Chapter IV, p.13).  
Yet with the development of Economics to become a more scientific discipline, a more 
quantifiable concept was sought. This resulted eventually in a stark simplification of 
the interpretation of the term utility. Utility was simply assumed to be measurable in 
                                                 
2 If there are several possible consequences to a decision, and if it is known how likely each outcome is, 
the decision is said to be risky; in contrast, uncertainty is defined as a situation where the probability 
distribution for the outcomes is not known (Knight, 1921).  
3 Prominent opponents to Bentham's utilitarianism included John Ruskin and Thomas Carlyle. 
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monetary terms. In their landmark work on rational behaviour, John von Neumann and 
Oskar Morgenstern assume that 
"the aim of all participants in the economic system […] is money, or equivalently a 
single monetary commodity" (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953: 8). 
This interpretation by von Neumann et al. (1953) permitted an ordinal (intra-personal) 
scaling of utility, meaning that greater utility is reflected by greater monetary value. As 
a consequence, preferences for choice options could be stated more easily in terms of 
value. Combinations of goods or decision outcomes that yield the same utility are 
graphically represented by an indifference curve. The preference order between 
different bundles is then illustrated by a utility function that intersects with each 
indifference curve. Thus, whilst early economists viewed human beings as seeking to 
maximise satisfaction, rational choice theory assumes because money can buy 
satisfaction that an individual makes choices in pursuit of wealth maximisation. Even 
though there may be substantial differences between satisfaction or happiness and 
wealth, this simplifying interpretation of utility as being equal to money has become 
widely accepted and also standard in Finance4. Consequently, economic agents aim to 
maximize wealth instead of pursuing happiness, and rational investing is assumed to 
be driven only by this consideration.  
A particular property of the utility function that should be mentioned here, too, is its 
concavity, derived from the intuition that people are generally risk-averse, and that a 
bird in the hand is worth two in the bush; or, in more technically correct terms, that the 
utility of an expected (certain) gain is always greater than the (uncertain) expected 
utility of that gain, hence 
(Eq-1.1) ( ) [ ])(][ XUEXEU >  
The property of risk aversion can best be illustrated with a hypothetical gamble: A 
risk-averse individual is predicted always to prefer the opportunity of winning £1,000 
for sure to the opportunity of winning £2,000 with a 50% chance or nothing otherwise. 
The product of an outcome with the probability of achieving it is called a 'prospect' 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In the given example, both prospects are of equal value. 
However, a risk-averse individual will prefer the certain to the risky prospect.  
                                                 
4 When risk-neutrality of the decision maker is assumed. 
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In contrast, someone who would always choose the risky over the safe prospect when 
both have about the same values because he enjoys gambling and taking a risk is said 
to be risk-loving (convex utility function). A third stylized risk preference type 
between these two extremes is risk-neutrality, where the utility curve is linear; a risk-
neutral individual would be indifferent between the two options from above on the 
basis that their prospects are identical. Due to the linearity of the utility function, risk 
neutrality offers benefits for modelling and will also be assumed in the model 
presented later in this thesis5. Utility theory is furthermore based on a set of 
assumptions about decision making that formally describe rational choice behaviour. 
These axioms of rational choice are introduced in the next section. 
Axioms of rational choice 
An initial requirement of rational choice is to evaluate and rank all different choice 
options in terms of their expected utilities (preference ordering). Based on the work by 
von Neumann et al. (1953), a set of preference ordering rules was developed to 
become the foundation of rational information processing. In particular, the 
contributions by Luce & Raiffa (1957) led to the formalisation of the axioms of 
rational choice. A central characteristic of these rules is that they are inherently logical. 
Below, I present the most important axioms of choice only briefly, as they are not 
directly in the focus of my investigation. I largely paraphrase Weber & Camerer 
(1987:130-142) in this list. 
• Completeness. The axiom of completeness states that for each pair of choices A and 
B, it is possible to compare the two outcomes, and that it is possible to determine a 
preference ordering such that A > B, A < B or A ~ B. 
• Reflexivity. If one outcome is viewed as better than the other by an individual such 
that A > B, then it is also true that B < A. 
• Transitivity. Given completeness and reflexivity, an individual’s preferences are 
furthermore assumed to be transitive such that if option A is preferred to option B (A > 
B) and option B is preferred to option C (B > C), then it follows that A > C.  
                                                 
5 As a result of making this simplifying assumption in this research, the predictions are limited to the 
special case of risk-neutrality. However, this is common practice in much of the literature in Finance.  
Capital investment decisions with managerial overconfidence and regret aversion 
- 17 - 
• Continuity. For the uncertain events A, B and C, assume that A > B > C. Under 
continuity, a probability p exists such that an individual is indifferent between B with 
certainty and playing a lottery where he receives A with probability p and C with 
probability (1−p). This implies that it is possible to construct a combination of choices 
A and C which is equally valuable to the individual as the ‘certainty equivalent’ B.  
• Independence / Substitutability. If A is preferred over B, this preference remains 
independent of any transformations that are the same for both outcomes. Formally, if 
A > B, then for all outcomes Z and for all probabilities p є [0,1] it is also true that  
pA + (1-p)Z > pB + (1-p)Z. Consequently, the individual must be indifferent between a 
lottery and its certainty equivalent. 
• Monotonicity. If two lotteries with the same alternatives differ only in probabilities, 
then the lottery that gives the higher probability to obtain the most preferred alternative 
is preferred. 
Decision-making can only be deemed rational if choices are made in adherence with 
these rules. 
Rational expectations 
When the outcome of a choice option is less than certain, choice preference orderings 
must be developed on the basis of expected utilities (as opposed to known utilities). 
The expected utility [ )(ˆ)( xUorxEU ] of a gain [ ix ] is effectively the product of the 
utility of the gain and the probability with which this outcome is likely to occur, hence 
(Eq-1.2) ∫
Ω∈
==
ix
ii xdPxUxUxEU )()()(ˆ)(  
A fundamental problem here is clearly the estimation part. Assuming that outcomes 
may be known, how does one determine the probability of an event occurring?  In the 
original version of rational choice theory by von Neumann et al. (1953), information 
on the probability distribution is assumed to be available in the form of historically 
observed frequencies. This data can then be used to generate estimates of future 
probabilities (frequentistic probabilities). Arguably, though, these circumstances are 
not representative of a truly uncertain decision problem, where historical information 
would not be available. Large investment projects may be assumed to be sufficiently 
unique for management not to dispose of such data (no prior experience). 
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Consequently, the decision maker is left with his best guess as to the likelihood of each 
possible outcome. These guesses are called subjective probabilities. An early theory of 
subjective probabilities was proposed by Leonard Savage (1954). However, subjective 
estimates could potentially suffer from being completely arbitrary, which would 
represent a serious limitation to the theory of rational choice in situations of 
uncertainty. This issue was resolved by the rational expectations hypothesis (REH), 
put forward theoretically by John Muth (1961) and stated formally by Robert Lucas 
(1972). According to the REH, rational (ex-ante) forecasts are very accurate 
predictions of the ‘true’ (ex-post) values: 
"…since they are informed predictions of future events, [subjective expectations] are 
essentially the same as the predictions of the relevant economic theory" (Muth, 1961: 
316). 
In understanding why this should be so, the following quote from John Maynard 
Keynes (1937) is helpful:  
"…the necessity for action and for decision compels us as practical men to do our best 
[…] and to behave exactly as we should if we had a good Benthamite calculation of a 
series of prospective advantages and disadvantages, each multiplied by its appropriate 
probability, waiting to be summed" (p.214).  
Keynes appears to make reference to some external force that disciplines human 
behaviour to be rational. Exactly this is also the intuition behind the REH: Subjective 
forecasts are accurate because any systematic deviation from what can rationally be 
expected will be eroded by market forces (arbitrage). According to the REH, thus, 
subjective forecasts cannot be systematically biased, an assumption Hargreaves-Heap, 
Hollis et al. (1992) describe as follows:  
"We can define the expectations which we expect instrumentally rational individuals to 
hold as ones which suffer only from random white noise errors; that is, the errors have 
a zero expected mean, constant variance and are serially independent" (p.17).  
Mathematically, this central idea underlying the REH can be written as: 
(Eq-1.3) 0])[()( 1 =−= −tttt IXEXEE ε   
where  tX : Forecast in time t 
  1−tI : Information available in time t-1 
Capital investment decisions with managerial overconfidence and regret aversion 
- 19 - 
Maximising subjectively expected utility 
Having developed rational subjective forecasts for outcomes and corresponding 
probabilities, the decision maker should compute the subjectively expected utility 
[SEU] of each possible course of action. The SEU for one choice option is the 
weighted average of subjectively expected utilities for different states of nature, where 
the weights are the subjective probabilities (Elster, 1986:5). Taking into account the 
choice axioms specified above, rational decision making then involves ranking the 
choice alternatives based on their SEU and selecting the course of action (if 
alternatives are mutually exclusive) that has the highest rank (the highest SEU). Note 
again that SEU can be equated here with the subjectively expected (monetary) value of 
a decision due to the assumption of risk-neutrality of the decision maker.  
With regard to the value of a decision, however, a potential difficulty arises when 
decisions are delegated, as in the case of large companies where shareholders employ 
managers to conduct the operations of the business. In this situation, it must be 
questioned if the utility of the manager is the same as that of shareholders, or if there is 
a divergence of interests. Two different opinions exist in the literature, agency cost 
theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and stewardship theory (Donaldson & Davis, 1989). 
In agency-cost theory, the decision maker is assumed to pursue selfishly his own 
interests, which are not identical to those of the shareholders. If managers dispose of 
inside knowledge not available to shareholders (hidden information) or are able to take 
decisions without the shareholders’ knowledge (hidden action), agency-cost theory 
predicts that there will be managerial shirking: The agent makes decisions so as to 
maximize his personal utility by seeking private benefits instead of pursuing 
shareholder value maximization that would be in the shareholders’ best interest. The 
effort required to monitor managers’ decisions, or to align6 their interests with those of 
the shareholders results in the cost of agency (Jensen et al., 1976:308). In contrast, 
under stewardship theory managers are assumed to pursue not their own utility 
maximization but the best interests of the shareholders (Davis & Schoorman, 1997:21). 
It should be stressed that even though agency cost theory predicts deviations in the 
manager's behaviour from what is normatively optimal, it still assumes the agent to be 
                                                 
6 A method of motivating managers to pursue shareholder value maximization that has been especially 
popular in practice is the use of stock option schemes (e.g. Gordon, 2004). 
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fully rational and maximize his wealth consistent with the three pillars of rational 
choice theory outlined in the preceding sub-sections.  
To summarize, rational behaviour does not only imply utility or wealth maximizing 
behaviour. It also requires the decision maker to form expectations in line with the 
rational expectations hypothesis and process information consistent with the axioms of 
rational choice. The theory of rational choice thus pertains to "means rather than to 
ends" (Elster, 1986:1), whereby the optimal outcome is obtained as a consequence. 
Traditional models of Corporate Finance that can be found in standard textbooks adopt 
rational choice as the assumed behavioural modus operandi of the decision maker7 to 
show how an optimal outcome in a given finance problem can be achieved. 
Consequently, these models are normative theory. In the following section, I review 
the optimal decision rules for each of the three identified capital investment choice 
problems as defined by modern corporate finance theory. 
1.1.2 Optimal capital investment decisions 
My research focuses on three elementary steps of the capital investment decision 
process. My analysis begins at the point where a given investment proposal has 
become available to the decision maker. The first decision task of the manager is thus 
to decide whether to reject the proposal or whether to accept it. I define acceptance of a 
project as the commitment to commence an investment by expending an initial sum 
and bearing any associated financial consequences. The investment decisions studied 
in this research are thus irreversible in the sense that once resources are committed to 
an investment, they cannot be recovered. The second managerial choice problem is 
how much effort to exert in order to ensure the successful completion of the 
investment. Finally, it may become necessary to evaluate an ongoing investment 
project in order to determine if the project is still 'on track' and may be continued, or 
whether it would be advisable to terminate it. Based on the assumption of a rational 
decision maker who seeks to maximize shareholder value, corporate finance theory 
                                                 
7 The assumption of a rational decision maker is so common that it is referred to in the literature as the 
fictional character of the 'homo œconomicus'. 
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offers relatively unambiguous guidelines on how to make optimal decisions8 in each of 
these three situations. 
Project selection 
The project selection decision must be taken following the net present value (NPV) 
rule9. This decision rule states that any investment with a negative NPV (NPV<0) must 
be rejected. The NPV of an investment is equal to the sum of the discounted expected 
cash flows from the investment, minus the initial cash outlay. Formally, 
(Eq-1.3) ∑
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where  )( tCFE : Expected cash flow in period t 
  0r :  Required rate of return (discount rate) 
  0I :  Initial investment outlay 
 
The NPV is thus the absolute additional cash value created by a new investment stated 
at present terms, which can be positive or negative. The discount rate should account 
for the risk of the investment, opportunity cost of capital and the financing mix for the 
project. Although Finance textbooks contain other appraisal methods besides the NPV 
method, there is widespread agreement that these are inferior as they can potentially 
lead to wrong decisions (e.g. Brealey & Myers, 2000:113). For example, static 
methods like return on investment (ROI) and payback do not account for the time 
value of money. ROI belongs to the group of accounting data based measures, which 
are less accurate than cash flow based appraisal methods. Payback favours projects 
with large initial cash returns, regardless of whether they add or destroy shareholder 
value. Even the internal rate of return (IRR), which is closest to the NPV approach, 
will at times lead to the wrong decision (e.g. Seitz & Ellison, 2005:167-177); in 
                                                 
8 Several scholars (e.g. Carr & Tomkins, 1996; Jones & Lee, 1998; Adler, 2000) accentuate the 
importance of qualitative factors for investment decisions. In this research, however, it is assumed that 
strategic considerations are quantifiable and can hence translate and be expressed in monetary value 
terms. 
9 Given that some investment projects share certain characteristics with financial options ('real options'), 
an alternative approach to the NPV rule is derived from options pricing theory (e.g. Ross, 1995). 
However, since real options pricing is also based on the principle of discounted cash flows of the NPV 
approach yet more complex, my research focuses on the net present value method alone.  
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particular, the IRR may be misleading when comparing investments that are different 
in several aspects (Kelleher & MacCormack, 2004). 
As an exception to the NPV rule, Brealey et al. (2000:114) point out that a company 
with hard capital constraints may not be able to take every investment with a positive 
NPV. In addition, there is one situation when a project with a positive NPV cannot be 
accepted. This occurs if the project is mutually exclusive to another investment. 
Investments are mutually exclusive if the acceptance of one prohibits the acceptance of 
the other. For illustration, one may think of a plot of land that can be used to build 
either a factory (investment A) or a shopping mall (investment B). For mutually 
exclusive investments, the optimal procedure is to rank the competing alternatives 
based on their NPV and accept the one with the highest NPV. This procedure of 
developing a preference ordering is directly adopted from rational choice theory; 
consequently, it requires the axioms of rational choice to be applied. 
Whilst theoretically any investment with a positive net present value may be 
undertaken, under no circumstances should a project with a negative NPV (NPV<0) be 
invested in. Making an investment that has a negative NPV implies a destruction of 
value, and thus obviously conflicts with the rational objective of shareholder wealth 
maximization. Since the calculation of the NPV took already into consideration all 
benefits (including strategic benefits) in monetary terms, there can be no reason to 
invest in such a project. However, as the formula in (Eq-1.3) also shows, the NPV of 
an investment depends heavily on the estimates about future cash flows. When these 
cash flows are very uncertain, it follows that applying the net present value rule 
involves considerable uncertainty. However, under the standard paradigm, this is not 
deemed to be much of a problem as expectations are assumed to be rational. 
Effort choice 
I define managerial effort broadly as any input the decision maker can contribute to the 
successful conduct of an investment. Hence, managerial effort summarizes the 
different ways in which a manager may allocate skill, expertise, time and other 
resources to the management of the investment project. The notion of 'effort' is in fact 
rather well-established in the literature, particularly in the field of experimental game 
theory that looks at the effectiveness of incentive systems in principal-agent settings 
(e.g. van Dijk, Sonnemans, & van Winden, 2001). The reason why the work effort of 
individuals is of interest to academics is that there is typically a rising cost associated 
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with increasing effort such that effort choice represents an optimisation problem: The 
individual thus needs to trade off the benefits of effort against its costs. According to 
basic economic theory, this trade-off should follow the simple rule that an activity 
should be undertaken up to the point where its marginal cost equals the marginal 
benefit derived from that activity. 
This stopping rule also applies to the decision problem of optimal managerial effort. 
Managers should exert effort to manage an investment only until the marginal cost of 
doing so is equal to the marginal benefit derived from the last unit of effort exerted this 
way. Simple as this rule may sound in theory, however, its application is not as 
straightforward. Specifically, two aspects are of relevance to this study. For one, there 
is the problem of who is affected by the cost of effort. In many cases, it is assumed that 
the cost of effort is internal to the manager, following the intuition that working harder 
reduces your utility (Mattsson & Weibull, 2002). Under this perspective, shareholders 
would not be negatively affected by increasing managerial effort and hence the optimal 
level of effort for shareholder value maximization would theoretically be unlimited.  
However, since my research abstracts from conflicts arising from a misalignment of 
interests between shareholders and the decision maker, I consider the cost of effort as a 
reduction of the expected value of an investment, which hence affects shareholders.  
This assumption should be no less intuitively plausible than interpreting the cost of 
effort as a disutility to the manager. Many resources that are deployed as part of 
managerial effort may for instance be associated with a real variable cost. For instance, 
if personal inspection and supervision of an investment project by the manager were to 
involve significant transport and travel costs, greater effort in this sense would directly 
hit corporate profits and thus shareholder value. In addition, the cost of effort may also 
be understood as an opportunity cost of managerial time and energy, or, more 
generally, of any resources allocated to one specific investment rather than to a 
different one. In spite of the traditional interpretation, there are thus also intuitive 
arguments that justify my assumption of the cost of effort directly and fully reducing 
shareholder value in reality. Moreover, from a theoretical point of view, a function for 
an external cost should be more tractable than that for an individual's disutility from 
extra work.   
While thus the cost of effort may often be known with relative ease, a second difficulty 
associated with adhering to the decision rule for normatively optimal effort is due to 
the potential obscurity of the (marginal) benefits of higher effort. Specifically, this 
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requires an estimation of the extent to which the individual's extra effort is able to 
increase the value of an investment at the margin. In addition to limiting or 
accommodating external factors, it is assumed here that individual competence – or the 
'quality' of the effort – plays an important part in the effectiveness of managerial effort. 
Determining the marginal benefit of effort consequently requires the decision maker to 
estimate the extent to which his personal ability, by means of his own effort 
contribution, can positively influence the expected value of an investment project. The 
accuracy of this estimate is thus a function of the accuracy of the manager's self-view, 
that is, how well he knows what he is able to do. Under the standard paradigm of 
rational decision-making, the manager is assumed to have a correct self-view and thus 
make a rational estimate of the marginal benefit of his effort. 
Project evaluation 
Although accepting an investment was defined to be committing in the sense that an 
initial allocation of funds had to be made, this does not imply that an investment that 
was accepted has to be continued until completion. Instead, I make the assumption that 
there is at least one point in time ('milestone') at which it is possible to terminate an 
investment prior to completion, that is, earlier than was originally planned. For 
instance, due to an unforeseen shift in consumer demand, the development of a 
production facility for a new product may suddenly no longer be required. If 
construction of the new facility has already started and progressed to some extent, 
management will have to decide whether to continue or to halt building. If completed, 
the facility may create value in some alternative use but it may also create future costs 
without contributing to revenues; on the other hand, terminating construction work 
may also involve further payments for instance to building contractors as 
compensation for loss of earnings. 
This general decision problem of continuing or abandoning an ongoing investment 
project is termed 'project evaluation' and constitutes the third and final stage of the 
capital investment decision process studied in this research. In particular, I assume that 
the manager observes that an investment he has undertaken is underperforming in the 
sense that it is now expected to incur losses in the future based on a renewed 
assessment. According to normative Finance theory, the abandonment / continuation 
decision (project evaluation) should be taken based on the net present value rule, since 
continuation of the investment would be analogous to undertaking a new investment. 
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The manager should thus calculate the net present value of either10 of his choice 
options. If this evaluation shows that the investment, if continued, would result in a 
negative NPV, the manager should abandon it, unless the termination value is even 
lower than the continuation value.  
Hence, Finance theory uses the logic of the NPV method to propose a clear decision 
rule for the project evaluation decision problem: An ongoing project should only be 
continued if its NPV in the case of continuation is greater than the NPV of immediate 
termination. Moreover, normative theory specifies that in these calculations, a forward-
looking stance should be adopted such that only incremental cash flows are taken into 
account (Brealey et al., 2000:123). Any preceding expenses on the investment should 
not be considered in the project evaluation decision, as these represent 'sunk costs', 
costs that cannot be recovered (Baumol & Willig, 1981). According to general 
economic wisdom, such unrecoverable 'bygones' must be ignored in rational decision-
making. Project evaluation thus essentially consists of a comparison of the discounted 
future cash flows expected for project continuation with those for project 
abandonment, and pursuing that choice option which has the greater net present value. 
1.1.3 Evidence of non-rational behaviour 
Shortly after a formalized theory of rational choice was presented, it was criticised 
based on observations that could not be reconciled with some of the theory's core 
elements. Two particularly well-known examples that put into question the descriptive 
accuracy of some of the core assumptions of rational choice theory are the ‘paradoxes’ 
attributed to Maurice Allais (1953) and Daniel Ellsberg (1961). Both experiments have 
been frequently replicated and their findings found to be robust. These findings have 
been called paradoxical because they demonstrate that people systematically make 
simple choices that violate axioms of rational choice theory. In the experiment by 
Allais (1953), subjects are faced with two gambles as in the example in Figure 1.1. The 
first gamble is a choice between a guaranteed (certain) amount of money and a larger 
but risky amount. The findings are generally that the majority of subjects always 
choose Option A in the first gamble, but prefer Option B' in the second gamble.  
 
                                                 
10 In reality, the project evaluation decision may consist of more choice options than abandonment or 
continuation, but the analysis in research is restricted to those two possible courses of action. 
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Figure 1.1: The Allais-Paradox – Example 
Option A:  Receive € 2000 with certainty (chance of 100%) 
Option B: Receive € 3000 with a chance of 80%, and nothing otherwise 
  
Option A': Receive € 2000 with a chance of 25%, and nothing otherwise 
Option B':  Receive € 3000 with a chance of 20%, and nothing otherwise 
  
 
What is interesting about this observed choice behaviour is that it is not rational. The 
choice options in the second gamble [A' and B'] are merely modifications of the 
options in the first gamble [A and B], in that the probabilities for the payouts were 
divided by four, with the likelihood of no gain adapted accordingly. According to the 
axiom of independence, however, this type of transformation should have no effect on 
an individual's preferences. 
Perhaps even more intriguing are the choices observable in the framework of Ellsberg's 
(1961) experiment. In that experiment, subjects are asked to make two independent 
choices in two gambles, and are consistently found to violate subjective expected 
utility theory. One version of the experiment is related by Barberis & Thaler (2003) 
and briefly repeated in the following: Subjects are informed that there are two urns, 
each containing 100 balls. Urn 1 contains 50 red and 50 blue balls. In Urn 2, there are 
also only red and blue balls, but subjects do not known how many there are of each 
colour. Two gambles are proposed (Figure 1.2) and subjects are asked to choose the 
preferred alternative in each gamble. In the first gamble, a ball is drawn at random 
from each urn. Subjects receive money if this ball is red and they correctly indicated 
the urn from which the red ball is drawn.  
 
Figure 1.2: The Ellsberg-Paradox – Example 
Gamble 1:  Payout 
Option a1:  a ball is drawn from Urn 1 $100 if ball is red $ 0 if ball is blue 
Option a2: a ball is drawn from Urn 2 $100 if ball is red $ 0 if ball is blue 
   
Gamble 2:   
Option b1: a ball is drawn from Urn 1 $ 100 if ball is blue $ 0 if ball is red 
Option b2: a ball is drawn from Urn 2 $ 100 if ball is blue $ 0 if ball is red 
 
Source: Barberis & Thaler (2003: 1072) 
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Results from this experiment show that subjects typically prefer Option a1 to Option 
a2, yet choose Option b1 over Option b2. As the rational reader may have noticed, 
such decision behaviour conflicts with rational choice theory because it appears to 
indicate that the concept of subjective probability estimates fails descriptively: A 
person who chooses Option a1 must necessarily believe that Urn 2 contains fewer than 
50 red balls. Given that there is a total of 100 balls in each urn, the individual who 
believes that Urn 2 contains fewer than 50 red balls must also believe that it contains 
more than 50 blue balls. Hence, in the second gamble, Option b2 should rationally be 
preferred to Option b1. Concerning the robust observation that people do not behave 
according to this logic, Ellsberg (1961:656) notes: 
"…the choices themselves do not appear to be careless or random. They are persistent, 
reportedly deliberate, and they seem to predominate empirically; many of the people 
who take them are eminently reasonable, and they insist that they want to behave this 
way, even though they may be respectful of the Savage axioms."  
The pervasiveness of such violations of the rational choice axioms was further 
underlined by the account that even Leonard Savage was among those who made 
illogical and non-rational choices in Ellsberg's experiment. 
What these early findings show is that even in an economic context, people do not 
always behave rationally (in the sense of conforming to rational choice theory), but 
that apparently there are situations in which the human  brain struggles to correctly 
process the available information. A rather remarkable illustration of the pervasiveness 
of such cognitive limitations is the task presented in Figure 1.3.  
 
Figure 1.3: Example of cognitive errors 
Please read the text below. Next, count how many times the letter F occurs.
How many instances of the letter F can you find? 
 
FINISHED FILES ARE THE 
RESULT OF YEARS OF SCIENTIFIC 
STUDY COMBINED WITH THE 
EXPERIENCE OF YEARS 
 
Source: www.neuro.psychologie.uni-saarland.de/ downloads/0405/biopsy_vorl/VL4-18-02-04_text.ppt  
 
Although this task may be argued to be partly an optical illusion, it clearly also 
involves basic mental processes. This exercise is so astonishing because someone who 
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encounters it for the first time will typically fail it, but when made aware of the 
underlying mechanism will not comprehend how an incorrect answer could have been 
obtained before. Most people find that the letter F occurs three times. However, the 
letter actually occurs six times. Apparently, this phenomenon is attributable to the 
difficulty our brain seems to have in processing the letter F if it forms part of the word 
'of'. Although this type of cognitive illusion lies beyond what is treated in the present 
research, the example demonstrates that there are ways in which the information 
processing of the human brain is systematically biased. The remainder of this chapter 
introduces research on the psychology of decision making under uncertainty that 
pertains to the context of capital investment decisions, with the focus being placed on 
the two biases my research focuses on, overconfidence and regret aversion.    
1.2 The psychology of decision making 
Evidence of human decision behaviour that conflicts with what would be optimal 
under rational choice theory prompted several scholars to propose alternative theories 
of choice. The one most protective of the rationality assumption is Simon's (1955) 
theory of bounded rationality, which is briefly introduced in the following. Since the 
days of Simon, however, the notion of full rationality has become less sacrosanct as 
psychologists started to make their findings more accessible to researchers in 
economics and related disciplines. An overview of these findings is also presented in 
this section. Given the large number of psychological biases, and the fact that not all 
are equally established, though, I decided to focus on the phenomena of 
overconfidence and regret aversion, which are reviewed in detail in the third part of 
this section. 
1.2.1 Boundedly rational decisions 
Bounded rationality theory was proposed by Herbert Simon11  as a descriptive theory 
of choice. At the heart of his theory lies the assumption that in reality, a decision 
maker is faced with different types of limitations preventing him from behaving 
optimally. These limitations can be external or internal to the individual; for instance, 
an internal limitation to the complete adherence to optimal decision making would be a 
                                                 
11 Simon received the Nobel Prize in Economics (1978) for his research on corporate decision-making. 
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person’s computational ability (Simon, 1955:101). The boundedly rational decision 
maker can consequently only gather and process a limited amount of choice 
alternatives. In financial and economic models, bounded rationality is often interpreted 
as a cost of effort: "[the agent] wishes to make a normatively optimal decision but at 
the same time is constrained by the costliness of the effort" (Ofek, Yildiz, & Haruvy, 
2002:4). As a consequence, the individual cannot optimise but merely satisfice (Simon, 
1955:104).  
One problem with Simon’s concept of bounded rationality is that a clear interpretation 
of it was missing. When modelled as an external cost of effort, or as limited 
(intellectual) ability of the decision maker, it seems that bounded rationality still 
assumes a fully rational individual who simply is faced by certain limiting aspects of 
reality. In this sense, bounded rationality theory is quite different from the present 
research. On the other hand, if one places more weight on the role of limitations and 
information processing deficiencies internal to the individual, bounded rationality 
tends more towards the psychology-oriented literature. Perhaps, however, this 
ambiguity was intentional. Simon (1955:100) himself saw his theory as a "marking 
stone placed halfway" between psychologists and economists. Half a century later, a 
large number of decision biases have been shown to be directly relevant to financial 
decisions, and the gap between psychologists and economists has narrowed further.  
1.2.2 Non-rational decision biases 
The general picture of the human mind that appears to be dominating in modern 
psychology is that of a dual process system of information processing (Kuehberger, 
2002:446; Stanovich & West, 2000:658). At the risk of oversimplification, one may 
summarize this view as suggesting that one part of the human brain thinks analytically 
and rationally, while the other part thinks intuitively and emotionally. The instinctive 
system can at times override the rational system, leading us to make seemingly 
irrational decisions. Among the phenomena that may affect our behaviour, a distinction 
can be made between visceral factors such as hunger or thirst (Loewenstein, 1996), 
emotions like guilt, joy or regret (Elster, 1998), and cognitive biases or heuristics. A 
problem with the different psychological biases identified by psychologists, however, 
is that they are not all readily accessible for outsiders to the discipline. For this reason, 
credit needs to be given to the pioneering work published by Daniel Kahneman and 
Amos Tversky, perhaps most widely known for their ‘Prospect Theory’ from 1979.  
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Their research showed the relevance of simple facts about the workings of the human 
mind for Economics and Finance topics. The significance of their contribution was 
acknowledged by the award of the Nobel Prize to Daniel Kahneman12 in 2002. 
Kahneman et al. (1979) demonstrate in a series of experiments that the human mind is 
predisposed to commit cognitive errors when it has to make economic decisions that 
are risky or uncertain. In those circumstances, the information processing of the human 
brain fails to conform to the axioms of rational choice. The two researchers use 
experimental settings that capture essential financial or economic decision problems. 
For instance, when presented with the choice between a certain gain and a slightly 
larger, but risky gain, a majority of subjects regularly preferred the certain gain. 
Kahneman et al. (1979:265) term this phenomenon the certainty effect. Interestingly, 
the reverse behaviour is observable for losses: While subjects are found to be risk-
averse in gains, they are risk seeking in losses (p.268).  
These observations lead Kahneman et al. (1979) to propose that the human utility 
curve ought to be thought of as S-shaped, a central feature of the authors' ‘Prospect 
Theory’, which is a descriptive theory of choice under risk and incorporates a range of 
biases such as mental accounting or framing. Mental accounting refers to the way in 
which the human mind records and analyzes financial transactions, which is different 
to the way this is done in financial accounting (Thaler, 1999:157). One effect of mental 
accounting is that sunk costs are not ignored (Statman & Caldwell, 1987:9), even 
though it is economic wisdom that there is no use in 'crying over spilt milk'. Framing 
leads people to evaluate choice options according to the way they are presented instead 
of only focussing on relevant differences between them (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1986:261). This list could be continued, since a range of other decision biases have 
been discovered over the years. However, good and rather exhaustive surveys of 
decision biases already exist, see for instance Rabin (1998), Slovic (2001) or 
Hirshleifer (2001). 
Following my review of the literature on the different biases, I concluded that 
overconfidence and regret aversion should not only be relevant in a capital investment 
decision context, but that they are also among the most interesting phenomena. For 
one, both either can explain the existence of a number of other biases or are direct 
effects of them, hence taking a central position in the larger picture of cognitive biases. 
                                                 
12 Amos Tversky died in 1996. 
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In addition, the characterisation in the psychology literature lets them appear as being 
rather opposite as far as their general behavioural effects are concerned. This aspect 
should make a joint analysis of the two biases particularly interesting.  
1.2.3 Overconfidence and regret aversion 
Overconfidence and regret aversion are among the most robust and well-documented 
psychological phenomena. Both have been found to affect decisions under uncertainty 
systematically. In this section, I review some of the theoretical background of the two 
biases, which will also be drawn upon in the development of my model. 
Overconfidence 
The term overconfidence is used somewhat ambiguously in the literature. Griffin & 
Varey distinguish between two ‘types’ of overconfidence. Overconfidence in the 
narrow sense is defined as "the overestimation of the validity of one’s judgment" 
(Griffin et al., 1996:228). The other form of overconfidence identified by Griffin et al. 
(1996) is optimistic overconfidence, "the tendency to overestimate the likelihood that 
one’s favoured outcome will occur" (p.228). Although such a distinction is useful for 
analytical purposes, casual observation and common logic seem to support the claim 
that it is unlikely that someone who overestimates his ability, skill and knowledge is 
not also simultaneously somewhat optimistic about his future. Optimism is thus 
included in the definition of overconfidence in my research. 
De Bondt & Thaler (1995:389) assert that overconfidence is "perhaps the most robust 
finding in the psychology of judgment". By definition, overconfident individuals suffer 
from a deficiency of their meta-knowledge (Zacharakis & Shepherd, 2001) and thus 
believe they know more and better than they actually do, both in absolute and relative 
terms. Svenson (1981) showed the pervasiveness of overconfidence in a survey of car 
drivers; well more than half of the questioned drivers rated themselves as being ‘above 
average’ in terms of their driving skills, which is of course statistically impossible. 
Other groups of people were also found to be generally overconfident13 , including 
engineers (Kidd, 1970), entrepreneurs (Cooper, Woo, & Dunkelberg, 1988) and 
different types of managers (Russo & Schoemaker, 1992). In the survey by Russo et al. 
                                                 
13 See also Barber & Odean (2001:263) 
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(1992), practically all of the 2,000 participating managers were found to be 
overconfident (p.9). 
An interesting question, and one that is also relevant for investigating overconfidence, 
is whether overconfidence is endogenous or exogenous. On the one hand, there is 
research claiming that overconfidence is associated with factors outside the individual, 
thus supporting the notion that overconfidence may be – at least partly – exogenous, 
too. For instance, Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein (1977) find that overconfidence 
increases in task complexity. Brenner, Koehler et al. (1996:213) even argue that task 
difficulty is the main determinant of the level of overconfidence. Furthermore 
conducive to overconfidence appear to be past achievements. In combination with the 
self-attribution bias, where individuals interpret past successes as confirmation of their 
ability whilst ascribing failures to bad luck (Shefrin, 1999:101), a positive performance 
track record may well strengthen overconfidence. Other researchers have suggested 
that biases may exist for evolutionary reasons (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994). In 
particular, a positively biased self-image may be beneficial for mental health, well-
being and one’s social life (Taylor & Brown, 1988:193), and thus ultimately, for 
survival. Overconfidence makes us feel better about ourselves and our future, and 
could thus be a desirable trait for the individual. As Stracca (2004) notes, "agents may 
draw some emotional gains from the perception of being smarter than others" (p.383), 
while they may "find a poor self-image painful" (Bénabou & Tirole, 2002:872). 
Yet there are also reasons to believe that overconfidence has endogenous roots. It was 
mentioned before that overconfidence may be the result of certain cognitive biases. 
Griffin & Tversky (1992) argue that the human mind tends to focus more on the 
strength of a signal than on its weight (p.413). The confirmatory bias leads people to 
only consider information that supports their preconceptions, discarding contradictory 
evidence (Rabin & Schrag, 1999), and may hence be further conducive to 
overconfidence. In addition, Langer (1975) observes that experimental subjects behave 
in a decision task where the outcome largely depended on luck as if they could control 
it, and terms this bias ‘illusion of control’. People apparently consider the factors they 
can control in a given situation much more than those beyond their control, which 
leads them to be overly confident about the situation and its outcome. Ellen Langer 
(1975:323) reports a positive relationship between illusion of control and confidence 
levels. Similarly, Weinstein (1980) proposes that overconfidence is more likely if 
someone feels he is ‘in control’. Further support on the notion of overconfidence being 
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endogenous comes from Klaczynski & Fauth’s (1996) finding that overconfidence 
increases in individual intelligence. Other research also seems to suggest that 
confidence14 is related to gender, with men being more confident, and certain 
psychometric personality traits (Furnham, Moutafi, & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2005). 
People may thus be assumed to have different individual levels of overconfidence. 
This assumption is further supported by research on individual differences (e.g. Pallier, 
Wilkinson et al., 2002). 
In conclusion, it may thus be stated that overconfidence is a well-established 
psychological phenomenon. It has been found to affect decisions that are similar in 
nature to those of the capital investment decision process, and considerable work has 
been conducted on how individual overconfidence may present itself. Given the 
presented evidence, it thus appears justified to consider the role of overconfidence in a 
financial and investment decision context. 
Regret aversion 
Prior to turning to regret aversion, it is helpful to note some properties of regret itself. 
A good and frequently cited definition of regret is the following:  
"Regret is a more or less painful cognitive and emotional state of feeling sorry for 
misfortunes, limitations, losses, transgressions, shortcomings or mistakes."  
(Landman, 1993:36). 
Primarily, regret is thus an emotion, and additionally a negative one. A typology of 
emotions can be found in Elster (1998). Following Elster's categorization of emotions, 
regret is a counter-factual emotion as it is “generated by thoughts about what might 
have happened but didn’t” (p.48). People thus compare, after a decision was made, the 
resulting outcome with an alternative that might have been obtained had they taken a 
different course of action. As Loomes & Sugden, who proposed a theory of regret 
simultaneously with Bell (1982), summarized later: 
"The central intuition behind regret theory is that the utility derived from the 
consequence of a choice is dependent upon the outcome(s) of the alternative(s) 
foregone, given the state of the world that occurs." (Loomes et al., 1992:18). 
                                                 
14 Confidence measured as the accuracy of self-estimated intelligence. 
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Hence, regret arises from the ex-post comparison of two different outcomes – the one 
realized and the best one foregone. If the outcome obtained is less than what could 
been achieved under an alternative strategy, there will be regret. An interesting 
observation many people may have made regarding their own feelings is that one can 
even regret a decision that seemed optimal at the time. Although we remind ourselves 
that action 'x' was optimal at a particular moment, given the information we had then, 
the fact that we know now that action 'y' would have been better bothers us 
emotionally. Regret may be felt even though we know we did the best we could, 
because retrospectively, people tend to underestimate the uncertainty that prevailed at 
the time of the decision making (hindsight bias; Fischhoff, 1975).  
As a negative emotion, regret hurts. It is painful for us “when we find, too late, that a 
different choice would have led to a better outcome” (Statman, 2001:9). Most people 
seek to avoid this emotional pain because it represents a disutility. Consequently, 
human beings have a “desire to avoid post-decision regret” (Bell, 1982:979). The 
interesting implication of this is not only that we are able to feel regret (unlike the 
homo œconomicus), but that our brain is capable and regularly engaged in the forming 
of forecasts of potential pain of regrets we might have later. Moreover, already this 
expectation can affect our behaviour. Research in cognitive psychology confirmed that 
human behaviour is influenced by the anticipation of potential regret associated with a 
decision or course of action (Loomes et al., 1982; Bell, 1982). Aversion to regret is 
particularly great when the individual is directly held accountable for the decision, 
when stakes are high, and for decisions under uncertainty (Isen, 2000). If the outcome 
of different decision alternatives is uncertain, there can be no strategy that does not 
potentially lead to feelings of regret. Under uncertainty, regret-averse decision makers 
estimate the potential ex-post regret associated with each possible choice option and 
consider the expected15 disutilities in their decisions. Of course, this leaves the 
question of what precise behavioural effect the aversion to anticipated regret may have. 
In the simplest of choice situations, an individual can always choose between ‘yes’ or 
‘no’, that is, between ‘action’ (commission) or ‘inaction’ (omission). In order to 
predict which of the two alternatives is favoured by regret aversion, one must know 
whether the regret people have felt in the past is on average greater for ‘actions’ or for 
                                                 
15 An interesting question in this context is whether such expectations of future emotions are accurate 
(Loewenstein, O'Donoghue, & Rabin, 2003). 
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‘inactions’. Gilovich & Medvec (1995) discover a temporal pattern to how regret is 
felt. They suggest that in the long run, regret appears to be greater for inactions 
(Gilovich et al., 1995:391). This is to some extent supported by the findings from 
Feldman, Miyamoto, & Loftus (1999). Their results indicate that over his lifetime, an 
individual more often regrets inactions than actions.  Contrarily, in the short term, 
people seem to regret more having done something they wish they had not done 
(Gilovich et al., 1995:392). Such a pattern would mean that regret aversion leads to 
inaction when the evaluative horizon for an individual’s behaviour is more oriented 
toward the short term. On the other hand, when an individual’s decisions are made 
with a view to the long run, regret aversion might result in a tendency to more action. 
Early empirical research on regret aversion is conducted by Loomes et al. (1992), who 
test experimentally certain violations of rational choice predicted by regret theory. 
However, their findings are somewhat inconclusive: Despite observing violations of 
the monotonicity principle, the predicted violation of equivalence cannot be supported 
by their data (Loomes et al., 1992:29). Experiments that are more recent provide 
stronger evidence to support the notion that individuals will behave in a regret-averse 
fashion. Zeelenberg, Beattie et al. (1996) show that regret aversion can lead to risk-
seeking as well as risk-averse behaviour in risky choice problems. In a follow-up 
article, Zeelenberg & Beattie (1997) employ an ultimatum game design for their 
experiment to study the effect of regret aversion under uncertainty. These more recent 
results thus deliver further support for the existence and impact of regret aversion:  
"People are motivated to avoid or minimize post-decisional regret. This motivation 
exerts impact on their decisions, because the probability of future regret is anticipated 
and taken into account when making decisions" (Zeelenberg et al., 1997:76). 
1.3 Summary 
In this chapter, I presented the relevant theoretical underpinnings for my analysis of 
the role of overconfidence and regret aversion as biases to managerial capital 
investment decision making. In a first step, central elements of rational choice theory 
were revisited in order to portray the traditional view of economic decision behaviour. 
The normative status of rational choice theory is the foundation of the normative status 
claimed by modern finance theory. Given my definition of the capital investment 
decision process as consisting of project selection, managerial effort, and project 
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evaluation (continuation or abandonment of an ongoing investment), optimal decision 
behaviour as recommended by modern finance theory was outlined. 
In the second part of this chapter, a contrasting and descriptively more accurate view 
of human decision making under uncertainty was introduced. Under this paradigm, 
decisions are not fully rational and are affected frequently and systematically by 
psychological biases. In particular, the two phenomena studied in the present research, 
overconfidence and aversion to regret were shown to be well established and 
theoretically relevant to the context of capital investment decisions. Furthermore, key 
findings from Psychology on overconfidence and regret aversion were described, and 
shall serve as foundations for the remainder of the present research. Naturally, this 
presentation does not do full justice to what has been discovered in Psychology on the 
topic of overconfidence and regret aversion, yet it is argued that the gained insights are 
solid and detailed enough to serve as a theoretical basis for the further study of the 
effects of these two phenomena.  
In terms of a simplified synopsis, overconfident individuals have an overly positive 
opinion of themselves, whilst regret aversion is the tendency to make choices so as to 
minimize potential future regret. To some extent, thus, both biases may be related by 
effectively protecting an individual’s emotional well being. For this reason, in addition 
to the identified pervasiveness of overconfidence and regret aversion, it is thus also 
plausible to focus on specifically these two biases. Moreover, since both seem to be 
particularly relevant to decisions under uncertainty it seems reasonable to suggest that 
they should also matter in managerial capital investment decisions. The argument that 
an investigation into the role of overconfidence and regret aversion in these decisions 
is justified is further supported by existing research in behavioural finance that has 
considered both biases in different decision tasks. This literature is reviewed in the 
next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2: BEHAVIOURAL FINANCE 
In view of the strong evidence of psychological factors affecting decision behaviour, it 
is unsurprising that other researchers have linked these phenomena to financial 
decision making in the past. The resulting accrued body of theory is grouped under the 
label Behavioural Finance owing to its focus on explaining actual behaviour in contrast 
to the standard normative theory that prescribes optimal behaviour. Given its 
orientation, my research seeks to add to this literature. The literature review in this 
chapter thus has a number of purposes. Its primary function is to offer an overview of 
the existing work in the field of Behavioural Finance, in order to delineate my research 
from and show its contribution to the existing body of research. The theories and 
findings presented in the following were also the initial point and a source of 
inspiration for my theoretical model and the ensuing empirical work reported in later 
chapters, and are therefore important in justifying my research topic and demonstrating 
its relevance. The chapter continues as follows. I begin by introducing the field of 
Behavioural Finance in general. The remainder of the chapter then has two main parts. 
Part one is dedicated to the application of overconfidence to financial decisions; whilst 
part two reviews treatments of regret aversion in financial decisions.  
2.1 What is behavioural finance? 
Research in Finance that relaxes the assumption of full rationality by integrating 
findings from the study of human psychology is referred to as Behavioural Finance. 
Behavioural Finance is thus a descriptive theory of how financial decisions are made, 
as opposed to standard (modern) Finance that offers theories on how decisions should 
be made. The common theme of research in behavioural finance is that decisions under 
risk and uncertainty are in reality affected by factors from human psychology16, and 
that consequently, behaviour may deviate from the patterns prescribed under the 
rationality paradigm of traditional finance. Early research in behavioural finance was 
triggered by the work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, and by anomalies in 
                                                 
16 John Maynard Keynes already conjectured that decisions under uncertainty contain at best a small 
element of rationality, and are instead driven by non-rational ‘passions’ (Marchionatti, 1999:414ff). 
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financial markets. Persistent mispricings such as the ‘twin shares’ phenomenon17 
(Barberis et al., 2002:1061) were taken as evidence that arbitrage was not perfect and 
that a case for the existence and pervasiveness of biased behaviour could be made. 
Other anomalies that set off Behavioural Finance research are the equity premium 
puzzle (Mehra & Prescott, 1985), the high volatility in stock markets (Shiller, 1981) 
and the predictability of stock returns (Fama & French, 1988). Early research in 
Behavioural Finance thus attempted to provide frameworks that could explain such 
observations outside the rational choice paradigm. 
Yet by challenging this assumption ground of standard Finance, researchers faced 
strong criticism. Perhaps most famous is the article by Eugene Fama (1998) who 
reviews contributions that put forward cognitive explanations of the over- or under-
reaction of financial markets to new information, such as Daniel, Hirshleifer, & 
Subrahmanyam (1998) who explain overreaction through investor overconfidence. 
Fama (1998) defends the theory of efficient markets (rational market participants) by 
criticizing these behavioural studies on three accounts. First, the fact that both over- 
and under-reaction have been found – but no unified explanation for this – should be 
interpreted as indicative of an overall efficient market where deviations average out 
(Fama, 1998:287). Further, Fama (1998:288) claims that most of the anomalies 
investigated by Behavioural Finance are artefacts and the results of a flawed 
methodology18. A final main point of criticism is then that behavioural models are only 
useful in explaining the particular event they were developed to explain but have no 
wider relevance as they fail to explain "the big picture" (Fama, 1998:291). In a similar 
spirit, Merton H. Miller, co-author of the classic Modigliani & Miller (1958) article on 
capital structure irrelevance, feels the need to warn that research into the "stories" 
behind some decisions may be a waste of time and resources (Miller, 1986:467)19. 
According to Keren (1996:169), this perhaps surprising degree of tension between 
traditional and behavioural finance theorists can be explained by the interrelation or 
                                                 
17 Ever since Royal Dutch and Shell Transport merged in 1907, the stocks of their independently quoted 
entities should be priced in a ratio of 60:40 (as they represent shares in one company only). However, 
from 1981 onwards, the two prices departed substantially over several years from this ratio (Froot & 
Dabora, 1999). 
18 Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinboelting (1991) and Erev, Wallsten, & Budescu (1994) also argue that a 
flawed methodology is the reason for findings of overconfidence. 
19 See Statman (2005:32). 
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entanglement of descriptive and normative. Arguing that over- and under-reaction can 
be explained within the efficient market model through random chance (Fama, 
1998:287) is indicative of the belief “that the normative presents not only the ought but 
also the is” (Keren, 1996:169). De Bondt et al. (1995) jokingly stylize the problem of 
Finance theory's “presumed dual purpose” (p.387) in the following quote: "Finance 
consists of theories for which there is no evidence and empirical facts for which there 
is no theory" (De Bondt et al., 1995:386). The authors emphasize the importance of a 
clear distinction between the normative role of traditional finance theory, and the 
descriptive models of Behavioural Finance. Moreover, reducing behavioural biases 
such as overconfidence to statistical errors or methodological problems is not doing 
justice to the overwhelming and varied evidence: 
"…it is evident that overconfidence is not eliminated by random selection of items, it 
does not disappear in estimates of relative frequency, and it cannot be treated merely 
as a regression artefact" (Brenner et al., 1996:218). 
In an outlook on the development of economic theory, Richard Thaler20 (2000:140) 
predicts that the fictional character impersonating all of the features of a fully rational 
decision maker, the 'homo œconomicus', will evolve to become the 'homo sapiens'. 
What he thus suggests is that the decision-behaviour assumptions used in future 
economic models will progress to become more descriptively accurate of actual human 
behaviour: 
"My prediction is that in future seminars, presenters will have to explain why they are 
using a model with only rational agents (unless the paper is on the history of economic 
thought)" (Thaler, 2000:136). 
For some, however, the departure from the traditional finance paradigm made by 
researchers in behavioural finance is not radical enough. Frankfurter & McGoun 
(2002) lament a "fatal attraction" (p.385) of the field to elements of the rational choice 
paradigm: Behavioural models often still assume the existence and optimality of 
rational behaviour as a benchmark. Nevertheless, since a lot of financial theory, which 
is built on the assumption of rationality, is at least normatively appealing and widely 
                                                 
20 Richard Thaler is Professor of Behavioral Science and Economics at the University of Chicago and 
Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) of the United States of 
America. 
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used in practice, traditional models do provide a useful benchmark. In addition, 
Frankfurter et al. recognize the practical difficulties associated with conducting 
revolutionary research:  
"Finance itself is burdened with its large investment in the old paradigm, and no one, 
young or old can get out from under it. [...] How does one write a Ph.D. dissertation in 
finance without a committee knowledgeable in and supportive of behavioral finance?" 
(Frankfurter et al., 2002:387)  
In the meantime, as is certainly the hope of the present author, opinions may have 
evolved a little. There are signs that even traditionalists acknowledge that Behavioural 
Finance “has passed the critical level of acceptance for some time now” (van der Sar, 
2004:441). For instance, the recognition given to leading-edge research in game 
theory, that enriches traditional strategic decision problems by incorporating arguably 
‘soft’ factors such as ‘fairness’ or ‘reciprocity’ (Anderhub, Gaechter, & Koenigstein, 
2002; Camerer, 1997; Fairchild, 2002) indicates that insights into how human beings 
actually behave is becoming more widely accepted. In 1999, Richard Thaler even 
proclaimed the “end of behavioural finance”, in the sense that it has ceased to be a 
discipline of controversy and is in the process of merging with mainstream finance: 
 “…in the not-too-distant future, the term ‘behavioral finance’ will be correctly viewed 
as a redundant phrase. What other kind of finance is there?” (Thaler, 1999:16).  
This process also may be reflective of Nobel Prize laureate21 George Akerlof’s (2002) 
vision of the future of economic theory. Akerlof calls for a renewed appreciation of 
elements of Keynes’ (1936) ‘General Theory’, such as the incorporation of 
psychological biases as more realistic model assumptions (Akerlof, 2002:411). As this 
comment also shows, assuming decision makers to be somewhat less than fully 
rational is not entirely new, even if the psychological findings nowadays are more 
advanced than they were in the days of Keynes. In fact, rather the opposite is true: 
Statman (2005) reminds us that it is the assumption of rational decision makers that is 
only rather recent. Contrasting rational with normal agents, where the latter are 
affected by cognitive biases and emotions (p.34), he argues that  
                                                 
21 George Akerlof received the Nobel Prize for Economic Science in 2001 for his analysis of markets 
with asymmetric information. 
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“…investors were normal before Miller and Modigliani described them as rational [in 
the early 1960s], and they remain normal today.” (Statman, 2005:33) 
In summary, Behavioural Finance is thus new literature on an old dispute. While 
traditional theory assumes economic agents to be fully rational, Behavioural Finance 
assumes them to be normal in the sense that they are subject to typical human decision 
biases that were demonstrated for a wide range of individuals in general. This dialectic 
can, however, be resolved if a clear distinction between traditional normative and 
descriptive behavioural research is made. In the remainder of the chapter, this review 
focuses on descriptive research relating to the phenomena of overconfidence and regret 
aversion respectively.  
2.2 Overconfidence in financial decisions 
Financial research that incorporates overconfidence is for the purpose of clarity 
structured here according to whether it relates to an asset market or a corporate finance 
context. Even though such domain related dissimilarities mean that models cannot 
simply be transposed to the other context, there are many ideas and insights relating to 
the modelling and the effects of overconfidence that are useful input at a general level. 
In addition, as the integration of overconfidence into finance research has largely been 
advanced in the past with respect to stock market investors, it is appropriate that this 
review should include both streams of the literature. 
2.2.1 Overconfidence in financial markets 
The literature on the role of overconfidence in financial markets can be further 
differentiated by its fundamental orientation. One strand of the literature considers the 
effects of overconfidence, while another deals with the question of whether and why 
overconfidence may survive in the market. In addition, there is empirical work to 
demonstrate the existence of overconfidence among market participants. 
The fundamental proposition that financial analysts and traders may be overconfident 
is sustained empirically by Tyszka & Piotr (2002) and Fenton-O'Creevy, Nicholson et 
al. (2003). Tyszka et al. (2002) compare the forecasting behaviour of financial analysts 
to that of meteorologists for future events in their respective domains of expertise; the 
authors conclude that financial analysts are much more strongly overconfident. In 
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another recent investigation, Fenton-O’Creevy et al. (2003) investigate the illusion of 
control, which is closely linked to, and may thus be used as a proxy for, 
overconfidence. The responses of 107 traders from different banks in the City of 
London to a computerized test show that many of these professionals are subject to this 
cognitive bias, although with noticeable individual differences (Fenton-O’Creevy et 
al., 2003:62).  
Trader overconfidence has been used by several researchers as a potential explanation 
of different market anomalies. For example, Daniel et al. (1998) develop a theory that 
can explain stock price momentum22 and long-run reversals (p.1866). Overconfident 
investors overestimate their ability to obtain or analyse important (private) information 
(p.1841), thus believing they know more or better than the other market participants 
do. Daniel et al. (1998) model overconfidence dynamically in the sense that an 
individual’s confidence is influenced over time by whether his private beliefs 
eventually turn out to be correct or wrong (p.1856), and show how this may lead to the 
observed security price patterns. Odean (1998b), who analyzes the effects of 
overconfidence in differently efficient markets, predicts over- and under-reaction as 
well as higher trading volume for excessively confident investors. Clearly, both 
predictions have been observed in financial markets, yet there is always the question to 
what extent anomalies like instances of high volatility can really be attributed to 
overconfidence.  
In view of the necessity to establish such a causal link, further empirical research to 
this has been reported. Empirical support for the proposition that overconfidence may 
lead to excessive trading is offered for instance by Glaser & Weber (2003); in their 
survey of 215 investors, Glaser et al. (2003) find that those individuals who consider 
themselves to have above average ability also trade more (p.35). In addition, Barber & 
Odean (2001) analyse trading account data on 35,000 households. Following findings 
on gender-specific differences of overconfidence in financial decision tasks, which 
predict that men are generally more overconfident, Barber et al. (2000:266) split their 
sample into men and women. The statistical analysis shows that men trade on average 
significantly more than women do, a finding that is interpreted as supporting the 
hypothesis that overconfidence leads to active stock dealing.  
                                                 
22 Positively or negatively serially correlated stock price returns. 
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One question that necessarily arises from these studies is how the effects of 
overconfidence are to be evaluated. A priori, one is inclined to view any deviation 
from rational choice as sub-optimal and be driven to suggest ways in which stock 
investors can overcome overconfidence. Overconfidence is detrimental for the 
individual trader in many contributions. In Barber et al. (2001), men, who are generally 
more overconfident than women, trade more but achieve lower returns. In an earlier 
article, Barber & Odean (2000) analyse a data set consisting of trading information of 
more than 60,000 households obtained from a large US brokerage house. Households 
that trade more often experienced on average a lower net annual return on their 
portfolios; just holding the stocks would have been better (p.786). So why do 
households not just buy and hold? Barber et al. (2000) propose that the overconfidence 
hypothesis may partly explain this behaviour (p.794). Similarly, Biais, Hilton et al. 
(2002) obtain results that are supportive of hypotheses that overconfident investors are 
less successful. Based on the data of 184 experimental subjects who participated in a 
trading simulation, Biais et al. (2002) find a relationship between participants’ 
measured overconfidence and losses (p.16). Faced with these hypotheses, and in a 
spirit of helping, Baker & Nofsinger (2002:112) even suggest ways for investors to 
overcome psychological biases. 
However, as many critics of Behavioural Finance would also point out, if 
overconfidence were indeed to affect investing in a way that tends to result in a bad 
performance, one might expect overconfident traders to be driven out of the market by 
rational investors and by the forces of arbitrage. This very argument, namely that 
overconfident market participants will be eliminated by the market forces, is addressed 
by Kyle & Wang (1997). The authors propose a model where one stock market trader 
may have a biased belief regarding the precision of his expectations. Upon receiving a 
good signal, the overconfident trader will buy more than a rational agent. Due to this 
difference in the holding quantity of an asset, overconfident traders may outperform 
rational colleagues, and may hence survive in the market (Kyle et al., 1997:2086). The 
persistence of overconfident traders is furthermore endorsed by DeLong, Shleifer et al. 
(1990) who, following a very similar line of argument, suggest a model in which 
overconfident traders can have higher expected returns because they tend to hold more 
of the risky asset. Greater risk taking is also the reason why overconfidence might 
persist according to Hirshleifer & Luo (2001), Wang (2001), as well as Daniel, 
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Hirshleifer, & Subrahmanyam’s (2001) model where arbitrageurs are assumed to be 
risk-averse (p.3). 
Under this logic, overconfident traders who survived for some time must necessarily 
have been rather successful. This past success can then in the sense of a vicious circle 
ensure that overconfidence will survive for even longer: As Gervais & Odean (2001) 
propose, overconfident and successful traders have accumulated enough wealth to be 
relatively safe from being driven out of the market quickly so that overconfidence can 
survive (p.20). This dynamic model by Gervais et al. (2001) is interesting because it 
not only assumes that successful traders may become overconfident when they 
underestimate the role of luck and give all credit for their own success to themselves, 
but also because it suggests that despite these causes for overconfidence, the bias may 
still be gradually eroded over time with increasing experience (p.11). However, by way 
of contrast, experimental evidence reported by Kirchler & Maciejovsky (2001) 
suggests that overconfidence may also increase with trading experience for quite some 
time. 
The overall perspective on overconfidence in financial markets is thus that it may lead 
to excessive trading and volatility, and predictable stock price patterns, and may be 
generally detrimental to performance. The empirical evidence collected so far suggests 
that over- and under-reaction as well as excessive stock dealing is value destroying, as 
for example overconfident individuals lose out by trying to ‘beat the market’, and 
several models have been proposed to explain this. However, the argument of whether 
and why overconfidence may exist in financial markets quickly leads into a discussion 
about the limits to arbitrage, and the question whether financial markets are efficient or 
not; a discussion that is not immediately relevant to the proposed research, though.  
For even if overconfidence is eventually eliminated in financial markets, on place 
where it may well endure quite some time is at the level of a corporate manager. There 
are several reasons to assume that individual managers are able to be overconfident 
without being eroded quickly (Heaton, 2002: 34). The following section reviews the 
literature in Behavioural Corporate Finance that incorporates investor overconfidence. 
2.2.2 Corporate finance decisions with overconfidence 
There are two approaches to studying the effect of non-rational behaviour on corporate 
finance decisions. The first approach assumes that it is investors who are biased, with 
managers being rational but having to cater to investor demands (Baker & Wurgler, 
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2002). Seemingly anomalous investment decisions are thus explained as (rational) 
responses to imperfect markets. Empirical support to the notion that stock market 
mispricings influence corporate investment decisions is provided for instance in 
Gilchrist & Himmelberg (2002). Models of how managers should react to share equity 
mispricings are offered by Blanchard, Rhee, & Summers (1993) and Stein (1996). As 
an example, in Stein’s (1996) model, stock market investors make errors in forecasting 
the returns of individual stocks so that a company’s shares may be over- or 
undervalued (p.432). Stein (1996) seeks to determine how an appropriate discount rate 
can be established in such a context, given different managerial time horizons (p.433). 
A drawback of this approach, however, is that even though it relates to corporate 
finance decisions, it assumes again inefficient stock markets rather than only biased 
managers. As a consequence, as interesting as this first approach in behavioural 
corporate finance theory may be, it is not directly relevant to the present research and 
shall thus not be discussed further. 
Closest to the present research is therefore the strand of corporate Behavioural Finance 
literature in which the individual manager is assumed to suffer from psychological 
biases. As far as managerial overconfidence is concerned,  perhaps the earliest 
contribution in this field is Roll’s (1983) ‘hubris hypothesis’. Hubris23 can be 
interpreted as another term for overconfidence. Roll analyses the case of take-over 
bids, and in particular the observation that the bidding price in such transactions 
typically contains a premium to the target company’s market value. Managers who 
believe that the market is wrong and that they know better how much the target is 
worth are hypothesized to be overconfident by Roll (1983:200). A similar line of 
argument can also be found in Duhaime & Schwenk (1985) who discuss the role of the 
illusion of control in a mergers and acquisitions (M&A) context. An attempt to 
investigate the role of managerial beliefs for corporate acquisitions is undertaken by 
Boehmer & Netter (1997). The authors use managers’ trading in their own stocks as a 
proxy for optimism and investigate if there are changes in this around acquisitions. 
Boehmer et al., 1997:694). The fact that they fail to make out any significant effects 
may (p.703), however, also be attributable to external factors such as legal restrictions 
on insider trading, a concern that the authors briefly attend to themselves (Boehmer et 
al., 1997:695). 
                                                 
23 The Greek term hubris translates as arrogant pride or presumption according to the Oxford Dictionary. 
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The role of overconfidence has also been studied in the area of capital structure 
decisions (Hackbarth, 2002; Fairchild, 2005), and the paper by Heaton (2002) also 
makes some predictions for a preference order of financing instruments when a 
manager is overconfident in the sense that he thinks the market is not correctly 
appreciating his company’s value. Given the focus of my research, however, of the 
greatest relevance here is the literature that studies the role of overconfidence in a 
capital investment decision context. The emphasis is thus placed on these 
contributions. Following the identified structure of the capital investment decision 
process as consisting of three essential steps, project selection, managerial effort and 
project evaluation, the review of this core body of knowledge maintains this structure.  
Investment project selection 
The first step of the capital investment decision process is defined as relating to the 
decision problem of whether to accept or reject a given investment. This decision 
ought to be made rationally, based on the expected net present value of the investment. 
Due to the uncertainty of future cash flows, a key challenge of the project selection 
decision is formulating forecasts. Subjective forecasts depend on managerial 
expectations. However, overconfidence may bias these expectations about the future 
by making a task seem more controllable than it is and by marginalising any potential 
noise or error component, and these effects are also seized upon by articles on the role 
of overconfidence in project selection. For instance, in Heaton’s (2002) model, 
overconfident managers “systematically attach too much probability to good outcomes 
and, correspondingly, too little probability to bad outcomes” (p.37). Due to such biased 
forecasts, the expected value of any project will be overstated and thus investments 
that have an objective negative NPV may seem to the overconfident manager to be a 
worthwhile investment. Consequently, in some cases, overconfident managers may 
accept a ‘bad’ investment project (Heaton, 2002:41) crediting it with more upside 
potential than is warranted for by rational expectations. 
Heaton (2002) further proposes that overconfidence may also lead a decision maker to 
turn down an investment with a positive NPV. This situation may occur when there is 
insufficient free cash flow to finance the project internally. Because of his 
overconfidence, the manager feels that the stock market is not giving credit to his 
company’s prospects and that as a consequence the cost of equity is understated 
(Heaton, 2002:38); he will thus assume a cost of equity he believes to be more 
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accurate, which is by definition higher than the actual one (p.38). As a result, an 
investment may appear not to have a positive NPV although it objectively has (p.40). 
The overconfident manager may thus turn down an investment even though it should 
be accepted based on an objective and rational assessment. In Heaton’s (2002) model, 
the effect of overconfidence is thus indeterminate a priori, and depends on the degree 
to which internal financing is available24. Overconfidence may lead managers to 
accept projects with a negative NPV, but also to reject investments that a rational agent 
would accept since they have an objective positive NPV. A testable prediction of the 
model is therefore the proposed relationship between managerial confidence levels and 
the cash flow sensitivity of capital expenditure.  
Precisely this hypothesis is investigated by Malmendier & Tate (2001). Specifically, 
the authors investigate whether overconfidence can explain the cash flow sensitivity of 
capital expenditure that is observable in reality. In order to determine whether a 
manager is overconfident, Malmendier et al. (2001) examine data on managers’ 
personal portfolio strategies. A manager is characterized as overconfident if he 
regularly failed to exercise stock options on the firm’s equity even though they were in 
the money (Malmendier et al., 2001:15) and if he is a habitual (net) buyer of his own 
company’s shares (p.23). The researchers find that capital expenditure is more 
sensitive to cash flow in companies where managers are characterised as 
overconfident. This result is interpreted as supportive of Heaton’s (2002) claim that 
overconfidence does influence investment project selection as a function of the 
availability of internal funding. Malmendier et al. (2001) are among the first to publish 
empirical research on managerial overconfidence in an investment decision context. 
Their work thus represents an important contribution. However, overconfidence is only 
inferred using secondary data in their research, as opposed to being directly observed. 
Another possible limitation is that their data does not allow Malmendier et al. (2001) 
to differentiate between different degrees of overconfidence, reducing it to a binary 
variable. 
While the models by Heaton (2002) and Malmendier et al. (2001) are static, a dynamic 
model of corporate investment decisions incorporating overconfidence is proposed by 
Gervais, Heaton, & Odean (2003). In this three-period model, the manager can either 
                                                 
24 With its emphasis on the role of internal financing, Heaton’s (2002) model can be compared to 
Jensen’s (1986) and Myers & Majluf (1984). 
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accept a project immediately or wait for further information (p.7). New information on 
the project becomes available at the end of each period in the form of a noisy signal. 
Overconfidence is modelled as an overestimation of the precision of this signal 
(underestimation of the noise). Given a good signal, the overconfident manager will 
overestimate the probability of a good outcome and, ultimately, the project’s NPV 
(Gervais et al., 2003:14ff). The challenge for the manager resides in the fact that a 
project may cease to exist during the process, thus creating a cost associated with 
delaying investing to acquire further information. Gervais et al. (2003) contrast the 
behaviour of an overconfident manager in this trade-off against that of an unbiased 
risk-averse agent. They conclude that overconfident managers accept investment 
projects more quickly than their risk-averse counterparts (p.27) do. In addition, similar 
to Heaton (2002), overconfidence may also lead managers to accept investments that 
have an objective negative NPV (Gervais et al., 2003:28). 
Managerial effort 
The second decision step in capital investment decision making was defined as the 
manager's choice of effort. Concerning this optimisation problem, the question arises 
whether overconfidence might lead to a higher or lower equilibrium level of effort. 
Intuitively, one may be inclined to suggest that feeling too sure about success should 
lead to lower effort; just as a pupil who overconfidently believes that he will have no 
problem in the next exam might be tempted to prepare less for it than would be 
optimal. Stone (1994), reporting observations from an experiment where positive 
expectations were induced in an effort level decision, notes that “conditions which 
create complacent self assurance provide few incentives for exerting [high effort]” 
(p.471). Based on Stone’s measure of effort, the subjects with strongly negative 
expectations worked hardest in his experiment (Stone, 1994:465). Consistent with this 
is also a result of research by Cooper, Folta, & Woo (1995), who investigate the extent 
to which entrepreneurs search for information prior to investing in a new venture. The 
authors conduct a survey in which they also measure respondent’s overconfidence 
(Cooper et al., 1995:112). Their analysis of the over 1,000 responses from US 
entrepreneurs leads Cooper et al. to conclude that “those who were more confident 
searched less intensively” (Cooper et al., 1995:117). 
In contrast to these empirical findings, more recent theoretical models predict that 
overconfidence should be associated with greater effort. Richard Fairchild (2004) 
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proposes a simple and perceptive model of managerial effort in the presence of moral 
hazard. The interesting aspect of his model is that overconfidence is interpreted closely 
with the existing literature in psychology as the manager’s exaggerated view of the 
impact of his effort contribution. It is hence through believing that his effort can affect 
the probability of success in an investment project by more than it really does that the 
manager becomes overly optimistic. Fairchild’s (2004) model also considers framing, 
and places the managerial decision in a principal-agent framework, which 
distinguishes between shareholder value and the manager’s pay-off. Regarding 
managerial effort, the prediction of this model is that overconfidence should result in 
greater effort provision (Fairchild, 2004:18). 
This prediction is consistent with other research on managerial effort. In Besharov’s 
(2002) model, the overconfident individual overestimates the value enhancing effect of 
his actions (p.8). Accordingly, the subjectively perceived ratio between the benefit and 
cost of effort is biased, causing an overprovision of effort. Further, the paper by Keiber 
(2002) also connects an agency model (hidden action) with the finding that people are 
overconfident. Different to Fairchild (2004), in Keiber’s model both the agent and the 
principal are overconfident. The manager receives a noisy signal relating to the future 
state of the economy; overconfidence leads the manager to overestimate the quality of 
the signal (Keiber, 2002:6). In negotiating his salary, the overconfident manager will 
more readily accept a contract with a high variable compensation component, given a 
good signal (p.20). In this setting, overconfidence is also predicted to lead to greater 
managerial effort (Keiber, 2002:23). However, the empirical evidence cited by Keiber 
seems to suggest a different, inverse, relationship between overconfidence and effort. 
Investment project evaluation 
The project evaluation decision is the third and final step of the capital investment 
decision process as it is defined for the present research. Surprisingly, given the 
importance of this decision task, the role of overconfidence in the decision whether to 
continue or abandon an investment seems to be largely unexplored as of yet. The only 
corporate finance contribution that the present author is aware of is the theoretical 
analysis by Richard Fairchild (2004). However, in addition to overconfidence, 
Fairchild’s model also features other psychological phenomena, namely framing and 
mental accounting. The model consists of three periods. Following the initial 
investment decision, the investment can turn out at a gain or at a loss. In the case 
Chapter 2: Behavioural Finance 
- 50 - 
where the project failed and is loss making, the manager can decide whether to 
continue or abandon the project; under continuation, the investment could still be 
profitable in the third period, but it could also have a cash flow of zero, whereas 
abandonment will result in a small but positive cash flow (Fairchild, 2004:13). The 
model illustrates that overconfidence may strengthen the tendency of framing and 
mental accounting to lead the manager to over-commit by continue investing in a 
losing project (Fairchild,2004:18). Although this prediction receives some support 
from psychologists Kahneman & Tversky (2000a:477), the body of literature in 
behavioural finance is somewhat deficient on this topic. 
2.3 Regret aversion in the finance literature 
As defined in the preceding chapter, aversion to regret is a psychological phenomenon 
that makes people consider the potential disutility of anticipated regret associated with 
outcomes in their assessment of choice alternatives. At least by some academics in 
Finance, the potential significance of regret aversion has been recognized: 
"Hope and fear might be the strongest emotions that drive […] stock traders, but 
regret is not far behind" (Statman, 2001:9).  
Despite such observations by distinguished scholars, very limited attention has been 
given to regret aversion in the existing Behavioural Finance literature so far. In the 
following, I review the most prominent contributions in this area. 
2.3.1 Regret aversion in financial markets  
One widely recognised application of regret theory to stock investment is the paper by 
Shefrin & Statman (1985). This article investigates the tendency of individuals to hold 
on to assets that are falling in value (p.778). Already Kahneman et al. (1979) had 
observed the unwillingness of individuals to realize (book) losses and termed this 
phenomenon loss aversion, which is also a central feature of their prospect theory. 
Shefrin et al. (1985) propose an advanced theory to explain this well-documented 
puzzle, termed the disposition effect, namely that investors appear to realize gains 
quickly by selling ‘winning’ shares too early, whilst holding on to losing stocks for too 
long (Shefrin et al., 1985:788). The authors conjecture that such behaviour is best 
accounted for by a decision making framework integrating several predispositions of 
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the human mind, including regret aversion: “Aversion to regret provides an important 
reason why investors may have difficulty realizing gains as well as losses” (p.778). 
The authors consider regret to be the chief driver behind the disposition effect: “the 
quest for pride, and the avoidance of regret lead to a disposition to realize gains and 
defer losses” (Shefrin et al., 1985:782). 
Another, more recent contribution that makes theoretical predictions about the effect of 
regret aversion in a financial market setting is the paper by Anna Dodonova (2001). 
She finds that regret aversion in investors may explain the equity premium as well as 
the high volatility of stocks. In her model, excessive volatility is explained as an 
overreaction to good news about a stock. Regret-averse investors try to minimize the 
potential regret of having lost out on a winner by buying even more shares following 
the recent positive development; this higher volatility leads to a higher equity premium 
demanded by the risk-averse investors (p10). Unfortunately, the model by Dodonova 
(2001) is not extended to cover the situation where share prices are falling. Hence, no 
predictions about the effect of regret aversion in the case of prior bad news are made, 
and the model is only of limited applicability to my research. 
2.3.2 Corporate finance decisions with regret aversion 
Fisher & Statman (2003) explore the role of currency hedging for international 
portfolios. For portfolios over the period from 1988-2002, they show that unhedged 
portfolios were characterized by roughly the same risk and return as hedged portfolios 
(p.8). Whilst rationally, agents should thus be fairly indifferent between hedged and 
unhedged portfolios, Fisher et al. (2003) note that in practice this is not the case; in 
fact, investors tend to switch back and forth between the two types of portfolios (p.9).  
The authors propose that this can best be explained through the regret aversion of 
investors:  
“Behavioral investors follow a cycle of hindsight and regret where they conclude, with 
hindsight, that they could have seen with foresight the securities that would make them 
rich, and suffer the pain of regret because they did not” (Fisher et al., 2003:6). 
Most immediately relevant to my research is the article by Statman et al. (1987), in 
which the authors apply regret aversion directly to corporate investment decision 
making. In their analysis, an investment project has failed. Because the decision maker 
cannot ignore the sunk costs of a project, termination would induce feelings of loss and 
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regret; because of mental accounting and framing, the pain of regret is only really felt 
when an investment is terminated and the loss is “admitted as a fact” (Statman et al., 
1987:12). As a consequence, money-losing investments are continued in order to delay 
experiencing the regret (p.14). According to Statman et al., this tendency to continue 
losing investments is greater when the decision maker is personally committed to the 
project. Given a focus that is identical to parts of my research, it is worth outlining the 
ways in which my research is different from and adds to this paper by Statman et al. 
(1987). 
Statman et al. assign a key role to the concept of sunk costs, and also draw on the 
concepts of mental accounting and framing. As a result, their proposed explanation is 
quite complex and does not make entirely clear the role of regret aversion. Moreover, a 
clear definition of regret is missing. Finally, their conclusion that the aversion to regret 
leads to inefficient continuation of an investment seems to assume that an individual 
may expect the pain of regret to be lower if it is realized in the future; again, though, 
no formal illustration of this conjecture is provided. In contrast, my research studies 
regret aversion in capital investment decisions (including the abandonment / 
continuation decision) in isolation to make clear predictions on the effect of this bias 
without drawing on other phenomena. Further, my definition of regret is derived 
directly from the Psychology literature, and I also substantiate my predictions using a 
formal model.  
When looking for empirical data to support the regret aversion hypothesis for late 
project abandonment, the first problem one has to deal with is to find out whether a 
project was abandoned late or on time. Statman & Sepe (1989) tackle this issue by 
looking at stock market price movements following project termination 
announcements. They develop the argument that termination announcements, which 
are good news to shareholders and thus lead to a rise in the share price, are inconsistent 
with the normative abandonment rule, unless a new and better project is announced 
simultaneously (p.2). However, high stock returns following a termination 
announcement can be consistent with the late project abandonment hypothesis (p.2). 
The analysis of their data set shows that “on average, shareholders consider project 
termination announcements good news” (Statman et al., 1989:80). According to 
Statman et al. (1989) this means that shareholders must have realized that managers 
were throwing ‘good money after bad’ and had put a discount on the shares for this; 
with the project terminated, there is an end to the cash drain and hence the share price 
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recovers to some extent. However, whilst the evidence by Statman et al. (1989) 
supports the claim that managers may often continue an investment for too long, it 
does not succeed in linking this observation to regret aversion.  
2.4 Summary 
The aim of the present research is to identify the effect of managerial overconfidence 
and regret aversion on capital investment decisions, and to assess if this effect is 
desirable from a shareholder value point of view or not. To this end, the purpose of this 
chapter was to consider the existing research that has at least addressed some of the 
issues relevant to this research. The reviewed contributions can largely be attributed to 
the field of behavioural finance, the discipline within finance research that seeks to 
integrated findings from psychology about how people make decisions under 
uncertainty. By way of summarizing the literature review, it appears that 
overconfidence may lead to over-investment, greater or lower effort, and investment 
project escalation. Concerning regret aversion, the existing body of literature in 
behavioural finance is even more limited, and essentially, there only seems to be a 
belief that regret aversion may lead managers to abandon losing projects too late. What 
the literature review has shown clearly, however, is that our understanding of the role 
of human psychology in managerial capital investment decisions is deficient in many 
respects, and that the present research, with its aim of contributing to filling this gap in 
knowledge in what is a rather recent but quickly developing area of research is useful 
and necessary. In the next chapter, I address this perceived necessity by proposing a 
theoretical model covering the three identified capital investment decision steps, and 
show how predictions about the effects of managerial overconfidence and regret 
aversion on those decisions can formally be derived 
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CHAPTER 3: MODEL AND PROPOSITIONS 
The central question driving my research is what effect(s) overconfidence and regret 
aversion may have on managerial capital investment decisions, and how this may 
affect shareholder value. Since the existing literature as reviewed in the preceding 
chapter does not respond to this question satisfactorily, I propose a new theoretical 
model integrating the project selection, effort level, and project evaluation decisions. 
The set-up of the model is such that it is possible to integrate overconfidence, regret 
aversion, or both, in a consistent manner into the analysis across all three decision 
problems. Without the biases, the model is used to describe normatively optimal 
(rational) decision behaviour. Including the biases will allow making predictions of 
how an overconfident or regret-averse decision maker would behave. The model thus 
permits contrasting behaviour ‘as it is’ (affected by cognitive biases) with behaviour 
‘how it should be’ (given the optimality of rational decision making). Prior to outlining 
the model in detail, however, some general assumptions I am making here need to be 
mentioned. 
For one, I assume the decision maker to pursue value-maximization, irrespective of 
whether he is assumed to be rational or biased by overconfidence or regret aversion. 
Hence, contrary to models of agency, the manager in my model does not pursue his 
own self-interest but tries his best to take decisions in the best interests of 
shareholders. As a result, any values or costs25 in this model relate to shareholder 
value. However, owing to the effects of overconfidence or regret-aversion, a biased 
manager will not be able to evaluate choice options correctly. As a result of such 
flawed perceptions, despite seeking to maximise value and adhering to the net present 
value rule, decisions with overconfidence or regret aversion may deviate from the 
normatively optimal behaviour. At this point, it is worth highlighting again that the 
studied biases, as well as the resulting behaviour, are assumed to be unintentional. The 
overconfident decision maker is not aware that his forecasts are biased, they appear 
rational to him. To him, the fact that they may deviate from those of others just means 
that the others must be wrong. Similarly, an individual who incurs a strong disutility 
                                                 
25 In particular, I model the cost of effort as a reduction in shareholder value rather than it being internal 
to the manager. This cost represents the opportunity cost of the manager contributing effort to this 
investment instead of another project. 
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from experiencing regret does not expressly reduce the values of outcomes by the 
related anticipated amount of regret; outcomes simply appear to him as being 
objectively that desirable or undesirable. 
Further, as noted in Chapter 2, different possible assumptions about individual risk 
preferences exist. Under the standard rational choice paradigm, individuals are 
assumed to be risk-averse based on the concavity of the utility function. Yet in the 
literature, the decision agent is frequently modelled as being risk-neutral. Risk-
neutrality is also assumed in the model presented in this chapter. Although this 
supposition may be considered as somewhat of a departure from descriptive accuracy, 
I argue that the benefits of this modelling convention outweigh its disadvantages. In 
particular, assuming a risk-neutral decision maker greatly reduces the complexity of 
the analysis. In that respect, models are like maps – they need to be reductions of 
reality in order to be useful. A further benefit from assuming risk-neutrality is that 
expected monetary outcomes are interchangeable with expected utilities. At the same 
time, the assumption of risk-neutrality is not likely to have a material effect on the 
basic direction of the predicted behavioural tendencies. The general behavioural 
tendency of the modelled biases is essentially independent of assumptions about risk 
preferences26. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I present my model of the capital investment 
decision process. I then explain my approach to modelling overconfidence and regret 
aversion. This formal representation is developed based on the reviewed literature in 
psychology and behavioural finance. The third part of the chapter is then dedicated to 
solving the decision choice model by backward induction. There are thus three sections 
in which the effects of allowing the parameters for individual overconfidence, regret 
aversion or both to vary are formally analysed for project selection, managerial effort 
and project evaluation. By varying one bias and holding everything else constant, I can 
make predictions about the effects of overconfidence and regret aversion individually, 
while predictions for the joint effect can be obtained when both the overconfidence and 
the regret aversion parameters are allowed to vary. Based on an analysis of critical 
'turning-points', the impact of these decision biases on observable behaviour is then 
finally proposed. 
                                                 
26 Risk preferences are, however, relevant in the assessment of the desirability of the biases for 
shareholders, but this issue will be discussed later. 
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3.1 A model of the capital investment decision process 
Consistent with the earlier definition of the capital investment decision process, the 
model consists of three consecutive managerial decision stages: Project selection [M1], 
managerial effort choice [M2], and project evaluation [M3]. The sequence of events in 
this model is as follows.  
 
• Period 1: Assume a given investment opportunity has arisen within a company. The 
manager needs to decide whether to accept and invest in the project, or whether to 
reject the proposed investment, based on his appraisal of the investment. The 
investment is rejected if it has a negative NPV [ 0ˆ <V ], and accepted otherwise. If the 
investment is rejected, the game ends and no value has been created or destroyed.  
 
• Period 2: If the investment is undertaken, the manager decides in the second time 
period how much of his energy, time and resources he wants to put into the 
management of the investment project. I assume this effort level [e] to be a continuous 
variable with [ 10 ≤≤ e ]. 
 
• Period 3: At a given milestone in the project, the manager receives information 
about the investment’s performance in the form of a reliable signal [ S ], which can be 
either good or bad. Following a good signal, which occurs with probability [p], the 
investment achieves a positive net present value [ 0, >GG ] and the model ends. This 
probability of success is assumed to depend in part on managerial effort. In contrast, if  
the bad signal was obtained, with probability [ )1( p− ], the investment is assumed to 
be underperforming, having lost more cash than expected. The manager is faced with 
the third decision problem, project evaluation, and has to choose between continuation 
and abandonment of the investment. If the investment is terminated, a negative NPV – 
the termination value [ 0, <LL ] – is realised. In reality, this value may be known (ex-
ante) with certainty, but may also be subject to some uncertainty27. To keep the model 
simple, however, it shall be assumed in the ensuing analysis that the termination value 
is known in advance.  
                                                 
27 Early termination of the investment might require for instance in some cases contractual penalty 
payments, the amount of which may depend on court settlement, so that the abandonment value is à 
priori not certain. 
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• Period 4: If continued, the eventual value of the investment depends on the 
realization of a state of nature [ N ] that is beyond the control of the decision maker, 
such as the price for crude oil. Depending on the output of this chance event, either a 
non-negative (high) or a negative (low) continuation value (with ,GCVh < LCVl < ) 
can be realised with probabilities [q] and [1-q] respectively28. The entire capital 
investment decision process is illustrated by the diagram in Figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1: Capital investment decision model – Decision tree diagram 
 
3.2 Formal representation of overconfidence and regret aversion 
In order to analyse the effects of overconfidence and regret aversion at all three 
decision steps, I propose a formal way of integrating these two biases into the decision 
model in line with the reviewed literature. Both overconfidence and regret aversion are 
built into the model as continuous variables defined over the range [ ]1;0  to allow for 
individual differences in either bias. The way in which the two phenomena are 
represented is consistent throughout the analysis and presented in the following. 
3.2.1 Overconfidence 
Overconfidence was defined as describing the human tendency to overestimate one’s 
knowledge and ability, one’s relative skilfulness, and the quality and reliability of 
one’s own information. Given the different symptoms of overconfidence, there are 
several ways in which this bias may be formally modelled. Where it is analysed in a 
financial markets context, overconfidence is typically interpreted as relating to the 
accuracy of information that frequently is modelled as a noisy signal (e.g. Daniel et al., 
                                                 
28 Note that these probabilities are assumed not to depend on the decision maker’s effort. 
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1998). Due to overconfidence, the individual receiving such information believes it to 
be more reliable than is warranted for and thus under-estimates the signal's variance. 
This approach is adopted for instance by Gervais et al. (2003) and Keiber (2002). As a 
result, the individual tends to over-react to new information (Odean, 1998b). However, 
whereas such an interpretation of overconfidence may be suitable to stock market 
investment, it appears less pertaining to an analysis of corporate capital investment. 
Consequently, my modelling of managerial overconfidence builds on an alternative 
way of accounting for this bias proposed in recent research in behavioural corporate 
finance. 
Two different situations are to be distinguished in this context, depending on whether 
the (uncertain) outcome of a decision can or cannot be influenced by the manager. The 
case where the outcome of the investment can be influenced by the manager (through 
his effort) is assumed in the model by Richard Fairchild (2004). Here, overconfidence 
in his ability makes the manager believe that he has greater control over the chance 
with which an investment will be successful than he actually has. Specifically, 
Fairchild (2004) models the success probability as a function of effort, where 
overconfidence leads to an over-estimation of the extent to which effort can influence 
the probability. As a result, the overconfident manager believes that for a given level 
of effort, success is more likely than it really is. This type of overconfidence, 
overconfidence in ability, is relevant to the first state of nature in my model, where, 
following the effort level decision, the information on the investment's performance 
can be either positive with probability [ p ] or negative with probability [ )1( p− ]. 
It is assumed that this probability is the realisation of an externally given probability 
distribution that is unknown to the decision maker. However, since this probability is 
unknown, it must be estimated ex-ante. In order to describe the benchmark of optimal 
behaviour, I assume that the probability of success is correctly anticipated by the 
manager in the absence of any bias. Hence, the ex-ante unknown (‘true’) probability of 
success is defined through the rational expectations of an unbiased agent of that 
probability such that: 
(Eq-3.4) rationalpp ˆ=    with  ]1;0[∈p  
Following Fairchild (2004), the rationally expected probability of success depends 
partly on managerial effort such that 
(Eq-3.5) ep ⋅= γ    with  [ ]1;0, ∈eγ  
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The effort coefficient [γ ] represents the degree to which the manager can affect the 
probability of success. The coefficient may thus be interpreted as the weight assigned 
to effort as opposed to pure chance in the equation of the success probability. Given 
this definition of [ p ], the manager is able to positively influence the odds with which 
the investment will be successful by working harder (providing greater effort) [e], but 
only to the extent [γ ]. As in the model by Fairchild (2004), I introduce overconfidence 
in this case as a biased perception of the effort coefficient [γ ]. Specifically, 
overconfidence is represented by the coefficient [ a ] with [ ]1;0[∈a ]. The coefficient is 
increasing in individual overconfidence and reaches a maximum for [ 1=a ], whereas a 
value of zero [ 0=a ] indicates the absence of individual overconfidence (well-
calibrated decision maker). With overconfidence in ability, the subjectively expected 
probability of favourable information received in period 3 is thus given by 
(Eq-3.6) ep aoc ⋅= − )1(ˆ γ     
It follows that overconfidence in ability always leads to an overestimation of the 
probability of success such that  
(Eq-3.7) ppoc >ˆ   for all  0>a  
In contrast to the case described so far, there are also situations in which the success 
probability cannot be influenced by the manager. For these types of decisions, the 
realisation of a particular outcome depends entirely on chance and is external to the 
control of the manager (state of nature event). In my model of the capital investment 
decision process, the outcome of continuation of the investment depends on the state of 
nature (period 5). Here, all the decision maker can do is formulating an estimate for the 
probability of the good state occurring. It is assumed again that an objective 
probability for the good state of nature exists and that it is defined by the notion of 
rational expectations akin to (Eq-3.4): 
(Eq-3.8)  rationalqq ˆ=   with  ]1;0[∈q  
Since in this case the state of nature cannot be influence by managerial effort, 
overconfidence in ability does not affect the manager's estimate. However, following 
Heaton (2002) and Gervais et al. (2003), the overconfident manager still holds a 
positively biased view of the chance with which the good state of nature will occur. In 
this situation, the individual's expectations are biased by the unfounded optimism that 
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was identified in the literature review as a central feature of managerial 
overconfidence. This type of overconfidence, referred to here as overconfidence in the 
state of nature or optimistic overconfidence, is modelled as an overestimation of the 
probability of success, when the outcome cannot be controlled, by the coefficient [b ] 
with [ ]1;0[∈b ]: 
(Eq-3.9) )1(ˆ boc qq
−=     
In the absence of overconfidence [ 0=b ], the probability for the good state of nature 
will be correctly estimated; with increasing overconfidence, however, the subjective 
probability estimate will be too optimistic, hence 
(Eq-3.10) qqoc >ˆ   for all  0>b  
In this analysis, and consistent with the literature (e.g. Griffin et al., 1996), I thus 
distinguish between two types of overconfidence, overconfidence in ability and 
overconfidence in the state of nature. Both are modelled similarly and lead to an 
overestimation of the probability with which the investment will achieve the better of 
two possible outcomes. Although treated separately in the model, it should be noted 
that in reality, it is unlikely that one may exist without the other (see earlier discussion 
in Section 1.2.3). What may thus be a somewhat artificial separation benefits the 
analysis in terms of clarity, but will not be upheld in further empirical work where it 
shall simply be assumed that [ ba = ]29.  
3.2.2 Regret aversion 
The second behavioural component in my analysis is aversion to regret. If an 
individual regrets a decision, the satisfaction derived from the associated outcome is 
reduced by the disutility of regret. Regret-averse behaviour consists of anticipating the 
disutility of any potential regret and including this in the evaluation of choice 
alternatives. Regret aversion has so far received much less attention in Behavioural 
Finance than overconfidence, and as a consequence, no specific modelling approaches 
exist to be built on. Therefore, with my modelling efforts entering almost untrodden 
                                                 
29 This equality is a logical conclusion from the understanding that overconfidence in ability and 
optimistic overconfidence are indeed the same as they both represent an individual's degree of 
overconfidence (generally). The distinction between these 'two sides of the same coin' is done merely 
for clarity of the theoretical analysis, akin to Gervais et al. (2003). 
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ground, I revert to the original definitions of regret and regret aversion in Psychology. 
Bell (1982) proposes to measure regret as “the difference in value between the assets 
actually received and the highest level of assets produced by other alternatives” 
(p.963). 
Hence, following Bell, I define anticipated regret as the difference between the 
expected value30 of the chosen option [
iSi
V ,ˆ ] and the highest possible outcome 
expected obtainable with an alternative choice [
iSopt
V ,ˆ ] under the given state of nature 
[ iS ], or 
(Eq-3.11)  SoptSii VVR ,, ˆˆˆ −=  where 0ˆ <iR  since ii SiSopt VV ,, ˆˆ >  
Note that in my models regret will only exist over a negative range of values because 
regret is a disutility. Positive values for [ iRˆ ] would correspond to positive feelings 
such as joy or pride. Since these emotions are excluded from my analysis, I assume 
that there will simply be no regret if the foregone outcome is inferior to the one 
realised, given the state of nature. In my models, anticipated regret thus always reduces 
the expected value of a choice option. The extent to which it does so, however, is 
assumed to be different for different individuals. I assume that people have something 
like an individual propensity to suffer from the negative emotion regret. This regret 
aversion factor is presumed to be stable over time, even though casual observation 
might suggest that in reality this inclination to think about and suffer from what might 
have been may change in the course of a person’s lifetime. A person’s effective 
disutility due to regret aversion [ iΡ ] is thus assumed to depend upon the size of the 
expected regret [ iRˆ ], and the individual’s regret aversion tendency [ r ]: 
(Eq-3.12) ii RrP ˆ⋅=   with [ ]1;0∈r  
In normatively optimal decisions, anticipated regret is irrelevant. This will be modelled 
by not including the disutility of regret in the value function. Alternatively, one might 
also think of the decision maker as the ‘homo œconomicus’ taking the decision, who 
would have a propensity to feel regret of zero [ 0=r ]. Aversion to regret, then, is 
reflected in my model by the regret-averse manager ranking choice alternatives based 
                                                 
30 Since my model assumes risk-neutrality, the notions of utility and monetary value can be used 
interchangeably. 
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on their expected net value contribution including any potential disutility from 
anticipated regret, and hence indicated by [ 0>r ].  
In the remainder of this chapter, the presented model of the capital investment decision 
process is solved by backward induction31. The following analysis is hence structured 
according to the three identified decision steps of project selection, managerial effort, 
and project evaluation – albeit in reverse order, following the logic of backward 
induction. At each stage, the optimal behaviour will be determined first (as a type of 
benchmark) before considering the effect of overconfidence and regret aversion. 
3.3 Solving the model 
In this section, I solve the capital investment decision model proposed earlier. The 
model is solved by backward induction: This means that for a given investment, I first 
consider the evaluation decision problem (continuation or abandonment) assuming that 
the investment was accepted, effort was exerted, and the negative signal was received. 
The analysis then moves to the effort decision and solves for the subjectively perceived 
optimal level of effort given the decision at the evaluation stage. Finally, given the 
evaluation decision and the effort level, I analyse the project selection decision. For all 
three decision steps, the optimal decision behaviour is determined by assigning neutral 
values to the parameters for overconfidence and regret aversion [ 0;0, == rba ]. By 
allowing one of the coefficients to differ from zero, I make predictions for the 
individual and combined effects of managerial overconfidence and regret aversion. 
3.3.1 The project evaluation decision 
The project evaluation decision constitutes the third and ultimate step of the 
investment decision process. Project evaluation describes the choice problem a 
manager faces when reviewing a given ongoing investment project. Following 
negative feedback on the performance of the investment, meaning that the project is 
underperforming, the manager may either terminate the investment, resulting in a 
termination value [L], or continue it. If continued, the outcome of the investment 
                                                 
31 Even though backward induction is typically used in games with several strategic players, it is also 
plausible to assume that a single decision maker will make choices with consideration of potential 
outcomes. 
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depends on the realisation of an external binary variable. With probability [q], the NPV 
of the investment under continuation will be small but non-negative 
[ hCV with 0≥hCV ], or negative [ lCV with 0<lCV  and lCVL > ] with probability 
[(1-q)]. Figure 3.2 shows the relevant section of the decision tree (Figure 3.1). 
 
Figure 3.2: Project evaluation decision problem 
 
 
Overconfidence and regret aversion are integrated into this decision problem following 
the general modelling definitions of these two psychological biases that were outlined 
in the preceding section. Overconfidence leads the manager to make estimates of the 
probability of the good state of nature with which a value of [ hCV ] is achievable that 
are biased by the degree of his overconfidence in the state of nature, optimistic 
overconfidence, denoted by [b ]. Following the general definition of regret (Eq-3.11), 
regret in the project evaluation decision depends on whether it is expected (ex-ante) 
that the outcome of the alternative choice option will be observable ex-post. It is 
evident that the model thus will lead to different predictions regarding the effect of 
regret aversion depending on which assumption regarding ex-post outcome 
observability is made. Theoretically, it is possible to distinguish between four different 
cases regarding expected outcome observability: 
• Only the outcome of the chosen strategy will be known, so that the outcome of the 
alternative choice option will definitely not be observable (no observability): In the 
absence of counterfactual information, there should be no regret anticipated for either 
choice option. This case is thus effectively identical to assuming a decision maker 
who does not feel regret at all.   
• Whichever strategy is chosen, both outcomes (continuation and abandonment) will 
be observable to the manager ex-post (total outcome observability): Interestingly, for 
this case, the effects of regret aversion associated with either choice option exactly 
offset and cancel out in my model (see Appendix A). 
M3 
 N 
q 
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• If continued, the abandonment value will not be observable, whilst the continuation 
value will be observable even if the investment is abandoned (type 1 partial outcome 
observability): For example, this situation may occur when the outcome of 
continuing the investment depends on an external and observable variable such as the 
price of crude oil, whilst at the same time, the abandonment value depends on a 
number of factors that can only be ascertained if the project were indeed terminated. 
• The value of the investment if abandoned is certain and will be known even if the 
investment is continued, whilst the continuation value is uncertain and will not be 
known if the investment is abandoned (type 2 partial outcome observability): This is 
the case where the scrap value of an investment is known, and will be known even if 
the investment is continued, but where the continuation value would not be 
observable ex-post subsequent to termination of the investment.  
 
As the decision tree diagram in Figure 3.2 shows, the formal analysis here will be 
limited32 to the second type of partial observability. 
   
The manager will hence feel regret if he chose to continue the investment but only 
obtains [ lCV ] since he would have been better off had he abandoned the investment 
[ lCVL > ]. Consistent with the definition provided in the preceding section (Eq-3.11), 
the amount of regret in this case – having continued when abandonment would have 
been better – is given by 
(Eq-3.13) LCVR lct −=   with [ 0<ctR ]. 
Assuming a risk-neutral decision maker, the investment's expected continuation value 
(general form) is 
(Eq-3.14) )()1( )1()1( ctl
b
h
b rRCVqCVqCV +⋅−+= −− . 
                                                 
32 Focussing on this particular case limits the complexity of the model. Moreover, of the different 
assumptions on outcome observability, this seems to be the most reasonable one with respect to the 
problem of knowing the outcome of a foregone choice option: Ignoring the possibility of alternative 
investment opportunities that might be taken up following abandonment, the cash flow a discontinued 
activity is arguably at least less uncertain than that for continuation, so that assuming type 2 partial 
outcome observability for this analysis would appear to be plausible.  
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Note that in this equation an asymmetry with a bias towards the good outcome 
emerges. However, this is intentional and induced by the specific modelling of 
optimistic overconfidence as an unjustified upward bias in probability estimates (in 
contrast to overconfidence in ability), which is consistent with the phenomenon of 
overconfidence as outlined previously in the review of the literature.  
 
o For an unbiased decision maker, the bias parameters take neutral values 
[ 0;0 == rb ] to yield the unbiased continuation value [ uCV ]: 
(Eq-3.15) lhu CVqqCVCV )1( −+= . 
Because of the assumption of type 2 partial outcome observability, the termination 
value of the investment is known with certainty and unaffected by the cognitive biases. 
Consequently, as demonstrated in the chapter on optimal investment decision making, 
shareholder value maximization requires an investment to be abandoned if the value 
expected for continuation is less than what would be achievable with termination. 
(Cond-3.1) uCVL > . 
The optimality of this decision rule is based on [ uCV ] representing the rationally 
expected continuation value.  
 
o The overconfident manager believes that achieving the high continuation value 
[ hCV ] is more likely than it really is. Given this intuition, and by considering (Eq-
3.14) it can be seen that the subjectively expected continuation value is increasing in 
the level of overconfidence, or 0>∂
∂
b
CV , and hence ( ) uCVrbCV >=> 0;0 ; that is, an 
overconfident manager who is otherwise unbiased (no regret aversion) overestimates 
the continuation value.  
 
o In contrast, the regret-averse manager, who is well calibrated (zero 
overconfidence), will underestimate the continuation value since as the individual 
regret aversion parameter [ r ] becomes larger, the subjectively perceived continuation 
value decreases, or 0<∂
∂
r
CV , and, therefore, uCVrbCV >>= )0;0( . Intuitively, the 
anticipated disutility of regret from having continued the investment and finding out 
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subsequently that abandonment would have yielded a higher value reduces the 
expected continuation value with weight [ r ]. 
For the evaluation decision, the effect of overconfidence is thus directly opposite to 
that of regret aversion: An overconfident manager will overestimate the continuation 
value of an investment, whereas a regret-averse manager will underestimate it. 
Therefore, it is interesting to consider the interaction effects resulting from a 
combination of these biases in more detail. To do this, one may thus take any level of 
managerial regret aversion [ r ] and define a critical level of overconfidence [b′ ] such 
that uCVrbbCV =′= );( . Solving33 this condition using (Eq-3.14) and (Eq-3.15) for 
[b′ ] yields 
(Eq-3.16) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−−
−−⋅−=′
)(
)(
log1
ctlh
ctlh
q rRCVCV
rRCVCVq
b . 
The locus of [ rb ;′ ], obtained from replacing [ ctR ] according to (Eq-3.13) and 
different levels of regret aversion is illustrated for assumptions of [ LCVCV lh ,, ] in the 
diagram in figure 3.3.  
 
                                                 
33 For the formal proof please refer to Appendix B. 
Figure 3.3: Interaction of overconfidence and regret aversion in project evaluation 
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The concave line illustrates combinations of overconfidence and regret aversion that 
yield the optimal decision behaviour. Any point above this line represents a situation 
where [ bb ′> ] such that the effect of overconfidence dominates that of regret aversion, 
and hence that the manager overestimates the continuation value; conversely, at any 
point below the line, the regret aversion drives the net effect by more than off-setting 
the impact of overconfidence, and the manager consequently underestimates the 
continuation value. Based on the preceding analysis, it is possible to state a first result.  
 
Proposition 1: The effect of managerial overconfidence regarding the state of 
nature and regret aversion on the abandonment / continuation decision given that 
negative information on the investment's performance was received; 
(a) If );( rbbCVCV ′>= , uCVCV >  follows, and hence the manager overestimates 
the continuation value. Therefore,  
i) If LCVCV u >> , the biased manager makes the efficient decision to 
continue the investment. 
ii) If uCVCVL >> , the biased manager makes the efficient decision to 
abandon the investment. 
iii) If uCVLCV >> , the biased manager makes the inefficient decision to 
continue the investment. 
(b) If );( rbbCVCV ′<= , uCVCV <  follows, and hence the manager underestimates 
the continuation value. Therefore, 
i) If LCVCVu >> , the biased manager makes the efficient decision to 
continue the investment. 
ii) If CVCVL u >>  the biased manager makes the efficient decision to 
abandon the investment. 
iii) If CVLCVu >>  the biased manager makes the inefficient decision to 
abandon the investment. 
(c) If );( rbbCVCV ′== , uCVCV =  follows, and hence the manager makes 
efficient continuation or abandonment decisions. 
 
As Proposition 1(c) demonstrates, optimistic overconfidence can lead to the correct 
abandonment decision, but it can also lead to sub-optimal decisions that may destroy 
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shareholder value. Similarly, although regret aversion does not necessarily have to 
affect a manager's investment evaluation, Proposition 1(b) demonstrates that there are 
conditions under which regret aversion leads to the sub-optimal (premature) 
termination34 of an investment. Given these individual effects, it was shown that a 
manager who is both overconfident and regret averse may not only over- or 
underestimate the continuation value, but may also arrive at the 'correct' unbiased 
forecast based on rational expectations. Similar to Besharov (2002), my model thus 
allows for the optimal behaviour despite the existence35 of psychological biases. 
3.3.2 Managerial effort 
The analysis now moves to the effort decision. Figure 3.4 shows the part of the 
decision tree that is relevant to this choice problem, whereby the decision at M3 is 
assumed to be given.  
 
Figure 3.4: Project evaluation decision problem 
 
 
The modelling of the effort decision presented here is adopted from a principal-agent 
capital budgeting model by Richard Fairchild (2004) that also considers managerial 
effort. It is still assumed that the manager seeks to maximize the subjectively expected 
value of the investment, which is now a function of his effort as the probability of 
success [ ep γ= ] at this stage of the model can be influenced by the manager.  
However, as outlined in Section 3.2, overconfidence biases the manager's perception of 
the extent to which his effort can improve the chance of success with [ γγ >− )1( a ]. The 
                                                 
34 It must be noted, however, that this result depends on the assumption of type 2 partial outcome 
observability, where only the continuation value is uncertain. 
35 The case where the two biases exactly offset each other is probably more a theoretical solution than a 
likely situation in reality. 
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effort level decision is thus influenced by overconfidence regarding ability, which is 
treated separately in this analysis from optimistic overconfidence at the evaluation 
stage. Following Fairchild (2004), there is a cost36 associated with managerial effort, 
which is assumed to be given by 
(Eq-3.17) 2)( eeC β=   with +ℜ∈β . 
As there are benefits and costs associated with managerial effort, the effort choice 
decision represents an optimisation problem. However, consistent with the logic of 
backward induction, I assume that the manager sets his effort level in relation to what 
he expects to do at the evaluation stage; therefore, the manager will base his effort 
decision on whether he anticipates continuing or abandoning a given investment in the 
case of underperformance (negative information), and thus two different value 
functions need to be distinguished in analysing this maximization problem. 
Eventual continuation of the investment 
If the manager expects to continue the investment in the case of bad performance, the 
expected value of the investment for setting the effort level is simply the prospect of 
the two possible outcomes, [G ] in the case of a positive signal and [CV ] the expected 
value for continuation for a negative signal: 
(Eq-3.18) 2)1()1( )1(ˆ eCVeGeV aact βγγ −⋅−+⋅= −− . 
The level of effort that maximizes this function represents the optimal level of effort 
given eventual project continuation and can be written as 
(Eq-3.19) β
γ
2
)()1(* CVGe
a
ct
−⋅=
−
. 
It can be seen from (Eq-3.18) that overconfidence affects the effort level choice in two 
ways. Overconfidence with regard to ability leads to a biased perception of the effect 
of effort [ 10)1( <<>− aforyy a ] and would thereby lead to higher effort if 
considered in isolation. Due to the logic of backward induction, however, the effort 
decision is also influenced by the manager's beliefs regarding the probability with 
which the good state of nature might obtain under eventual continuation. This type of 
                                                 
36 While the cost of effort in Fairchild's (2004) model is born only by the manager, in my model it is 
assumed that the cost of effort reduces shareholder value in the sense of an opportunity cost. 
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overconfidence, optimistic overconfidence, induces a degree of complacency: Owing 
to the overestimation of the continuation value due to [ 10)1( <<>− bforqq b ], 
overconfidence regarding the state of nature also indirectly decreases [ CVG − ], 
inducing lower effort. 
The effect of regret aversion, in contrast, is unambiguous in this case given the 
assumptions about anticipated regret in the continuation / abandonment decision: 
Regret aversion was shown to reduce the expected continuation value, and hence 
indirectly leads to a higher perceived equilibrium level of effort. 
Eventual abandonment of the investment 
If the manager expects to abandon the investment in the case of bad performance, the 
expected value of the investment for setting his effort level is given by 
(Eq-3.20) 2)1()1( )1(ˆ eLeGeV aaab βγγ −⋅−+⋅= −− . 
This equation is identical to (Eq-3.18) except for the value of the investment following 
negative signal with probability )1( )1( ea−− γ  which is now equal to the abandonment 
value [ L ]. Consequently, this maximization problem solves akin to (Eq-3.19) to yield 
an optimal level of effort in this case of 
(Eq-3.21) β
γ
2
)()1(* LGe
a
ab
−⋅=
−
. 
It can be seen from (Eq-3.21) that in the case of eventual abandonment, 
overconfidence is predicted in my model to lead to a higher equilibrium level of effort: 
The effect of overconfidence in ability unambiguously increases the numerator so that 
[ *abe ] is increasing in the individual level of overconfidence. Intuitively, 
overconfidence leads the manager to overestimate the positive effect of his effort 
contribution relative to the associated cost, and thus biases this cost-benefit analysis in 
towards greater effort provision. Due to the earlier assumption that the termination 
value [ L ] is always observable and known with certainty, regret aversion does not 
affect the effort decision in this case. 
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Proposition 2: The effect of overconfidence and regret aversion on the 
manager's effort level, given the evaluation decision (continue or abandon). 
(a) If LCVCV u >>  or uCVLCV >> , or if LCVCVu >> , so that the manager  
continues the investment following a bad signal, 
 i) Overconfidence in ability induces higher effort since 0
*
>∂
∂
a
ect ;  
ii) Overconfidence regarding the continuation value (optimism) induces lower 
effort since 0>∂
∂
b
CV  and 0
*
<∂
∂
CV
ect  such that 0
*
<∂
∂
b
ect ; 
iii) Regret aversion induces higher effort since 0<∂
∂
r
CV , 0
*
<∂
∂
CV
ect  and, 
therefore, 0
*
>∂
∂
r
ect . 
(b) If uCVCVL >>  or CVCVL u >> , or if CVLCVu >> , so that the manager 
abandons the investment following a bad signal, overconfidence induces greater effort 
since 0
*
>∂
∂
a
eab . 
 
Note that the effect of the manager's biases on his decision to continue or abandon has 
already been given in proposition 1. 
 
One of the aims of this research is to determine the effect of the studied biases on 
shareholder value. Since my model assumes that the interests of the manager and the 
shareholders are perfectly aligned, the cost of managerial effort is assumed to affect 
shareholder value rather than just reducing the manager's own pay-off. In a practical 
context, this may mean either that there are opportunity costs of managerial effort 
being deployed to one investment rather than to another one, or that the manager's 
compensation is directly linked to his effort. In any case, given this assumption, any 
deviation from the optimal level of effort, which is obtained by setting neutral values 
for the parameters representing the psychological biases [ 0;0, == rba ], represents 
inefficient behaviour. As a result, an associated prediction of my model is that 
overconfidence may lead to under- or over-provision, and regret aversion to over-
provision of managerial effort, which are all inefficient equilibria. 
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3.3.3 Project selection 
The analysis now moves back to the project selection decision. Given the effort level 
choices, it is now possible to consider the implications of overconfidence and regret 
aversion for investment selection. Deciding whether to invest in a given project or to 
reject the proposal was defined to be the first managerial decision problem. The 
diagram in figure 3.5 shows once more the decision tree for the capital investment 
process to illustrate the context of this decision.  
 
Figure 3.5: Project selection decision tree 
 
 
The project selection decision consists of accepting or rejecting an investment and 
should be made based on an investment's net present value: Any investment with a 
negative expected value should be rejected (general project selection rule). In the 
model, the subjectively expected value of the investment depends on whether the 
investment would be continued or abandoned in the case of bad news at the evaluation 
stage, and on the level of effort provided. As in the preceding analysis of the effort 
decision, a distinction is made again here between the case of eventual project 
continuation and eventual abandonment of the investment. 
 
In order to make the analysis tractable, I shall consider here only the case when regret 
aversion and overconfidence regarding the state of nature offset at the evaluation stage, 
so that the manager makes the efficient evaluation decision (continue or abandon). 
Consequently, this detailed analysis considers neither any indirect effect of optimistic 
overconfidence nor that of regret aversion, but focuses solely on the effect of 
overconfidence in ability. The complete solution of the model, including the indirect 
effects of regret aversion and optimistic overconfidence at the project evaluation stage, 
however, is provided in the form of tables in Section 3.4 of this chapter. 
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The case of eventual project continuation 
This section relates to the case when the investment would be continued subsequent to 
discovering underperformance in period 3. By substituting the optimal level of effort 
for the case of eventual project continuation (Eq-3.18) into the value function of  
(Eq-3.17), the subjectively expected maximum value of the investment is given by 
(Eq-3.22) CVCVGV
a
ct +−⋅=
−
2
)1(2
* )(
4
ˆ β
γ . 
Optimal project selection builds on the notion of an unbiased value estimate [ *,ˆ uctV ] 
which can be derived from (Eq-3.21) by assuming zero overconfidence [ 0=a ]. 
Hence, the decision rule for value-maximizing investment selection for the case of 
eventual project continuation is 
(Cond-3.2) *,ˆ0 uctV> . 
As mentioned, regret aversion is not considered to influence the selection decision in 
this case. As for overconfidence, from (Eq-3.21) it can be shown that 0
ˆ * >∂
∂
a
Vct  so that 
the overconfident manager will overestimate the value of the investment. Intuitively, 
this is simply the result of the subjectively perceived higher equilibrium level of effort, 
induced by a biased perception of the positive effect of effort. 
The case of eventual project abandonment 
In this case, if the investment were found to be underperforming, it would not be worth 
continuing. The value of the investment given optimal effort, and expressed in terms of 
the optimal level of effort from (Eq-3.18) can thus be stated as 
(Eq-3.23) LLGV
a
ab +−⋅=
−
2
)1(2
* )(
4
ˆ β
γ . 
For an unbiased decision maker, the parameters for the psychological biases are 
assigned neutral values [ 0=a ], which yields the unbiased expected value of the 
investment in the case of eventual project abandonment 
(Eq-3.24)  LLGV uab +−= β
γ
4
)(ˆ
22
*
, .  
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Since fully rational behaviour is optimal, given eventual project termination following 
a negative signal, any investment should be rejected for which  
(Cond-3.3) * ,ˆ0 uabV>  
Since 0
ˆ * >∂
∂
a
Vab , the overconfident manager will overestimate the value of the 
investment such that * ,
* ˆ)0(ˆ uabab VaV >> . 
 
Based on the results established in this section, it is possible to state as a final 
proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: The effect of overconfidence and regret aversion on the 
manager's project selection decision, given that overconfidence in the state of nature 
and regret aversion at the evaluation stage offset. 
 
(a) If the conditions for project continuation as outlined in Proposition 1 are given 
such that the manager continues the investment following a bad signal, he 
overestimates the value of the investment for project selection since 
*
,
* ˆ),0(ˆ uctct VraV >> . Therefore, 
i) If 0ˆˆ *,
* >> uctct VV , the manager makes the efficient decision to accept the 
investment. 
ii) If *,
* ˆˆ0 uctct VV >> , the manager makes the efficient decision to reject the 
investment. 
iii) If *,
* ˆ0ˆ uctct VV >> , the manager makes the inefficient decision to accept the 
investment. 
 
(b) If the conditions for project continuation as outlined in Proposition 1 do not hold, 
so that the manager abandons the investment following a bad signal, he overestimates 
the value of the investment for project selection since * ,
* ˆ)0(ˆ uabab VaV >> . Therefore,  
i) If 0ˆˆ ** , >> abuab VV , the manager makes the efficient decision to accept the
  investment. 
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ii) If ** , ˆˆ0 abuab VV >> , the manager makes the efficient decision to reject the 
investment. 
iii) If ** , ˆ0ˆ abuab VV >> , the manager makes the inefficient decision to accept the 
investment. 
 
Again, these propositions also make intuitive sense: Assuming that the project 
selection decision is only affected by the biased effort decision, given that 
overconfidence and regret aversion offset at the evaluation stage, the NPV of the 
investment will, under certain conditions (see above), tend to be overestimated by the 
manager. In those cases where this bias is strong enough to make a project with a 
negative investment (which should be rejected) appear as having a positive NPV, the 
biased manager will potentially accept a bad project (inefficient decision). 
 
In summary, the preceding analysis of the effects of overconfidence and regret 
aversion on the three decision steps of my capital investment decision model 
conducted in this section has demonstrated the following:  
 
(i) Optimistic overconfidence results in an overestimation of the continuation value, 
and may thus lead to inefficient continuation (late abandonment) of an investment, 
while regret aversion results in an underestimation of the continuation value and may 
thus lead to inefficient (premature) abandonment; 
 
(ii) Overconfidence in ability and regret aversion (relevant only in the continuation 
case) each induce higher effort but this effect is countered by the effect of optimism in 
the state of nature on the expected continuation value; 
 
(iii) Assuming that optimistic overconfidence and regret aversion in project evaluation 
offset (cancel out), so that the net effect on the subjectively perceived continuation 
value is zero, only the effect of overconfidence in ability will affect the project 
selection decision and potentially lead to over-investment. 
 
 These findings are summarized in the table below (Table 3.1).  
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Table 3.1: Summary model predictions 
Potential Impact on \ of Overconfidence Regret aversion 
  
Project selection overinvestment n.a. (see further analysis) 
   
Managerial effort greater (overconfidence in ability) or lower (optimism)  greater 
   
Project evaluation late abandonment early abandonment 
   
 
However, as the analysis (tabular form only) in the next section demonstrates, the 
complete solution of the model also allows for different predictions.  
3.4. Complete solution of the model 
Analysing the complete solution of the model is complex, since there are effectively 
three different biases (optimistic overconfidence, overconfidence in ability and regret 
aversion), as well as three decision problems. Although the analysis of the model 
presented so far demonstrates the most interesting effects of overconfidence and regret 
aversion for managerial capital investment decisions, it makes a number of simplifying 
assumptions in order to remain tractable. In this section, I provide the complete 
solution of the model for the different combinations of the biases and the resulting 
decision behaviour. A fundamental assumption made in the preceding analysis was 
that the effects of overconfidence and regret aversion exactly offset in the evaluation 
decision (abandonment vs. continuation), so that the analysis of the project selection 
decision related to the case that the continuation value was effectively unbiased 
[ uCVCV = ]. Obviously, other cases are also possible, depending on which of the two 
effects dominates. 
In the following, I provide an overview of the different possible constellations and the 
effect on behaviour at each of the three decision stages. I first present the solutions for 
each bias alone for all three decision problems before turning to analysing them 
jointly. Once again, I distinguish between overconfidence in ability and optimistic 
overconfidence, although it should be noted that in practice such a clear distinction is 
not possible as optimism is a symptom of overconfidence. It is found often that the 
solution shows that the behavioural effects of the biases depend on specific properties 
about a given investment and that they are thus a priori indeterminate.  
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3.4.1 Optimistic overconfidence alone 
If the parameters for overconfidence in ability and for regret aversion are assigned 
neutral values [ 0;0 == ra ], the only psychological factor to potentially affect 
decisions at all three stages of the capital investment decision process is 
overconfidence regarding the state of nature under project continuation  (optimistic 
overconfidence). It was previously shown that this biased perception of the success 
probability will lead to an overestimation of the continuation value, and thus 
potentially to inefficiently late project abandonment. Considering the effect of an 
optimistically biased continuation value at the effort level stage (without 
overconfidence in ability), it can be shown that 0<∂
∂
b
e , hence that increasing 
optimism leads to decreasing effort. For a given level of optimistic overconfidence, the 
subjectively perceived equilibrium level of effort will be inefficiently low.  Intuitively, 
someone who thinks that a good outcome will occur anyway is clearly not going to 
exert a lot of effort since this would seem unnecessary to him. 
 
However, because effort does have an impact on the success probability in this model, 
under-provision of it negatively affects the objectively expected value of the project. 
Thus whilst optimism alone at the evaluation stage tends to favour over-investment, 
lower effort due to optimistic overconfidence at the effort level decision tends to 
counteract this effect. The overall prediction for project selection (over- or under-
investment) can thus only be made in the form of a condition (see Table 3.2 below). 
 
Table 3.2: Effect of optimistic overconfidence alone, no regret aversion 
Project evaluation Effort level Project selection 
   
uopt CVCVL >>  
Efficient abandonment 
Efficient effort since 
*
,
*
, 2
)(
uaboptab e
LGe =−= β
γ  
Efficient selection since 
*
,
22
*
,
ˆ
4
)(ˆ
uaboptab VL
LGV =+−= β
γ  
LCVCV uopt >>  
Efficient continuation 
Lower effort since 
*
,
*
, 2
)(
uct
opt
optct e
CVG
e <−= β
γ
 
Overestimates value if 
)2(
42
optu CVCVG −−
< βγ  
uopt CVLCV >>  
Inefficient continuation 
Lower effort since 
*
,
*
, 2
)(
uab
opt
optct e
CVG
e <−= β
γ
 
Overestimates value if 
)2(
42
LCVG opt −−
< βγ  
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In the case of eventual project continuation at the evaluation stage, the effect of 
optimism on the project selection decision thus cannot be stated in general terms. 
Optimism may in this case lead to an over- but also to an underestimation of the value 
of the investment, and thus potentially to inefficient over- or underinvestment, 
respectively. However, given that overconfidence and optimism are two sides of the 
same coin, it is also important to understand the effect of overconfidence in ability. 
3.4.2 Overconfidence in ability alone 
This analysis assumes that the manager only has a biased perception of the impact of 
his effort, but since the state of nature in the project evaluation decision for 
continuation does not depend on effort, his estimate of [ q ] is unbiased [ 0=b ]. In 
addition, let [ 0=r ] so that the manager is not bothered by anticipated regret. As a 
result, the decision to abandon or continue a given investment is not biased but 
optimal, since the evaluation decision in my model is only affected by either optimism 
or regret aversion.. In contrast, the effort decision is affected by the overestimation of 
the positive impact the manager can make through his effort contribution, and this 
feeds through to an overestimation of the value of the investment, potentially thus 
leading to overinvestment when ** ˆ0ˆ uoc VV >> . These effects are formally shown in 
Table 3.3 below. 
 
Table 3.3: Effect of overconfidence regarding ability alone, no regret aversion 
Project evaluation Effort level Project selection 
   
uoc CVCVL =>  
Efficient abandonment 
Higher effort since 
*
,
)1(
*
, 2
)(
uab
a
ocab e
LGe >−=
−
β
γ  
Overestimates value since 
*
,
2)1(2
*
,
ˆ
4
)(ˆ
uab
a
ocab VL
LGV >+−=
−
β
γ  
LCVCV uoc >=  
Efficient continuation 
Higher effort since 
*
,
)1(
*
, 2
)(
uab
u
a
ocab e
CVG
e >−=
−
β
γ
Overestimates value since 
*
,
2)1(2
*
,
ˆ
4
)(ˆ
uab
a
occt VCV
CVGV >+−=
−
β
γ
   
 
The effect of overconfidence in ability here is again rather straightforward: Since the 
expected value of the investment is a function of managerial effort, greater effort will 
induce an overestimation of the project's NPV. Whenever the subjectively expected 
NPV is biased such that the 'true' negative NPV of an investment appears to be 
positive, overconfidence in ability will lead to an inefficient selection decision. 
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3.4.3 Regret aversion alone 
I now consider the case where the manager is only regret averse [ 0>r ] but is 
otherwise unbiased, and in particular, is in no way overconfident [ 0, =ba ]. The 
solutions of my model for this case can be seen in Table 3.4. At the project evaluation 
stage, regret aversion alone leads to an underestimation of the continuation value and 
thus tends to favour inefficient premature abandonment; this is because the manager is 
assumed to be concerned about the regret he would feel for continuation37 if the bad 
state of nature occurred. 
Concerning the manager's effort level, it is interesting to note that the model predicts 
regret aversion to result in higher effort for the case of continuation or inefficient 
abandonment at the project evaluation stage. Hence, if the investment and the 
manager's expectations are such that the project will be continued following a bad 
signal, the regret-averse manager will tend to work harder; and similarly for the case of 
inefficient abandonment.  
 
Table 3.4: Effect of regret aversion alone, no overconfidence 
Project evaluation Effort level Project selection 
   
rau CVCVL >>  
Efficient abandonment 
Efficient effort since 
*
,
*
, 2
)(
uabraab e
LGe =−= β
γ  
Efficient selection since 
*
,
22
*
,
ˆ
4
)(ˆ
uabraab VL
LGV =+−= β
γ  
LCVCV rau >>  
Efficient continuation 
Higher effort since 
*
,
*
, 2
)(
uct
ra
ract e
CVG
e >−= β
γ  
Overestimates value if 
)2(
42
rau CVCVG −−
< βγ  
rau CVLCV >>  
Inefficient abandonment 
Higher effort since 
*
,
*
, 2
)(
uctraab eß
LGe >−= γ  
Overestimates value if 
)2(
42
LCVG u +−
< βγ  
   
 
This prediction is a result of the more conservative evaluation of the project  due to 
regret aversion, which in turn leads to the perception that 'more is at stake' 
[ )()(;)()( uura CVGLGCVGCVG −>−−>− ], meriting greater effort. As a result of 
this higher effort, and depending on the specific relative costs and benefits of effort, 
the regret-averse manager overestimates the value of the investment unless it is to be 
                                                 
37 Note that this is due to the model's specific assumption on (partial) outcome observability.  
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abandoned eventually anyway. Hence, regret aversion alone may lead to inefficient 
over- but also underinvestment.  
To summarize the findings on the effects of each bias in isolation, it can be noted that:  
 
(i) Overconfidence regarding the state of nature may lead to inefficient continuation, 
lower effort and inefficient project selection decisions;  
 
(ii) Overconfidence regarding ability will not affect the continuation / abandonment 
decision (in this model set-up), but may lead to higher effort and inefficient over-
investment;  
 
(iii) Regret aversion may lead to inefficient premature abandonment (under the 
assumption of partial outcome observability), higher effort and inefficient project 
selection decisions.  
 
When considered in isolation, and assuming the cost of effort to affect shareholder 
value, optimistic overconfidence, overconfidence regarding ability and regret aversion 
thus only38 have potentially negative (in a shareholder value sense) consequences on 
managerial capital investment decisions. However, when the (realistically likely) case 
is considered that all of the studied psychological phenomena may simultaneously 
affect the manager's decisions, the effect of one individual bias is no longer necessarily 
only bad, but may be positive by offsetting the other bias. This is demonstrated in the 
following sub-section.  
3.4.4 Overconfidence and regret aversion combined 
This analysis now considers the case that the manager is both overconfident (regarding 
his ability as well as the state of nature) and regret averse. By way of structuring the 
analysis, I distinguish between two cases based on which, overconfidence or regret 
aversion, dominates39 at the evaluation stage. Given the different interactions, the 
                                                 
38 If overconfidence is not split into optimism and overconfidence in ability, the optimal level of effort 
may be obtainable in the case of eventual continuation if 
)(
)(
CVG
CVG oca
−
−=γ . 
39 The case when these two biases offset was already considered in Section 3.3. 
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analysis of the general case is rather complex and in most cases can only describe the 
conditions for certain behaviour.  
 
Table 3.5: Combination of overconfidence and regret aversion 
Project evaluation Effort level Project selection 
a) OPT  > RA   
ub CVCVL >>  
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Higher effort since 
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Given below are the conditions under which project selection behaviour may be 
efficient despite the influence of overconfidence and regret aversion. If these 
conditions are not given, then the result will be either inefficient over- or 
underinvestment. 
 
a) OPT > RA: Indeterminate cases 
(i) *,
*
,
ˆˆ
uctbct VV =  Æ uubb
a
CVCVGCVCVG +−=+−
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b) OPT < RA: Indeterminate cases 
(i) *,
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ˆˆ
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)( 222)1(2  
Concerning project selection, for which it was assumed in the preceding section that 
the effects of regret aversion and optimistic overconfidence exactly offset, it can be 
noted that removing this restriction any type of behaviour is theoretically possible.  
3.5 Summary 
In this chapter, I presented a model that includes the project selection, managerial 
effort and project evaluation decision problems as defined for this research. I assumed 
a value-maximizing decision maker whose interests are perfectly aligned with those of 
shareholders. I also presented ways in which the two studied biases of overconfidence 
and regret aversion could be represented formally and consistent with the insights on 
these phenomena gained from the literature review. The model was then solved by 
backward induction under certain limiting assumptions. Overall, the results of this 
analysis suggest that each bias individually, unless it is not sufficiently strong to have 
any noticeable impact, will lead decision behaviour to deviate from the normatively 
optimal and efficient solution. 
In addition, however, I also demonstrated that a combination of the studied biases can 
have opposite effects, thereby potentially leading to the efficient40 decision behaviour 
if they offset. Alternatively, their individual effects will be reinforcing, in which case 
behaviour will be inefficient. Given the complexity of the interaction of the two biases, 
however, the empirical research to be introduced in the following chapter shall focus 
exclusively on investigating the proposed individual effects of overconfidence or 
regret aversion resulting from the presented analysis of the three capital investment 
decision problems, leaving an empirical exploration of the interaction effects of these 
biases to future research. 
 
                                                 
40 This is also a result of the model by Besharov (2002), and will be of interest in the discussion of the 
costs and benefits of psychological biases in managerial capital investment decisions in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 4: DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
In the preceding chapter, I presented my model of the capital investment decision 
process and derived predictions on the potential effects of managerial overconfidence 
and regret aversion. However, 'all theory is grey'41. In this chapter, I thus present my 
approach to collecting data in order to enrich my theoretical propositions with some 
empirical evidence. I start by briefly highlighting some of the implications of the 
general paradigm42 of my research on the research methodology. In the second section, 
I offer a review of the methods used in existing, related research efforts reported in the 
literature. Based on the insights and inspirations gained from this review, I define the 
way in which data will be collected in the present research, and outline strengths and 
weaknesses of the chosen approach. Finally, the remainder of the chapter is dedicated 
to a detailed presentation of the design of my survey questionnaire and the two 
experiments. The wider purpose of this chapter in the presentation of my research is 
thus to provide an account of the data collection process and its underlying 
considerations for the purpose of facilitating an assessment of the quality of my data.   
4.1 Epistemological considerations 
Developing hypotheses first and then investigating whether they match with reality 
reveals a deductive and positivist43 view of how knowledge is created (Johnson & 
Duberley, 2000:41), and is typical of research in Finance and Economics. Such a 
general epistemological perspective has several implications for the design of the data 
collection process. Of central importance is the way in which the empirical data should 
be interpreted with relation to the theoretical propositions. For this, the principle for 
testing hypotheses proposed by Karl Popper (1963) is to be considered. According to 
Popper, in order to be testable, a hypothesis must be stated in a way that clearly 
disallows a certain event; genuine data collection should then be directed at 
discovering just a single instance of the event ruled out by the theory. Even if this is 
                                                 
41 Goethe, Faust I, Mephisto 2038f. 
42 Kuhn (1962:11) defines the term paradigm as a set of „rules and standards for scientific practice“. 
43 While it is not argued that this thesis reflects a purely positivist approach, the work is certainly 
oriented towards this paradigm and has sought to adhere to its core requirements. 
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not achieved despite credible efforts, the theory is still not proven but only 
strengthened. For the proposed causal effects of overconfidence and regret aversion on 
capital investment decisions, Popper's falsification principle implies that my 
methodology must be suited to collecting data by which an association between the 
two variables can be tested.   
However, positivism’s proposition that theory can be tested and potentially be refuted 
by empirical findings implies that reality is objectively observable44. Hence, the fact 
that I managed to observe something must mean that anyone else can observe the exact 
same thing under the same circumstances. In order to ensure that observations are truly 
objective, so that general conclusions can be drawn from them, the findings must be 
reliable and valid. Reliability implies that any other researcher could replicate the 
findings when following the same methodology; as a result, the methodology should 
adhere to a clear structure (Gill & Johnson, 1997:8) such that the impact of any bias 
introduced by the researcher is minimized and the findings are as objective as possible 
(Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2000:85). Regarding the validity of findings, two types 
of validity are distinguished. External validity refers to the extent with which findings 
can be generalized beyond the analysed data set; in contrast, internal validity is 
concerned with the strength and accuracy of identified cause-effect relationships 
(Malhotra & Birks, 2003:762). 
Yet, while reliability and validity of the data are defined targets of positivist research, 
in reality they can only be aspired to but are hardly ever achieved. Given different 
strengths and weaknesses of the commonly used methods, a trade-off is to be made. 
One method may be very good in terms of reliability, but not optimal as far as internal 
validity is concerned. External validity has traditionally been most highly valued by 
researchers in Finance. As a consequence, statistical significance testing of the findings 
dominates data analysis. Since statistical results become more robust as they 
approximate the population, sampling methods where large numbers of observation 
points can be collected are often used. 
Still, even a statistically significant correlation does not necessarily imply a cause-
effect relationship, as the variables may also just happen to correlate for some external 
reason (spurious relationship). Furthermore, hypothesis testing implies that all 
                                                 
44 This is a view not shared by all researchers. The constructivist school of thought argues that reality is 
subjectively construed and perceived, and may thus vary from one individual to another. 
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variables are directly observable and measurable, but in reality, this is often not the 
case and ‘proxies’ have to be found45. Finally, another inevitable problem, known as 
the Duhem-Quine thesis46, resides in the fact that no hypothesis can ever be tested in 
isolation. Even in a highly controlled environment experiment, there are several 
connected hypothesis that are tested jointly.  
In the light of these considerations, and the restrictions on the choice of methodology 
arising from the research paradigm in particular, I returned to the literature in order to 
find out what methods had been used in earlier but related research. The next section 
provides a review of the articles on which the data collection methods of the present 
research lean upon, and to which they can be compared. 
4.2 Data collection methods used in the related literature 
Since my research introduces elements from Psychology to classical Finance decision 
problems, relevant contributions reviewed in this section are drawn from both bodies 
of literature. The section thus contains two parts: In the first part, reported empirical 
research related to investment project selection, managerial effort and the evaluation 
decision (continuation or abandonment) is presented. In the second part, techniques for 
collecting information on the studied psychological phenomena of overconfidence and 
regret aversion employed by other researchers are discussed.  
4.1.1 Observing capital investment decisions 
Project selection 
Much of the research on the practice of investment selection has been conducted in the 
form of surveys. Recent examples include Arnold & Hatzopoulos (2000), Graham & 
Harvey (2001) and Akalu (2002). Primarily, these surveys have centred on the use of 
appraisal techniques in order to establish the extent to which practitioners follow the 
recommendations of corporate finance theory. As a result, the questionnaires employed 
in that research are mostly limited to closed multiple-choice questions where managers 
                                                 
45 Clearly, in the specific context of this research, the study of psychological factors such as 
overconfidence and the aversion to regret is most acutely affected by this problem. 
46 The Duhem-Quine thesis is mentioned for instance by Cross (1982); an in-depth discussion of this 
thesis and its relevance for experimental research in economics is offered by Soberg (2005). 
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can indicate which specific financial techniques they use. Yet as important as knowing 
how managers appraise investments may be, the existing research often leaves 
unanswered the question of why such decisions are made the way they are. To some 
extent an exception to this criticism are Graham et al. (2001) who compare differences 
in responses across sub-samples of the respondent set (p.118). 
A second research method that appears to have been popular is the direct observation 
of individuals' investment decisions in experiments. However, most experiments seem 
to have studied investments in a financial markets context (e.g. Moore, Kurtzberg et 
al., 1999; El-Sehity, Haumer et al., 2002) so that their designs are not easily 
transferable to the topic of selecting a capital investment. An exception represents the 
experiment reported by Dittrich, Gueth, & Maciejovsky (2001) which offers features 
relevant to the design of my methodology. In this experiment, subjects receive a 
certain budget and can choose how much of this they want to invest in a single risky 
asset; any funds not spent are invested by default in a risk-free asset (Dittrich et al., 
2001:8). Another feature of this experiment is the measurement of individual risk 
preferences, which allows the authors to distinguishing between rational and 
overconfident choices (p.15) in their investigation of the relevance of this bias for the 
studied decision task. The experiment is conducted using computers and a special 
software guiding subjects through the task and recording their decisions, which 
represents an impediment to direct adaptation to this research, though. 
Finally, a case study method was employed by Bromiley (1986). Although this method 
theoretically benefits from direct and detailed observations of the investment selection 
decisions of practitioners, as opposed to experimental subjects, having only a low 
number of observations seriously limits generalisation of the findings. Under a 
positivist research paradigm, case studies are thus typically not considered to deliver 
meaningful insights. 
Effort 
Several studies that measure individual effort were found. Technologically the most 
sophisticated, Stone's (1994) experiment is fully computer based. Effort in this 
experiment is measured as the time individuals spend on a decision task, recorded by 
the computer. Yet while this approach to measuring effort is rather straightforward, it 
may also be argued that higher concentration or better ability of individual subjects 
may lead to shorter completion times without necessarily representing lower effort. In 
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addition, development of such software is beyond the scope of the present research. 
Rather than observing individual effort indirectly, other researchers have taken a more 
direct approach by asking participants about their level of effort in a given situation. 
Whilst Gueth, Klose et al. (1998) do so within an experimental framework, Cooper et 
al. (1995) conducted a survey to investigate individual levels of effort in an investment 
setting.  
In the experiment by Gueth et al. (1998), the group of subjects is divided up into 
principals and agents. A principal offers a payment contract, which contains fixed and 
variable (based on firm value) elements, to an agent. The agent then chooses his effort 
out of four different permissible levels, where effort comes at a cost reducing an 
agent’s payoff. Firm value at the end of the period – relevant for the variable part of an 
agent’s income –depends on the agent’s effort and a chance variable. Participants 
indicate their level of effort on a response form. The experiment is designed in such a 
way that only either zero or full effort should be observable (Gueth et al., 1998:334) 
based on the game-theoretic solution. The general principle of observing effort here 
seems very useful: Subjects make a conscious decision on their effort level and are 
aware of the costs and benefits associated with exerting effort. Under this quite 
realistic set-up, behaviour can be argued to be approximating the model assumption of 
a value-maximizing trade-off under uncertainty. One small shortcoming of this 
experiment is the neglect of individual risk preferences, which the authors argue, 
though, was intentional so as to limit the complexity of the game (p.332). 
In contrast, the large-scale survey by Cooper et al. (1995), with 13,000 posted 
questionnaires, targeted entrepreneurs who had recently started a new business. Cooper 
and his colleagues were interested in the degree to which these entrepreneurs had 
engaged in information search prior to launching their venture. As part of their 
questionnaire, they asked participants to evaluate several sources of information – such 
as relatives, consultants or books – based on how important they had been in their 
information gathering preceding the start of the business. The researchers then 
compute a measure for the number of sources used, and their relative importance for 
each individual entrepreneur (Cooper et al., 1995:111). This measure thus pertains to 
the degree of preparation undergone by an entrepreneur and can hence be interpreted 
as a proxy for individual effort. However, since reported effort levels may be 
inaccurate given the responses are made in retrospective, it would seem that eliciting 
Chapter 4: Data collection methods 
- 88 - 
effort level decisions directly as in the experiment by Gueth et al. (1998) may be a 
better way of collecting the required data. 
Project evaluation 
The issue of how managers deal with ongoing investments, in particular when a project 
is losing money has been investigated mainly experimentally. The only research I am 
aware of that uses secondary data (companies’ stock price movements following 
project abandonment announcements) is by Statman et al. (1989). The experimental 
method thus seems to dominate investigations of the decision problem of abandoning 
or continuing a failing investment.  
A relatively recent study using an experiment is reported by Chang & Ho (2004); 
interestingly, their methodology is somewhat hybrid by combining elements of a 
survey with their experiment. Chang et al. (2004) set out to compare the project 
evaluation decisions of managers with those of students, and post an ‘experimental 
package’ to the managers. Since the managers complete the questionnaire at home, this 
method is arguably more of a survey, lacking the controlled conditions of a proper 
experiment.  
On the other side, it is difficult to get managers to participate in research at all, let 
alone to participate in a formal experimental session. All participants evaluate one 
project only, and receive information on the project’s projected cash flows, previous 
investments made, the degree of completion and the amount required to continue the 
investment. Subjects then learn that either one of two states of nature has occurred, 
representing a favourable or an unfavourable market development (Chang et al., 
2004:104). They are instructed that a further cash injection into the project would be 
required and are asked to decide whether to do this and continue or whether to abandon 
the investment.  
In another experiment, conducted by Harrison & Harrell (1993), the subjects (MBA 
students) are provided with financial background information on four investment 
projects. Uncertainty is introduced as in Chang et al. (2004) through two possible 
states of nature. Based on the data available to subjects, an optimal strategy exists: 
Two investments have a projected internal rate of return for the remainder of their 
lifetime greater than the defined ‘hurdle rate’, whilst the other two investments have 
negative IRRs (Harrison et al., 1993:639). The former should thus be continued and 
the latter terminated. Project abandonment results in a positive cash flow that is 
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reinvested in a risk-free asset at a fixed rate of return, greater than the hurdle rate. 
Subjects' decisions on each of the four investments are recorded by Harrison et al. 
(1993) on a ten-point scale, allowing participants to indicate not only their choices but 
also how much confidence they have in these.  
Subjects in the project evaluation experiment by Kogut & Phillips (1994) repeatedly 
decide whether to continue or abandon an investment using computer software that 
creates a series of virtual evaluation decision problems. This programme follows down 
a pre-defined decision tree randomly for up to five periods, or until abandonment. In 
each period, with a certain probability, the expected value of the investment can go 
either up or down (Kogut et al., 1994:464). Given this new value estimate, subjects can 
continue by making an additional investment at the end of each period, or otherwise 
stop. Following the optimal stopping rule, the investment should be abandoned once 
marginal cost (the investment required to continue) exceeds the expected value of the 
investment. Once again, however, a direct adaptation of this dynamic method is 
prevented by the considerable complexity of developing such software.  
4.1.2 Observing psychological biases of individuals 
The second challenge for the present research is the integration of psychological 
factors into the methodology. The question of how individual overconfidence and 
regret aversion can be observed is crucial to this research. In addition, the data should 
be such that inferences about the predicted causalities of the studied biases on capital 
investment decisions can be made. To provide some guidance on addressing these 
questions, several contributions from the literature proved to be useful, and are 
reviewed in this section.  
How to study individual overconfidence empirically 
In the presentation of the overconfidence bias based on literature in Psychology, 
different 'symptoms' of overconfidence were outlined. It is thus plausible to measure 
individual overconfidence by measuring these individual symptoms. An excellent 
paper that does this, and which provides the foundation for the way overconfidence is 
measured throughout my data collection, is presented by Glaser et al. (2003). 
One definition of overconfidence relates to an unjustified, excessive belief in the 
accuracy of one’s beliefs. In other words, it is an underestimation of the errors one is 
making. Following this interpretation, overconfidence is most directly captured by 
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assessing an individual’s calibration. Someone is said to be well calibrated when his 
meta-knowledge (how much he knows he actually knows) is about accurate, and  
mis-calibrated otherwise. Calibration can be measured in two ways. Aukutsionek & 
Belianin (2001) define calibration as “the empirical frequency of forecasts that have 
been correct, related to the judged probability that these forecasts will be true” (p.662). 
Consequently, they measure it by presenting subjects with a list of binary choice 
questions and asking them afterwards how many they think they answered correctly. 
Overestimation of the number of correct answers is taken as evidence of 
overconfidence. An alternative approach is to use confidence intervals. Here, subjects 
state confidence intervals for some unknown value they are asked to estimate. Since 
narrow intervals should represent greater confidence in the estimate, the percentage of 
confidence intervals that are given as too narrow can be used as a measure of 
overconfidence (e.g. Glaser et al., 2003: 18ff). 
Another technique to identify overconfidence is to check for extreme or unjustified 
levels of optimism in participants' beliefs about future events; this link between 
overconfidence and optimism was outlined previously (Weinstein, 1980). Glaser et al. 
(2003:22) build on this finding and ask stock market investors to estimate the future 
return on their portfolios, and set this in relation to participants’ responses regarding 
past portfolio returns to calculate a measure of optimism. Similarly, Moore et al. 
(1999:98) conjecture that an overestimation of one’s portfolio returns is a signal for 
optimism. As part of their experiment, subjects also responded to a question on how 
they believed their investment would perform (p.103). 
In addition, Glaser et al. (2003) probe for the illusion of control, which was also shown 
to be related to overly positive expectations (Langer, 1975), by asking for the extent to 
which a stock market investor believes he is in control of the performance of his 
portfolio (p.22, Q3), and include the response in their optimism measure. A further 
measure of overconfidence proposed by Glaser et al. (2003) is based on the better-
than-average effect of overconfidence. Overconfident people overestimate their own 
ability and skill both in absolute and relative terms. Glaser et al. (2003) explore the 
participating investors' illusion of control by asking them to rank themselves relative to 
other investors with regard to skill, and past performance (p.21).  
The better-than-average concept also features in Camerer & Lovallo's (1999) 
experiment of the effects of overconfidence on market entry, where pay-offs depend on 
the (actual) ranking of subjects based on their individual performance in a general 
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knowledge quiz (p.308). The rankings are not made available to participants, so that 
they remain uncertain their relative 'ability' throughout the experiment. Yet because 
Camerer et al. (1999) limit market size such that only the top-ranking participants will 
receive a positive cash flow, subjects' market entry decisions are effectively made 
based on beliefs about own performance (and thus ability) compared to that of others. 
Consequently, the decision to enter the market is indicative of individual confidence: 
Subjects who did poorly in the quiz but still chose to enter the market must 
(overconfidently) have thought themselves to be better than they were; similarly, top-
performers who stayed out can reasonably be considered to lack confidence. This 
prediction was confirmed by the finding that in the control group, where ranks 
depended on chance only, subjects were less likely to enter the market (Camerer et al., 
1999:314). 
How to study individual regret aversion empirically 
The second psychological phenomenon on which my empirical research needs to 
collect data is regret aversion. It is fairly intuitive that most people experience a 
disutility from feeling regret. Researchers studying regret aversion have therefore 
simply focused on post-decision regret and assumed anticipated post-decision regret 
would lead to, or had triggered, regret-aversion. In the literature, two broad approaches 
to the study of regret aversion and its behavioural effect can be distinguished. The field 
can be split into those who see regret-aversion as endogenous and pervasive, and those 
arguing that it is exogenous and can thus be induced. 
In the former approach, researchers look for indications in participants’ statements that 
regret was a factor in the decision process, and sometimes also to what extent so. In the 
latter approach, behaviour under a regret-treatment is compared with that of a control 
group. This distinction between underlying views of regret aversion entails differences 
in the research method. In the following, I consider contributions of both perspectives 
to demonstrate the ambiguity related to measuring regret aversion and the resulting 
methodological creativity of past research efforts. 
Fisher et al. (2003) cite interview comments of practitioners to support their 
proposition that regret aversion is one of the chief drivers behind corporate hedging 
behaviour. Companies have been found to switch from unhedged to hedged portfolios 
even though they should be indifferent as both strategies have comparable risk and 
return properties. Fisher et al. (2003:8) quote a fund manager who reflects on what 
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might have happened if he had hedged Asian currencies as opposed to his actual 
decision not to hedge, and propose that such thoughts are indicative of ex-post regret.  
Other researchers enquire directly about any feelings of regret in a given scenario. 
Gilovich et al. (1995) question randomly selected US citizens by telephone on whether 
they regretted actions more than inactions. Feldman et al. (1999:236) criticize this 
method and conduct experiments in which subjects are asked to recall a regrettable 
decision, to describe it and to rate the intensity of the regret on a seven-point scale. 
However, while such a technique avoids some of the shortcomings of Gilovich et al.’s 
(1995) approach highlighted by Feldman et al. (1999:236), the large time lag between 
the actual decision and the emotional evaluation is a potential shortcoming of the 
Feldman et al.'s (1999) method. When post-decision regret is considered possibly 
several years after a decision was taken, it may be questioned if the passing of time has 
not in some way affected the respondent’s perception of what had once motivated his 
decision in terms of ex-ante, anticipated regret.  
That particular concern is reduced in the experiments by Connolly, Ordonez, & 
Coughlan (1997). Subjects read a case about two people who find out that they shared 
the worse of two possible outcomes (p.76); the twist in this story though is that only 
one person was en route to this outcome from the start (with no chance to change 
things) whereas the other person ended up there by his own decision (condition 1) or 
through a random event (condition 2). Conolly et al. (1997) ask their subjects to 
indicate who (if any) of the two fictitious individuals would feel more regret upon 
learning their outcome condition, and how happy they would be at the end. The 
method used here by Conolly et al. (1997) thus represents a vehicle for eliciting 
individual propensity for regret, assuming that subjects personally identify with the 
story’s characters. Compared to Gilovich et al. (1995), Conolly et al. (1997) study 
regret temporally close to the actual decision. But because subjects are not themselves 
faced with the decision problem, this data collection approach may be argued to lack 
authenticity as far as subjects’ responses are concerned.  
 
The articles discussed above all share in common that by asking individuals directly 
about experienced regret, they only investigate ex-post – as opposed to anticipated – 
decision regret. In contrast, empirical research where an anticipation of eventual regret 
is created prior to decision-making is able to investigate the behavioural effects of 
regret aversion directly. For instance, Ordonez, Benson, & Beach (1999) report on an 
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experiment in which they explicitly advised subjects in the treatment group prior to 
their making any decision to consider the regret the latter might feel upon finding out 
subsequently that their decision had been sub-optimal (p.75). Interestingly, Ordonez et 
al. (1999) find that this treatment only has an effect when subjects are warned about 
the regret of having foregone a good outcome, but not when the treatment consists in 
drawing their attention to potential regret from having mad a bad decision (p. 77). By 
way of contrast, the notion of regret is not mentioned to subjects at all in the 
experiments conducted by Ritov (1996).  
Ritov's (1996) experiments are partly computer based and are made up of several pairs 
of gambles for which subjects indicate their preferred option (p.231). Some subjects 
were instructed that they would receive information on the outcomes of all gambles, 
while for others only the outcomes of the chosen options would be revealed (p.233). 
The treatment in Ritov's experiments is thus effectively the type of outcome resolution, 
which serves as a means of inducing regret aversion. This approach, which is 
consistent with my model, can also be found in the experiment by Zeelenberg et al. 
(1996) and Zeelenberg et al. (1997). One experiment described by them involves a 
choice between two types of financial assets with differing risk criteria (Zeelenberg et 
al.,1997:66). Subjects in the treatment group receive feedback on the chosen 
investment as well as on the outcome of the low-risk alternative investment, whereas 
control group members are briefed on the outcome of their chosen asset only (p.66). 
Decisions are recorded on two seven-point semantic preference scales, one for each 
investment product, ranging from ‘definitely would not invest’ to ‘definitely would 
invest’ (Zeelenberg et al., 1997:66). 
4.2 Methodological considerations 
As mentioned previously, developing a research methodology and selecting an 
appropriate data collection method should be driven by the type of data needed to 
address the theoretical propositions. For the present research on the effects of 
managerial overconfidence and regret aversion, most importantly, the claims about the 
existence and relevance of these two phenomena in the chosen context need to be 
tested. Overconfidence was shown for a range of different professionals (see literature 
review), so there is some hope that evidence on this bias will also be found for my 
target group of managers who are in charge of capital investment decisions; yet this 
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cannot be assumed to be given, and for the case of regret aversion, no prior study has 
demonstrated its existence among corporate finance decision makers. Second, data on 
the independent variables in the model, the managerial decision behaviour, must be 
obtained. Observations of project selection, individual effort and project evaluation 
decisions are thus to be collected alongside the psychometric data. Third, there ought 
to be measures that can be used to evaluate the role of external factors such as moral 
hazard.  
The ideal method would thus need to gather individual psychological data on a large 
number of corporate finance managers or other managers responsible for capital 
investment decisions, in real-time, and guarantee the absence of any disrupting 
alternative drivers of the observed behaviour. In Bavaria, a country with a strong 
pastoral culture, people refer to such an ideal as a 'milk-producing, woolly pig that can 
lay eggs'47. Just as with productive livestock, no single data collection method seems 
able to offer all properties desirable.  The review of the related literature with regard to 
data collection methods has shown that experiment and survey appear to be dominant 
in research on individual investment decisions; with the exception of the survey by 
Glaser et al. (2003), overconfidence and regret aversion have so far largely been 
investigated experimentally. In the following, I therefore examine these observations 
more closely.  
4.2.1 Methodological considerations relating to surveys 
A survey48 potentially offers some advantages that would be beneficial to my 
investigation. Most importantly, a survey questionnaire permits a standardized 
recording of first-hand data by directly collecting feedback from practitioners. In 
research that makes propositions regarding managerial decision behaviour, such 
insights are obviously very valuable. It has also been suggested that surveys are ideal 
for the investigation of variable associations in a likely multi-causal situation 
(Oppenheim, 1992:21); hence, a survey could explore the potential role of several 
factors like overconfidence, regret aversion, and moral hazard in capital investment 
decisions quite efficiently. In addition, there are a number of practical advantages to 
                                                 
47 The infamous "Eierlegende Wollmilchsau". 
48 Although a survey can also consist of a series of interviews, the term is used here to describe 
questionnaire mailings only. 
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conducting a survey that are relevant to the present research. Administering a 
questionnaire is possible with limited resources, and represents an efficient way of 
gaining access to top-level corporate decision makers who are normally very busy, 
because respondents can complete the survey questionnaire by themselves and at a 
time that suits them best. Theoretically, this should increase the willingness of 
practitioners to contribute to academic work. 
However, surveys are also criticized for being only able to record beliefs at best, and 
‘socially desirable’ comments that do not reflect the facts at worst (Aldridge & Levine, 
2001:103).  Clearly, the fact that the researchers does not know if responses reflect 
sincere opinions, and even if they do, whether they are accurate of reality, poses a 
limitation to what can be inferred from survey data. However, the collection of purely 
quantitative firm-level financial data may also be distorted by certain accounting 
methods, so that it can be argued that empirical data at the corporate level will always 
be subject to some distortion.  
Another problem with surveys is that there may be a divergence in the interpretation of 
questions between the researcher and the respondent, aggravated by the fact that, in 
case they do not understand a question, respondents will rarely turn to the researcher 
for clarification for reasons of time and lack of interest. It is therefore very important 
to formulate questions such that respondents will understand what the researcher wants 
to know; in other words, the ambiguity in survey questionnaires strictly must be 
minimized. 
This requirement attaches great importance to the design of individual questions and 
the construction of the questionnaire as a whole. Even though Malhotra et al. (2003) 
note that “there are no scientific principles that guarantee an optimal or ideal 
questionnaire” (p.326), they offer several useful insights regarding the design of a 
questionnaire. On the issue of ambiguity, they caution that some questions may be 
perceived as leading to a certain response option and that this should be avoided 
(Malhotra et al, 2003:328). Moreover, since a crucial component of respondents’ 
willingness to participate in a survey is the time needed to respond to all questions, 
questionnaires should be relatively efficient to go through; hence, the questionnaire 
should rather be shorter than longer, and only questions that are truly needed in the 
research should be featured.  
A further point raised by Malhotra et al. (2003) is the importance of structure in 
improving response rates: Questions that may seem threatening to participants (which 
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is arguably the case for inquiring about overconfidence or regret aversion and 
inefficient decision making) should be placed towards the end of the questionnaire in 
order to establish a certain rapport with the respondent (Malhotra et al., 2003: 328).  
4.2.2 Methodological considerations relating to experiments 
In experiments, a sample group of subjects is submitted to a treatment (independent 
variable) and the resulting effect on the dependent variable(s) is observed and 
measured (Hussey & Hussey, 1997:60). The purpose of experiments is thus to study 
the influence of one variable on one or several others in order to make inferences about 
possible causal relationships. Experiment as a research methodology originates from 
the natural sciences, where laboratory tests of cause-effect relationships between 
variables under controlled environmental conditions are well established. According to 
Malhotra et al. (2003:206), for conducting social experiments, three requirements for 
making inferences must be met: (i) the variables must vary together (concomitant 
variation), (ii) the suspected cause (treatment) must occur prior to or simultaneously 
with the suspected effect, (iii) and extraneous factors must be controlled for. Clearly 
the most significant benefit of an experimental methodology lies in the possibility of 
studying the effect of only one treatment in relative isolation (Johnson et al., 2000:45), 
which is owed to the mentioned controlled decision environment. 
However, when experiments are criticised, it is particularly this aspect of control that is 
targeted. The typical criticism is that experiments are too artificial to be meaningful 
(Oppenheim, 1992:12). As a consequence, the laboratory set-up might cause the 
behaviour of subjects to be influenced by their role as subjects in an experiment, as 
opposed to the presumed more natural behaviour in the real world decision making 
(Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1997:8). These arguments may be valid to some extent, but 
they do not provide a basis for discarding experiments as a useful research method in 
testing cause-effect relationships in general (Dobbins, Lane, & Steiner, 1988). It is 
precisely the ‘artificiality’ which enables researchers to isolate specific variables of the 
causal relationship under investigation (e.g. Nelson, Krische, & Bloomfield, 
2003:505). In a corporate context, a manager may take a particular decision not 
because he is biased but because his superior has expressed a preference for a given 
strategy, and the manager does not wish to counteract. The risk of such spurious 
relationships should thus be lower for experimental data. 
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Another frequently mentioned demand on experiments is that they must be ethical, 
particularly as they involve human beings (Blaxter, Hughes, & Tight, 2001:75). In 
particular, subjects should not be misled or deceived in the experiment, as Cadsby et 
al. (1998:281) argue, because this might entail damaging repercussions for the 
reputation of experiments in general. On the other hand, and especially in the case of 
studying the role of cognitive biases, subjects should not be fully informed about the 
purposes of the experiment or different parts of it either, because this might cause 
behaviour to be 'unnatural'. Further points of consideration in the design of an 
experiment mentioned by Cadsby et al. (1998) include deciding which experimental 
materials should be made available for subjects, the type and number of treatments to 
be administered, the subject group, and the use of incentives for participants. 
Regarding whether subjects should be given incentives to introduce an incentive for 
them to perform well in an experimental game, Cadsby et al. (1998:277) find that “the 
average payment per subject ranges as high as $165 for 2h to no payment at all” but 
argue, though, that rewards are essential to make participants take real economic 
decisions (p.286). 
Finally, concerns are frequently voiced as to whether students do not make good 
experimental subjects because of differences compared to managers that would impede 
external validity (Remus, 1996; Tosi, Brownlee et al., 2003; Chang et al., 2004). 
However, not least because they are most conveniently available at any academic 
institution, students are the obvious choice for experimental subjects, and consequently 
are employed by the majority of experimental studies in Finance I encountered. Even if 
conducting an experiment with students were to limit to some extent the 
generalisability of the findings, obtaining managers’ participation is prohibitively 
difficult. To address this concern, a good compromise may be to ensure a certain 
suitability of the students; for instance, Schwarzkopf (2003) selects for his experiment 
students who have prior investing experience (p.96).  
4.2.3 Choice of methodology 
The choice of how to best collect data on the existence of managerial overconfidence 
and regret aversion, and the hypothesized effects of these biases on capital investment 
decisions should take into consideration the arguments and insights presented in this 
chapter so far, and evaluate them in the light of the requirements of the present 
research. Essentially, my methodology should be somewhat hybrid: Establishing the 
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existence of managerial overconfidence and regret aversion, and the predicted 
inefficient behaviour can only be done with observations of real-world practice; on the 
other hand, in order to investigate the proposed association between the biases and 
certain decision behaviour properly, a relatively controlled environment as in 
experiments would be ideal. As the analysis of the existing literature in this chapter has 
shown, experiments are particularly popular for investigating decision processes. 
In view all of these considerations, I decided to use a dual approach to data collection 
by carrying out a survey and conducting experiments as well. Such a strategy is hoped 
to seize on the benefits associated with either of the two methods in order to meet the 
challenging data requirements imposed by the research topic, whilst minimizing the 
individual disadvantages of either experiment or survey alone. Since it was considered 
a priority to ascertain relatively early on in the research process that a case for 
managerial overconfidence and regret-aversion could be made, the survey was 
launched first. In particular, I decided to conduct an internet-based49 survey in order to 
capitalize on the benefits associated with electronic communication. For example, 
mailing costs were effectively halved since there are no fees associated with the 
posting of online questionnaires.  
In addition, the data from an online survey is available for download in a format that 
can be directly imported into statistics software such as SPPS. This feature obviously 
also eliminates any errors that may occur if the responses need to be entered manually 
into the computer. Furthermore, an electronic questionnaire can be programmed so as 
to have greater control over the way in which it is completed; for example, participants 
in the survey can be automatically alerted if any question was not completed properly. 
In addition, past concerns about internet access and computer literacy inducing a 
sample bias do not seem so relevant nowadays. Once the first-hand data obtained in the 
survey seemed to support some of the assumptions and predictions of the model, I 
began to design experiments to further obtain evidence on the proposed effects of 
overconfidence and regret aversion on project selection, effort, and project evaluation 
decisions. 
As the earlier review has revealed, experiments have also become more widely 
accepted in economics and finance in recent years, with the survey of the use of 
                                                 
49 Please refer to appendix F for a description of how the survey questionnaire was created and made 
available to participants. 
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experiments in this area by Cadsby & Maynes (1998) containing a surprisingly large 
number of references. An experimental framework was deemed to be fitting for the 
studied decision stages for at least three reasons. For one, the questionnaire-related 
hindsight problem, which was already noted for the research by Cooper et al. (1995), 
could be reduced, as instead of a report of past decision making, experimental data 
would pertain to behaviour 'as it happens'. In addition, a number of potentially 
disturbing factors could be excluded. For example, when subjects make decisions on 
their own account, agency cost problems should be negligible. Reputation or career-
related concerns should equally be minimized in an experimental setting. Third, by 
asking managers questions of the type “do you often make mistakes?” the survey 
responses could be potentially somewhat insincere with managers wishing to protect 
their self-esteem. The direct observation of actual behaviour where decisions do not 
have to be justified should present a useful addition to the survey. In the remainder of 
this chapter, I now present the survey questionnaire used in my empirical research, as 
well as the two experiments I conducted. 
4.3 Design of the questionnaire 
Following on from the preceding discussion, the main objective of the questionnaire 
was to determine whether overconfidence and regret aversion could be identified 
among the target group of professionals who make capital investment decisions within 
companies. Related to this, it was intended that not only the general existence of the 
studied biases would be checked for, but that the measures for overconfidence and 
regret aversion should allow for individual differences. As a second objective, the 
survey should also collect information on how managers make certain choices related 
to capital investments. Responses to these questions will be used in establishing 
whether predicted behaviour like late abandonment and over- or under-investment 
exists in practice.  
Further, in combination with the individual overconfidence and regret aversion scores, 
associations between choice behaviour and psychological factors can then be analysed 
to provide evidence by which to evaluate the theoretical propositions of the model. A 
final objective was to explore the extent to which certain important assumptions of my 
model, such as the alignment of managerial interests with those of shareholders, would 
hold for the sample. 
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Overall, the questionnaire can be viewed as consisting of three parts. The first part, 
entitled 'demographic information' collects general data for characterising the sample. 
The second part, on 'investment appraisal', contains questions that relate to the three 
investment decisions of my model. Finally, all questions that a respondent may not be 
as happy to respond to, such as certain psychometric questions, were placed in a third 
section named 'your opinion on selected aspects of investing'. Prior to launching the 
final questionnaire, some minor changes such as reducing the number of page breaks 
in the online questionnaire and clarifying the wording of some questions, which were 
encountered during a small pilot of the survey, were implemented. The construction 
and purpose of the individual questions in the final questionnaire is presented in the 
remainder of this section. 
4.3.1 Psychometric questions 
In this sub-section, I outline the questions designed to explore whether the studied 
biases are prevalent among respondents.   
Questions relating to managerial overconfidence 
Individual overconfidence is measured with seven variables. This approach as well as 
the general format of the underlying questions is adopted from Glaser et al. 
(2003:18ff); however, since the research by Glaser et al. (2003) targeted stock market 
investors, most of the questions were modified to suit the context of corporate 
investment decision making. The questions address four phenomena related to 
overconfidence that were identified in the literature review: Illusion of control, 
optimism, calibration and the better-than-average effect. In the following, the 
calculation of each variable is outlined and it is shown how the different variables are 
combined to yield the individual overconfidence score. The general approach to 
calculating the value for the individual variables by standardising responses and 
creating a scale of confidence values was also adopted from Glaser et al. (2003). 
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For questions 12 and 20, responses are measured using a thermometer scale ranging 
from 0% to 100%. Such scales have the benefit of allowing for nuances in the 
responses and are useful when a fine differentiation of answers is desirable. Regarding 
the interpretation of the responses, in order to allow for potential under-confidence, the 
mid-point of the scale was assigned a neutral value50. The confidence score captured 
by [ 1CTRL ] and [ BTA ] was thus calculated as 
(Eq-4.1) 
50
50,1 answerBTACTRL −=  
                                                 
50 This approach was adopted from Glaser et al. (2003) since it has some intuitive appeal: The two 
extreme points of the scale clearly represent extreme overconfidence and extreme underconfidence – a 
manager who does not think that luck plays a role in success may fairly be considered as strongly 
confident. It is important to note, however, that choosing an absolute and externally determined neutral 
point is likely to introduce some degree of bias to the results unless it corresponds to the mean or 
median of the population. For instance, if the true neutral point was greater than the mid-point of the 
scale, some subjects identified as overconfident may in fact merely display average confidence. One 
way to remedy this problem is to use the mean or median of the sample as a benchmark for what is over- 
or underconfident. As this would require quite a large sample, however, and effectively should only 
result in a shift of the confidence scores, this approach is not adopted here. 
Table 4.1: Overconfidence questions 
Q12 "The factors that make a project turn out profitable, once it was accepted, are
 partly controllable and partly down to luck. How much would you say is – on 
average – down to luck (beyond control)?" [CTRL1] 
Q15 "The effort I dedicate to an investment project always significantly increases its 
chances of success." [CTRL2] 
Q16 "Please estimate 80% confidence intervals <5 items, see below>." [CALIB] 
Q17 "Please indicate how you would rate the prospects of your company (compared 
to its competitors, for the medium to long term)." [OPT1] 
Q18 "It seems to me that in the stock market, my company’s shares are most of the 
time…" [OPT2] 
Q19 "My experience at making investment is…" [CTRL3] 
Q20 "In comparison to other managers at your level, doing a similar job (inside and 
outside your company), what percentage would you estimate to have better skills 
and ability than you?" [BTA] 
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A negative value for these variables indicates underconfidence51, while a value greater 
than zero indicates overconfidence. 
 
Question 15 asks a participant to indicate the strength of his agreement or 
disagreement on a five-point Likert scale with the notion that his effort is generally a 
significant success factor. A respondent who 'strongly disagreed' with this view is 
assumed to be underconfident, while someone who would strongly agree qualifies as 
overconfident. The coding of the responses ranges from 1 for strong disagreement to 5 
for strong agreement. In order to obtain values for [CTRL2] that are consistent with the 
defined scale from (-1) for extreme underconfidence to (+1) for extreme 
overconfidence, the variable is calculated as 
(Eq-4.2) 
2
32 −= answerCTRL  
Question 16 measures calibration, but is limited to five instead of the normal ten items 
in order to reduce the amount of time required to complete the questionnaire. The 
approach taken here is that of confidence intervals, whereby participants are asked 
questions to which the answer is a numerical value. However, the questions are of such 
difficulty that it is unlikely that a participant knows the exact value. For this reason, 
participants were told to only indicate a value range for each question such that they 
believe there is only a 20% risk that it does not contain the correct answer; this is 
called a confidence interval. In my survey, managers were thus required to indicate the 
lower and upper boundaries of value intervals for which they were quite (80%) 
confident that the unknown correct value lies within. The five items for which 
respondents were asked to form estimates are partly adopted from Glaser et al. (2003): 
 
(a) How many shares of Adidas Salomon AG were traded on the German DAX 
stock index on 1st October 2003? 
(b) How many cars did BMW AG sell in total (incl. BMW, Mini and Rolls Royce) 
in the first quarter of 2004? 
(c) How many SHELL petrol stations were there in Germany as of July 2003? 
                                                 
51 Note that my model does not consider underconfidence, but this might be included for instance by 
means of a variable that increases the probability of failure with increasing underconfidence. 
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(d) How many employees outside of Germany did Deutsche Bank AG have as of 
1st January 2004? 
(e) How many medical doctors (excluding dentists) were there in Germany as of 
December 2003? 
 
Again following Glaser et al. (2003), each interval stated too narrowly is counted as an 
error point, and the sum of error points over all five questions is used to calculate the 
calibration measure of overconfidence [CALIB ] for the participant. With a confidence 
interval of 20%, a well-calibrated respondent should only commit one error over the 
five questions. More errors indicate that the respondent was overly confident in the 
accuracy of his estimate on too many occasions by suggesting too narrow a range of 
possible correct values on more than one of the five items. The calibration score is 
therefore calculated as  
(Eq-4.3) 
4
51 errorsofnumberCALIB −−=  
A well-calibrated respondent, committing only one error over the five estimates, would 
therefore have a calibration score of zero. In contrast, a calibration score of one would 
correspond to having stated overly narrow intervals for each item, and is thus viewed 
as an indication of strong overconfidence; for a respondent with no error, the 
calibration variable will be negative and thus indicate underconfidence. 
 
For the remaining questions 17, 18 and 19, semantic differential scales were employed. 
Semantic differential scales consist of opposing adjectives on either side of a seven-
point scale (Malhotra et al., 2003:305). In each of the three questions, I assigned 
adjectives to the scaling points in such a way that the neutrality of the mid-point was 
made explicit. The coding of the responses ranged52 from (-3) to (+3), where the mid-
point had a value of zero. The three variables [ 1OPT ], [ 2OPT ] and [ 3CTRL ] were 
then computed as 
(Eq-4.4) 
3
3,2,1 answerCTRLOPTOPT =  
                                                 
52 Assignment of the extreme values to the end points of the response scale depended on the logic of the 
question so that consistency in the calculated confidence scores was ensured. 
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Based on these measures, I calculate a confidence score for each respondent. 
Specifically, this level of individual confidence is computed as the mean of the seven 
presented variables according to (Eq-4.5). 
(Eq-4.5) )21321(
7
1 CALIBOPTOPTCTRLCTRLCTRLBTAa ++++++⋅=  
Note that the level of confidence is intentionally represented by the variable [ a ] so as 
to highlight the link between this empirical value and my model. Consistent with the 
definition of the overconfidence parameters, the neutral (unbiased) confidence level is 
given by [ 0=a ], and maximum overconfidence is indicated by a value of [ 1=a ]. 
Underconfidence would be shown by a negative value for the confidence measure. In 
terms of further statistical analysis, output from non-comparative scales such as this 
confidence score is often treated as interval or even ratio data (Malhotra et al., 
2003:319) and is consequently compatible with many statistical analysis methods. For 
the purpose of evaluating the predictions on the effects of overconfidence of my 
model, the individual confidence level will be employed as an independent variable. 
Measuring regret aversion 
In contrast to overconfidence, there is very little guidance in the literature as to how 
one might empirically measure individual regret aversion. The approach proposed in 
the following is thus a pioneering effort, which undoubtedly does not do full justice to 
the complexity of the bias and should be seen as a basis for further development in 
future research. As the review of the related literature revealed, it is generally assumed 
that if people anticipate to feel regret in a given choice scenario, they are very likely to 
behave in a regret-averse way (Zeelenberg et al., 1997). I thus propose to proxy for the 
strength of regret aversion by measuring individual self-reported inclination to feel 
regret in a given hypothetical situation relating to the investment decision process. The 
questions relating to regret aversion thus investigate the extent to which investment 
decision makers claim to be concerned about the potential regret they might feel if a 
certain unfavourable outcome occurs.  
The questionnaire contains three questions relating to potential regret (Table 4.2). 
Questions 21 and 22 are employed to calculate the individual regret aversion score (see 
below). One unanswered question in the regret literature is whether actions are more 
regretted than inactions (e.g. Feldman et al., 1999). At a basic level, the two questions 
thus explore whether regret aversion is likely to induce managers to accept more or 
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fewer investment projects. More importantly, however, the role of questions 21 and 22 
is to find out if and to what extent managers consider regret53 in their decisions at all. 
Responses to these two questions are recorded on thermometer scales that consist of 
twenty response points to permit a relatively fine tracing of individual differences in 
expected regret levels. The regret aversion score [ r ] is computed as the mean of the 
responses to questions 21 and 22 and will be treated as interval or ratio data. Like the 
overconfidence score, it will be used in eventual statistical analysis as an independent 
variable. 
 
Question 23 was included to determine an important property of regret in the context 
of capital investment projects, namely whether delaying the realisation of a loss would 
also serve avoiding the pain of regret. Statman et al. (1987) seem to suggest that 
delaying the pain of regret may lead managers to delay realising losses and to continue 
investing in failing projects. In this respect, regret aversion might be related to the 
phenomenon of loss aversion (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991), which describes 
the tendency of people to try and avoid certain losses by preferring gambles where a 
loss is only uncertain. In my model, regret is anticipated and its effect on behaviour 
depends on outcome observability and not so much on the timing of loss realisation. 
Question 23 seeks to shed some light on these conjectures. Responses to this question 
are recorded on a five-point Likert scale measuring agreement. 
                                                 
53 Although intuition tells us that regret is a rather widespread phenomenon, it should be noted that in 
traditional finance theory, this emotion is not considered at all. 
Table 4.2: Regret aversion questions 
Q21 “How much would you regret not having chosen an investment that subsequently turns out to be very profitable?” [REG1] 
Q22 “How much would you regret having chosen an investment that subsequently turns out to be loss-making?” [REG2] 
Q23 
“The regret about having undertaken a project that subsequently turned out to 
be loss-making is greatest once the project is terminated, and the total loss is 
realised.” 
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4.3.2 Questions relating to capital investment decision behaviour 
Since this is a thesis in Corporate Finance, a great interest of the survey is also on 
obtaining information regarding how and why managers take certain capital 
investment decisions. The proposed model of the capital investment decision process 
covers three decision steps: Project selection, managerial effort and project evaluation. 
There are obvious limitations54 to the extent that actual decision behaviour in these 
choice situations can be observed using a questionnaire. Nevertheless, the questions 
presented in the following attempt to overcome these limitations as much as possible. 
Project selection 
Regarding the decision whether to accept or reject an investment, my model predicts 
that both overconfidence and regret aversion may lead to inefficient project selection. 
Yet since a manager may not be aware of his bias, he will not consider his decision to 
be suboptimal. To him, any project he accepts seems worthwhile, and conversely, 
every rejected investment seems to be a bad investment. Even in retrospect, if a project 
failed, an overconfident decision maker may tend to search blame for the failure 
elsewhere. The resulting difficulty for the formulation of questions is therefore that 
that respondents lack the objectivity required to decide whether a decision was really 
good or bad, whilst there is no way of knowing for the non-participating researcher, 
either. With the intent of bypassing this logical obstacle, I stated question 7 with regard 
to the past, and introduced in questions 10 and 11 the concept of a third person’s NPV 
calculation that may have been available to the manager at the time he took the project 
selection decision; whereby this third party is meant to represent a proxy for what is 
objectively optimal. The three project selection questions are listed in Table 4.3. 
 
                                                 
54 See earlier discussion on the methodological weaknesses of surveys. 
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Responses to question 7 are recorded on a seven-point semantic differential scale with 
a label assigned to each point, coded from one to seven. Possible inferential statistics 
for this type of interval data thus include product moment correlation and cross-
tabulation. In questions 10 and 11, participants choose between several closed-form 
response-options, representing different possible explanations for the indicated 
behaviour; otherwise, Q10 and Q11 would observe the 'how', whilst in this form, they 
also investigate the 'why'. In addition, there is an open text response field added to 
each question to let participants provide alternative reasons than the ones suggested.  
Data from the two variables is nominal, and can hence be analysed through cross-
tabulation and the chi-square test statistic. 
Managerial effort 
Managerial effort, due to the difficulties associated with assessing this type of decision 
in a survey, is proxied for by information search effort. Given that this is effort 
required to make informed decisions and thus can be assumed to have an effect on the 
probability of success, this approximation55 is justifiable. Information search is 
measured by question 9 (see Table 4.4 below), which requires respondents to indicate 
on a standard five-point Likert scale their agreement with the statement in Table 4.4. 
The resulting coded responses from this question can thus be treated as interval or ratio 
data (Malhotra et al., 2003:319). 
 
                                                 
55 See also my earlier discussion of Cooper et al. (1995). 
Table 4.3: Project selection questions 
Q7 "Looking at past forecasts you made, would you say they were typically…[strongly pessimistic to strongly optimistic]" 
Q10 "Have you ever accepted an investment project which had been forecast to have a negative NPV, and why?" 
Q11 "When would you reject an investment that was forecast to have a positive NPV?" [Other than the case of mutually exclusive projects] 
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Project evaluation 
The questionnaire furthermore collects information on managers’ project evaluation 
decision behaviour. However, a respondent objectivity problem similar to the one 
discussed for project selection arises also in this context. It can be assumed that few 
managers will say that they would not abandon a project that should be terminated. Of 
course, if they continue to invest this means that they believe the project is worth 
continuing. Hence, all a questionnaire can do is enquiring about past instances in 
which the manager may have realised, and is willing to admit, having made an 
inefficient project evaluation decision. In view of this complication, I formulated 
question 13 as relating to the evaluation of a decision in retrospective56. The purpose 
of this question is thus merely to determine if the manager is aware of past sub-optimal 
decision behaviour, irrespective of its motivations at the time. Consequently, the data 
expected from this question will be nominal and will permit an analysis of differences 
in mean overconfidence and regret aversion for the two (yes or no) respondent groups. 
 
 
                                                 
56 Note that with this approach there is a potential risk of the responses being influenced by hindsight 
bias: Even if a manager feels in retrospective that he should have made a different evaluation decision, 
was this also what would have been objectively optimal at the time, given the information available 
then? 
57 Note also that I confined the survey investigation on project evaluation to the case of inefficient 
continuation, as observing inefficient abandonment would be quite impossible to identify in reality. 
Table 4.4: Effort question 
Q9 "Prior to making an investment decision, I require putting in a lot of research and analysis to reduce uncertainty as much as possible." 
Table 4.5: Project evaluation question 
Q13 "Did you ever keep investing – at least for some time – in a project where immediate (early) abandonment57 would have been cheaper than continuation?" 
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Other / control questions 
My theoretical propositions and the models make several assumptions about 
managerial motivations and behaviour. For example, I assume that managers pursue 
the maximisation of shareholder value. This assumption is a relatively important 
building block of my propositions because without such intentions on the part of the 
capital investment decision makers, any deviations from what is normatively optimal 
that might be found from the responses could simply be attributable to managerial 
selfishness. Controlling for the alignment of interests of managers with shareholders is 
therefore relevant to probe for any likely interference of a moral hazard issue. In order 
to address concerns of this nature, I have included questions in my survey that should 
deliver evidence pertaining to such assumptions underlying my models and the 
hypotheses. Table 4.6 lists the different questions. 
Questions 5 and 14 are designed to assess the role agency cost theory as a driver of 
reported decisions. If managers respond in question 5 that they have a personal stake in 
their companies’ equity, I take this as evidence of a weak moral hazard problem. The 
purpose of corporate equity plans is to motivate managers to act in the best interests of 
shareholders by making their salary or wealth depend on the price of the company’s 
stock, too. Although there can be no guarantee, I assume that such methods are fairly 
effective in reducing managerial shirking and value destroying decisions. Given the 
importance of agency cost models, results from question 5 are further backed up by 
responses to question 14. In addition to probing for the model assumption of 
shareholder value maximisation as the overall aim of managers, that question also 
allows a cross-check with the inferences from the agency cost control question: If an 
individual indicates owning corporate equity but still does not seek to maximize 
shareholder value, different kinds of questions would arise. In particular, not all 
managers who do not own company stocks automatically need to be selfish. They 
might still be pursuing shareholders’ best interests, something that question 14 is 
designed to explore. Question 14 contains a five-point Likert scale, while responses to 
question 5 are limited to a straightforward yes-or-no question.  
Proponents of traditional finance might argue that managers who are not selfish should 
be expected to make optimal decisions. However, if one assumes a more human image 
of corporate decision makers, it is conceivable that they may be trying to act in the best 
interest of shareholders but simply do not manage to. The theory of bounded 
rationality (Simon, 1955) suggests in broad terms that there may be external limits to 
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optimizing behaviour, or internal limits imposed by the function of the human psyche. 
The purpose of question 24 is therefore to obtain an indication of which theory 
managers find more descriptively accurate of their investment decision behaviour, 
rational optimising or boundedly rational satisficing.  
The remaining two questions, Q6 and Q8 also link to this idea of satisficing behaviour, 
and should also be interesting in conjunction with the responses on the importance of 
shareholder value. Questions 6 and 8 both investigate aspects of corporate finance 
decision making which may be quite time-consuming. A manager who tries to make 
optimal decisions should always use the NPV method and calculate an individual 
discount rate for each project. Any other behaviour recorded by these two questions 
would therefore support the notion that, for whichever reason, managers do not or 
cannot behave fully rationally. 
 
 
Table 4.6: Control questions 
Q5 "Do you own shares or stock options in the company you are working for (with 
respect to your investment decision making)?" 
Q6 "Which of these methods do you choose for the financial appraisal of an 
investment project?" [Choice from a list of different methods]  
Q8 "How do you determine the discount rate for appraising an investment 
project?" [Choice from a list of different techniques] 
Q14 "My aim is that every investment I promote or select will increase shareholder 
value." [Agreement] 
Q24 "Which of the following statements best reflects your overall approach to 
investment decisions? 
(i) Time and effort are very costly. Once a proposed investment meets my 
requirements (e.g. positive NPV, profitability level), I do not continue to search 
for a potentially even better investment that may exist. 
(ii) I devote considerable effort to making sure I can compare as many 
acceptable projects as possible so that I can select only the best 
(iii) None of the above" 
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4.4 Presentation of the experiments 
In addition to the survey, and with regard to its inevitable methodological limitations, I 
also designed and conducted two different experiments to collect further empirical 
evidence for evaluating the model predictions. This section details the set-up of the 
experiments and the underlying rationale. Experiment 1 provides a simple framework 
for studying the effect of overconfidence on project selection and individual effort. 
Experiment 2 is designed to permit an investigation of a potential effect of regret 
aversion on the decision whether to continue or abandon an existing investment. In 
both experiments, students are used as experimental subjects and receive performance 
related rewards after the experiments. Rewards are paid out in cash or as vouchers; this 
alternative to cash payments was introduced for ethical considerations by arrangement 
of a voucher scheme with the on-campus supermarket. 
4.4.1 Experiment 1: Project selection, effort and overconfidence 
This experiment tries to provide a context in which investment project selection and 
effort level decisions of subjects can be observed. In addition, by applying the concept 
of skill-rank dependent success probabilities (Camerer et al., 1999), individual 
confidence levels are simultaneously observed. In this set-up, subjects' expected pay-
offs from their investment choices are dependent on self-assessed (relative) ability and 
knowledge. Another source of inspiration in the design of the experiment were Heath 
& Petersen (1996) who induce uncertainty using a random event for which they 
determine only ex-post which of two probability distributions will apply to the 
evaluation of the different strategies. The experimental subjects thus know the space of 
permissible probability distributions, but do not know which one will apply. In my 
experiment, it is each individual participant's rank based on performance in a simple 
general knowledge (pub) quiz that determines which of the two probability 
distributions will be used. Uncertainty about the probability of success is thus linked to 
uncertainty about own relative knowledge and performance, and ultimately therefore to 
individual confidence. 
Hence, in this experiment, and consistent with the literature in psychology, it is 
uncertainty that causes the interference of psychological biases. The analysis of the 
model has shown that overconfidence may cause excessive effort, since overconfident 
individuals overestimate the benefits from their effort contribution relative to the cost 
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of effort. In addition, the model predicts that overconfidence should be associated with 
overinvestment in the sense that overconfident individuals invest in projects that have 
a negative NPV. The aim of this experiment is to investigate these two predictions 
empirically by exploring whether the hypothesised behaviour can be observed in the 
laboratory, and if it can be shown to be associated with measures of individual 
confidence. The independent variable in this experiment is thus individual confidence, 
and the dependent variables are the number of projects accepted by a participant 
(project selection behaviour) and the level of effort. Individual confidence is measured 
using ten calibration questions, as well as using the accuracy of self-estimated 
performance in relative and absolute terms. Effort is for the benefit of simplicity 
limited to a binary variable, hence participants exert effort, or they do not. The 
procedure of the experiment is described in sequence below. 
 
At the beginning of the experimental session, subjects are assured that the experiment 
does not affect the marks or grades for their degree course and that individual 
responses would be treated confidentially by the experimenter. In addition, subjects are 
told that the ten best performing participants will receive prizes. The experiment is 
then introduced as consisting of the following two parts. In a first step, subjects 
complete the 'test questionnaire'. They begin by responding to twenty questions in a 
general knowledge quiz. Subjects are told that their performance in the test will affect 
the probability with which their investment decisions later on would be successful. 
This feature represents the idea of rank-dependent success probabilities (Camerer et 
al., 1999).  
Out of the twenty questions, however, only ten are actual quiz questions. They 
comprise multiple-choice general knowledge questions and simple calculus exercises. 
The remaining ten questions of the quiz are confidence interval questions; they were 
included to assess individual overconfidence scores but this is not disclosed to 
participants. Following the quiz and the confidence interval questions, subjects are 
asked to evaluate their own performance in the twenty knowledge questions in 
absolute and in relative terms. In addition, two simple gambles (Figure 4.2) are 
proposed as a way of accounting for individual risk preferences. 
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Figure 4.2: Risk preference questions 
Q4.4 Please indicate which option you would prefer in each case 
(i) 500 pounds for sure OR a 45% chance of winning 1,000 and nothing otherwise
(ii) 500 pounds for sure OR a 55% chance of winning 1,000 and nothing otherwise 
 
The idea behind these questions is that respondents who prefer the safety equivalent in 
both cases can be classified as risk-averse, and respondents who choose to gamble in 
both cases as risk loving. Someone who prefers the certain cash payment in the first 
choice pair but chooses to enter the gamble in the second proposal is assumed here to 
be weakly risk-averse or risk-neutral. The final questions in this first section of the 
experiment record a respondent’s gender and email address (for contacting the prize 
winners).  Fifteen minutes are allocated for this first part of the experiment. 
 
The second part of the experiment contains the actual investment decision task for 
which subjects have to make an investment decision in combination with an effort 
decision for a given budget. Another fifteen minutes is allocated for this second part of 
the experiment. Responses are recorded on the experimental handout, which is 
collected at the end of the experiment. Subjects are reminded that in order to qualify 
for a prize, this second section has to be properly completed. The basic structure of the 
investment task is as follows: 
 
• Subjects initially dispose of a virtual budget of 10 monetary units (MU). In the first 
period, subjects make two interdependent decisions. For one, subjects must decide how 
much of their budget they wish to invest in the uncertain projects. Each project 
requires an investment of 2 MU, so that subjects can invest in at most five of the 
investment projects58 . However, subjects are also given the option to expend 2 MU as 
‘effort’ to improve the probability with which the projects will be successful. Given 
the budget constraint, making this payment reduces the amount disposable for 
investment so that only four projects can be invested in if effort is chosen. 
 
• If a subject does not make any investments in the first period, and does not pay for 
‘effort’, his final wealth position at the end of the game will simply be his original 
                                                 
58 Projects are identical. 
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budget of 10 MU. In contrast, if a subject invests in one or more projects, his final 
wealth depends on the cash flows from the investment(s). These, in turn, depend on 
which state of nature will occur in the second period. 
• The realisation of the state of nature depends on performance in the ten knowledge 
questions, and whether a participant purchased the ‘effort’ option in period one. In 
terms of test performance, I distinguish between the top quartile and the rest, whereby 
the success probability for the top quartile is greater. As for the effort choice, the 
probability of success is greater when effort was bought. The resulting four possible 
probability distributions, illustrated in Figure 4.3 below, are available to participants in 
the experiment already in period one. Since subjects can only estimate their individual 
ranking in the test, they are uncertain which probability distribution applies for them59.  
 
 
• In the good state, each project delivers a cash flow of 4 MU. Under the bad state of 
nature, each project fails and results in a negative cash flow of (-1) MU. To facilitate 
subjects’ decision-making, payout information is stated in a table in terms of net 
present values per number of projects chosen. For illustration, investing in two projects 
would have a bad-state NPV of (-6) MU and a good-state NPV of 4 MU. 
 
Assuming that subjects will base their investment decision on the expected net present 
values for the different choice options, they will need to estimate which probability 
distribution is most likely to apply for them. Hence, in this experiment individual 
investment decisions depend to a large extent on how well subjects believe they fared 
in the quiz compared to all the other experimental candidates. Consequently, the 
observable decision behaviour (effort choice, number of projects invested in) should 
depend on an individual’s level of confidence. Hereby, individual confidence is 
measured using two variables. The use of confidence intervals in measuring 
overconfidence was already introduced in the presentation of the survey questions. 
                                                 
59 Uncertainty in an investment game is also induced in this way by Heath et al. (1996). 
Figure 4.3: Probability of success for different groups of subjects 
 No effort Effort 
Top-quartile 0.50 0.83 
Rest 0.33 0.50 
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Now, in this experiment, subjects respond to ten instead of five questions, and are set 
an 80% confidence level. As a result, the first measure of individual confidence in this 
experiment is 
(Eq-4.6) 
8
1011
errorsS −−=  
In addition, having completed the quiz section, subjects are asked to assess their 
performance in relative and in absolute terms. These assessments can then be 
compared against actual performance to determine the accuracy of self-perceived 
performance. Someone who thinks he has done well while in fact he has not will be 
deemed to be overconfident, and underconfident in the opposite case. The second 
measure of confidence is hence calculated as the mean level of perceptive accuracy for 
relative and absolute performance. 
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where  actest xx , : Percentage of questions correct, estimated and actual 
actest yy , : Relative performance scaled from well below average 
(-2) to well above average (+2), estimated and actual 
 
For the neutral point (no over- or under-confidence), each of the measures takes a 
value of zero. Positive values indicate overconfidence, with the maximum level at 
(+1); negative values indicate under-confidence, with the minimum level of confidence 
at (-1). While the overall experimental design is aimed at testing the effect of 
overconfidence on project selection and effort in general, determining individual 
confidence should – assuming there are individual differences in behaviour – enable a 
finer analysis, particularly for analysing different degrees of potential over-investment.  
4.4.2 Experiment 2: Project evaluation and regret aversion 
This second experiment is aimed at studying the effect of regret aversion on 
individuals' decisions whether to continue or abandon a given investment (project 
evaluation). As outlined previously, it is optimal to abandon an investment when the 
expected value with continuation is less than that obtainable with termination. 
Allowing for managerial regret aversion, my model predicts that project evaluation 
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decisions may deviate from this normatively optimal behaviour. In the model, it was 
assumed that the continuation value would only be observable (ex-post) with actual 
continuation of the investment; on the other hand, the value obtainable with immediate 
termination of the investment was assumed to be always observable ex-post (type 2 
partial outcome observability). Under these assumptions, the model predicts that 
aversion to regret is conducive to premature abandonment in the sense that investments 
that ought to be continued may be (sub-optimally) terminated. However, whilst the 
model assumed a risk-neutral decision maker, people in reality are assumed to be 
generally risk-averse. 
This likely difference between theory and practice regarding risk-preferences poses a 
potential problem for empirical testing: Project termination would not only be 
consistent with the model prediction for regret aversion, but also with simple risk 
aversion. As a result, it would be very difficult to decide if observed project 
abandonment decisions are evidence to support the hypothesis of an effect of regret 
aversion. A way of overcoming this problem is to modify the feedback condition 
following Zeelenberg et al. (1997:15) so that the risk-averse choice is different from 
the regret-averse choice. 
In my model, this step can be accommodated simply by assuming the mentioned type 
1 partial outcome observability, under which the continuation value is always 
observable ex-post but the abandonment value is only observable for actual 
termination of the investment. Such a manipulation leads to an inversion of the model 
prediction, such that regret aversion should now favour project continuation. In 
contrast, regret aversion would still lead to project abandonment. The experimental 
framework presented in the remainder of this section aims to test this prediction and 
follows largely the experiment reported by Zeelenberg et al. (1996).  
The experiment follows a post-test-only control group design, which is a true 
experimental design (Malhotra et al., 2003:271). Subjects are randomly attributed to 
one of two groups, and one group receives a treatment. The treatment effect is then 
studied by comparing the post-treatment observations for both groups. The general 
task for both groups is identical. Subjects are told to picture themselves as corporate 
finance managers in a medium-sized company. In addition, they read the following 
scenario description: 
"There is one investment project which has serious problems; in fact, things are so bad 
that the CEO has asked you to think about whether the project should not be 
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abandoned immediately – after all, it was you who initially assessed the proposal and 
recommended to start investing in this particular project." 
The subsequent choice options (continue or abandon) are outlined and also 
summarized in a simple pay-off table (Figure 4.4). The expected values for the project 
are chosen such that any unbiased risk-neutral or risk-averse individual60 should prefer 
abandonment of the project.  
 
Figure 4.4: Project evaluation set-up 
Decision Probability Outcome 
0.2 0 continue 0.8 -235,000 
   
0.5 -170,000 abandon 0.5 -200,000 
    
 
Following these explanations, the experimental handouts contain additional 
information regarding the observability of the outcomes. This information represents 
the treatment, and is thus different for each group. The treatment in this experiment is 
adopted from Zeelenberg et al. (1996) although in the present experiment there are 
only two instead of three different feedback conditions. Subjects in the control group 
are instructed that only the outcome of the option they choose will be observable to 
them and the fictional CEO of the company. Hence, if they continue the investment, 
they will not find out what outcome they could have achieved had they decided to 
terminate the project instead, and vice versa. Since there is no counterfactual feedback 
in this condition, there should be no regret associated with either choice option. 
In contrast, the instructions for subjects in the treatment group tell them that if they 
chose to abandon the project, the outcome of the foregone action (continuation) would 
be observable ex-post, whereas if they chose to continue the project, no feedback on 
the outcome for abandonment would be received61. The treatment condition thus 
consists of asymmetric feedback as in Zeelenberg et al. (1996) such that the regret-
minimizing option (avoiding feedback) is the uncertain choice (continuation), whilst 
                                                 
60 Individual risk preferences of subjects are measured prior to the actual investment decision by means 
of a choice between two gambles. 
61 In other words, the abandonment option is assumed to be unobservable (ex-post) under continuation. 
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the low-risk option (abandonment) is associated with potential ex-post decision regret. 
Subjects in the control group should thus behave consistent with their risk preferences, 
and given that people are typically risk-averse, one would expect a significant 
proportion favouring the risk-minimizing option of abandonment. If anticipated regret 
had no impact on behaviour, then roughly the same behaviour should be observable in 
the treatment group, as the treatment of inducing regret aversion should be ineffective 
(null-hypothesis). However, assuming the existence and behavioural influence of 
regret aversion, subjects in the treatment group should behave in a regret-minimizing 
yet in the present set-up a risk-seeking fashion, which should be inconsistent with their 
risk preferences (unless they are natural risk-seekers anyway). At the end of the 
experiment, subjects are also asked to indicate the reasons underlying their decision.  
4.5 Summary 
In this chapter, the chosen data collection methods were presented and justified. The 
purpose of the methods is to gather empirical data by which the predictions of the 
theoretical model can be evaluated. Following some general epistemological 
considerations, as well as a review of the research methods used in the related 
literature, a two methods research strategy is retained. The importance of the validity 
and reliability of findings in a research design that is oriented towards positivism is 
reflected by the preference for surveys and experiments in past finance research. By 
combining these two methods for my empirical research, I hope to mitigate the 
identified weaknesses of either approach whilst building on the combined strengths. 
The construction of the survey questionnaire and the purpose of individual questions, 
as well as the approach for administering the questionnaire were outlined. In addition, 
the purpose and sequence of events of the two experiments that were designed for this 
research project were presented. The next chapter reports on the data that was collected 
with these methods and presents the results of the statistical analysis. 
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CHAPTER 5: DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
Subsequent to the presentation of my model in Chapter 3, I discussed possible options 
how data to evaluate the model propositions might be collected in Chapter 4; I 
concluded that a survey in combination with experiments would be the most 
appropriate data collection methodology. Accordingly, I conducted a survey of 
managers who make capital investment decisions using the questionnaire detailed in 
the previous outline of the methodology. Additionally, following the two different 
experimental designs I proposed, I conducted experiments to investigate any causal 
link between the phenomena of overconfidence and regret aversion on one side, and 
reported decision behaviour at the three identified decision steps of the capital 
investment decision process. 
In this chapter, I describe how the different methods were implemented and present the 
empirical results. As a function of the dual methods research strategy, the present 
chapter consists essentially of two building blocks. In the first part, I present the 
findings from the survey on managerial overconfidence, regret aversion, and selected 
capital investment decisions. I also report the results of inferential statistical analyses 
conducted to investigate eventual associations between biases and behaviour. In the 
second part, the experimental findings for the two conducted experiments as described 
in the preceding chapter are presented. This chapter closes with a discussion of the 
limitations of the findings. 
5.1 Evidence on corporate decision makers: The survey 
In this section, I present the findings from the analytical, cross-sectional survey that I 
carried out using the internet-based questionnaire presented in the preceding chapter. 
The online questionnaire was accessible through a dedicated internet address that 
remained open for a total duration of eight months starting in January and closing in 
August 2005. On an ongoing basis throughout this period, I sent out invitations to 
participate to corporate finance decision makers, largely at chief financial officer 
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(CFO) level, at the UK’s largest manufacturing62 companies. Contact information for 
the target group was drawn from the FAME database. Only companies for which it 
could be assumed that their business activity required substantial tangible assets (real 
capital), and hence that important capital investment decisions were likely to be made, 
were considered. In a first step, thus, companies were ranked according to asset size. 
For practicality reasons, companies for which the FAME database did not contain at 
least a name for a relevant manager were excluded from the sample. Companies 
without an internet-address were also excluded since no detailed checks on their 
activity and management could be made in an efficient manner. 
The managers’ full names and corporate addresses as obtained through the FAME 
database were then checked against company information from the Hoovers.com 
database as well as individual corporate websites. In this process, incomplete or false 
mailing details were eliminated, resulting in a final database of 350 corporate contacts. 
The letters invited the managers to participate in the survey and provided details of 
how to access the online questionnaire. Strict anonymity and confidentiality were 
asserted in the text. The letters also explained that for each received questionnaire, one 
pound would be donated to Cancer Research UK, which was hoped to provide an 
incentive for participants to take part in the survey. 
In addition, an invitation to participate in the survey was also posted to alumni of the 
University of Bath’s MBA programme via the electronic Alumni magazine. This was 
done in order to obtain more responses following signs of a very low participation 
from contacted managers despite several 'waves' of contacting. However, to address 
the problem of a potentially less homogenous respondent group, the required profile in 
terms of capital investment experience was emphasised in the invitation mailing to the 
MBAs. What may thus be seen in a strict sense as a dilution of the original target 
group can be justified by the argument that capital investment decisions are often part 
of the responsibility of non-financial managers. It was felt that as long as participants 
had relevant experience, job descriptions were of a lesser importance.  
Overall, from the around 350 letters to corporate managers, as well as the contacting of 
Bath MBA alumni with relevant experience, a total of 57 responses to the survey 
questionnaire. However, only 34 questionnaires were sufficiently completed, resulting 
                                                 
62 The reasoning behind the focus on the manufacturing industry was that the type of capital investment 
decision investigated by this research would be unlikely to be taken by companies that operate without 
significant plant or machinery. 
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in an estimated response rate of around 10%. Although such a response rate is 
comparable to other and larger surveys, the relatively large number of only partially 
completed questionnaires for this survey is surprising. The average response time here 
for the completed questionnaires was just short of eight minutes63; given that this is 
shorter than the estimate indicated in the invitation letters, the questionnaire was 
arguably not too lengthy but actually achieved its objective of being efficient to 
complete. The many incomplete responses may, however, be explained by the fact that 
questionnaires were mostly aborted when participants encountered the first set of 
psychometric questions.  
Based on the responses to the demographic questions, the respondent sample can be 
characterised by some selected demographics. All thirty-four respondents are male. 
The majority of them (60%) are younger than forty-five years of age, and only about 
10% are older than fifty-five. Respondents are quite heterogeneous regarding their 
academic backgrounds. Around a third holds a bachelor’s, and another third a master’s 
degree. The remaining third of participants in this survey either successfully completed 
an MBA or a PhD programme, or have some other form of degree not specified64. 
Over two-thirds of the respondents describe their job role as being grouped within their 
organisation as a finance function. All others may not formally belong to the finance 
departments of their companies, but can be assumed to have nevertheless experience in 
making capital investment decisions; for example, investment decisions may be placed 
within the area of responsibility of an operations or corporate development manager. In 
addition, some of the respondents from the MBA group may currently not be actively 
working in a finance function despite having experience of investment appraisal.  
5.1.1 Drivers of managerial decisions 
The traditional view in corporate finance theory assumes that managers behave 
rationally but may be inclined to pursue their own interests instead of purely 
                                                 
63 While participation in the survey was not overly time-consuming, the average completion time is also 
long enough to refute criticism that respondents simply rushed through the questions and selected 
answers at random. Hence, although the sample is of limited size, the collected responses can safely be 
assumed to be of a reasonable quality in the sense that they represent respondents’ considered views and 
experiences. 
64 My respondent sample is thus slightly younger than the CFOs who responded to the large-scale 
survey by Graham & Harvey (2001:193), but similar in terms of education levels. 
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maximizing shareholder value (moral hazard). In the model, I assumed that there is no 
conflict of interests but that the decision maker always seeks to act in the best interest 
of shareholders. Evidently, whether this assumption holds or not for the sample is 
relevant for the interpretation of the responses to the investment decision questions. 
Given the importance of this assumption, there were two questions to control for 
possible moral hazard concerns. In question 14, respondents were asked to what extent 
they aimed to maximize shareholder value with their decisions. Almost 90% of the 
participating managers claim taking their investment decisions in the pursuit of 
shareholder value maximisation. 
Naturally, it may be argued that this finding is flawed because managers want to be 
seen as maximising shareholder value even if they are not; for this reason, it is 
interesting also to consider the responses to question 5, which investigated if a 
respondent participated in the company's equity in some form. Arguably, being a 
shareholder to some extent should lead to a motivation to pursue shareholder interests. 
The responses from my sample indicate widespread equity participation for the 
sample, with 90% of respondents owning shares or stock options in the companies they 
are working for. I therefore propose that the companies represented by the respondents 
have largely addressed the moral hazard problem, and that the assumption of the 
responding managers pursuing shareholder interests is plausible. Hence, the response 
data shall be viewed as being largely free of any bias related to the principal-agent 
conflict of interests and can thus be compared to the normatively optimal benchmark 
of rational investment decision making. 
Interestingly, however, the responses to Q6 and Q8 on how the participating managers 
select investment projects appear to be in conflict with the principle of shareholder 
value maximisation. As my data shows, the managers in the sample use investment 
techniques that for a long time have been shown by academics to lead potentially to 
value-destroying capital allocation decisions. Only about one-third consider the net 
present value of an investment project; the second most popular appraisal technique is 
payback (25% of respondents), followed by return ratios such as return on investment 
or return on assets (16%), and the internal rate of return (15%). The data also shows 
that managers generally rely on combinations of these techniques when deciding 
whether to reject or accept an investment project. As far as discounting is concerned, 
around 40% of respondents in my sample apply a standard discount rate across 
different projects; only 50% at least subjectively risk-adjust this rate, and a mere 3% 
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calculate an individual rate for each project. Such behaviour is inconsistent with 
traditional finance theory, according to which only the NPV method should be relied 
upon, yet has also been noticed in larger surveys (Graham et al., 2001; Pike, 1996). 
The observation that managers who on the one hand say they would like to maximize 
shareholder value, but who on the other hand make important decisions on the basis of 
methods that have for a long time now been criticized in Finance, is somewhat 
paradoxical. In trying to understand this theory-practice gap, Arya, Fellingham, & 
Glover (1998:499) poignantly summarize that 
 "…one of two conclusions can be drawn: (1) firms are making sub-optimal decisions 
or (2) the assumptions underlying the NPV rule are not always met in practice."  
As I explained in the first chapter, one of the central assumptions on which the 
normative status of the NPV method hinges is the perfectly rational, optimizing 
behaviour of the decision maker. In response to question 24, one-third of respondents 
indicated that they could not fully optimise due to constraints of time and resources. 
Following Herbert Simon (1955), such perceived bounds to rationality may be caused 
by the fact that human information processing is not as perfect as assumed by standard 
theory. These responses may thus be seen as support of the notion that managers 
struggle with the same imperfections of the human brain as everyone else. If one 
accepts this argument, it does not seem to be too far-fetched to conjecture that 
corporate capital investment decision makers are also subject to psychological biases 
like overconfidence and the aversion to feeling regret just as everyone else is.  
5.1.2 Evidence of psychological biases 
Following the finding that several participating managers, although they wish to act in 
the best interest of shareholders, may simply not be able to do so – potentially due to 
bounds to full rationality – I now present in detail evidence obtained from the 
psychometric questions suggesting that the two studied psychological biases of 
overconfidence and regret aversion are indeed prevalent for the sample group.  Prior to 
presenting these findings and using them in the statistical analysis, however, attention 
must be drawn again to the specific way in which overconfidence and regret aversion 
are measured here. In particular, and as noted previously in the methodology chapter, 
several measures of the two psychological biases employ neutral points (to define 
benchmarks of unbiased preferences) that are not relative to the sample or the 
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population but simply represent the mid-points of the respective scales (as opposed to 
using for instance the mean of the sample as the rational choice). Whilst this does not 
have a significant impact on the general findings of the data analysis, it should be 
remembered that individual degrees of overconfidence or regret aversion are relative to 
these subjectively determined benchmarks rather than the sample group. 
Overconfidence 
Based on the definitions presented in the literature review, overconfidence is measured 
for each individual respondent using several psychometric questions that were adopted 
in modified form from Glaser et al. (2003). The questions probe for the existence of a 
range of psychological phenomena65 that are theoretically symptomatic of respondent 
overconfidence.  Two objectives are pursued with these questions. First, it is evident 
that finding out if managers who make capital investment decisions are indeed prone to 
overconfidence is crucial to the relevance of my models and their predictions; the main 
purpose of the overconfidence related questions is hence to deliver evidence by which 
the existence of the bias can be verified. Additionally, measurements of individual 
levels of overconfidence will be used as the independent variable for simple statistical 
analyses of relationships with other variables that pertain to the proposed hypotheses. 
A first ‘symptom’ of overconfidence, the illusion of control (Langer, 1975), was 
investigated by two questions that were designed to capture the extent to which 
managers believe that they can control the outcome of an investment project. Question 
12 measures the subjectively perceived importance of chance in success as perceived 
by the respondents. I find that the majority of respondents believe that chance accounts 
for less than 40%. More than a third of respondents even feel the outcome of a capital 
investment project depends to over three-quarters on factors they can control as 
opposed to mere chance. Consistently, fewer than 10% of participants seem to think 
the part beyond control of an investment is greater than a half. These findings are 
illustrated by the bar chart in Figure 5.1. The second question related to the perceived 
control over a project’s outcome asked participants to state the extent to which they 
agree that their effort input to an investment project “always significantly increases its 
chances of success” (Q15). My analysis of the responses shows that about 60% 
(cumulatively) of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with this statement; 
                                                 
65 For a detailed presentation of these questions, please refer to Chapter 4 on the research methodology. 
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disagreement was only indicated by one individual. The detailed frequencies can be 
seen in the pie chart in Figure 5.1. On the grounds of these observations, I thus propose 
that most respondents display a strong feeling of control, which may be illusionary or 
not, but is certainly congruent with the notion of strong confidence. 
 
Figure 5.1: Illusion of control diagrams 
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Q12: What percentage of a project's success
is down to luck / beyond control?
10%
20%
30%
40%
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Neither agree nor disagree
Agree
Strongly agree
Q15:The effort I dedicate to an investment
project always significantly increases its
chances of sucess.
35,29%
44,12%
17,65%
 
Source: Own survey data, analysis with SPSS 
 
 In addition to the illusion of control, a second feature of overconfidence identified in 
the literature review is an overly positive view of oneself, one’s abilities and skills, 
both in absolute and in relative terms. Individual beliefs with respect to this better-
than-average effect were investigated by questions 19 and 20. Evaluating their own 
experience by completing the statement “my experience at making investment 
decisions is…” (Q19), a cumulative 35% of participants selected “very high” or “high” 
as a response; about 70% (cumulatively) indicated that they felt they were ‘above 
average’ regarding their investment decision making experience. Overall, only 18% 
rated their expertise as below average. In a subsequent question (Q20), respondents 
had to rank themselves by indicating the percentage of peers they believed having 
better skills and ability. Half of all participants, on a cumulative basis, claim that there 
are only about 20% of colleagues who are superior to them. In other words, 50% of the 
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respondents believe they are among the top fifth in their peer group. In contrast, no one 
deemed themselves to be in the bottom quarter of their peer group. Again, despite 
individual differences, these findings of widespread strikingly positive self-images 
tend to support the idea of managerial overconfidence for the respondent sample. 
Figure 5.2 displays the summarized responses in graphical form  
Figure 5.2: Self-image diagrams 
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Source: Own survey data, analysis with SPSS 
 
A further robust conclusion of the literature on overconfidence is its association with 
unrealistically positive expectations of the future, that is, systematic optimism. In this 
survey, participants’ degree of optimism was measured by asking managers to indicate 
how they viewed the prospects of their company compared to its competitors in the 
respective industry (Q17). The results are once more skewed, supporting the 
pervasiveness of optimism: Cumulatively, over a quarter of respondents believe their 
companies’ prospects to be somewhere between ‘far better than average’ to ‘superb’. A 
further 60% feel their company is better than average. Yet since this optimism is not 
necessarily unfounded (particularly in view of a small sample), I included question 18 
which makes reference to the stock market's view of the company.  Arguably, the 
market is always correct, or at least reflects the opinion of several others: The finding 
that more than one-third of the participants think the stock market undervalues to some 
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extent their companies’ shares “most of the time” must imply that these respondents 
think they know better than many other people; moreover, they also think that others 
have an overly negative outlook on the company's ability to create value in the future. 
At a general66 level, and in the absence of information asymmetries, this evidence thus 
provides yet another indication that managerial overconfidence is given for my sample.   
 
Figure 5.3: Optimism diagrams 
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Source: Own survey data, analysis with SPSS 
 
In a final approach to measuring participants’ confidence levels, this questionnaire 
contained one question requiring participants to estimate confidence intervals (Q16). 
The different items, presented in detail in the preceding chapter on the research 
methodology, are a commonly used technique to assess whether people ‘know how 
much they know’ (meta-knowledge). Deficient meta-knowledge, in the sense that 
someone thinks he knows more than he actually does, is generally taken as evidence of 
overconfidence. This method thus distinguishes between different levels of 
overconfidence based on how many confidence intervals were stated as too narrow 
(number of errors). Since question 16 asked for 80%-confidence intervals, a well-
calibrated (unbiased) individual would be expected to commit only one ‘error’ over the 
                                                 
66 To their credit, though, 50% of respondents felt their stocks were fairly priced, and around 12% even 
though they were overvalued to some degree. 
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five intervals in this question. Hardly anyone achieved this target, though. With around 
40%, three errors were most frequent. About one third of the participating managers 
were wrong in their judgement on 4 or more out of the ten questions. These results 
show that most of the respondents overestimated the accuracy of their own knowledge, 
thus qualifying as overconfident by this measure.  
 
To summarize, the presented responses to the overconfidence questions seem to 
indicate a widespread existence of managerial overconfidence for the respondent 
sample. Even though the scales of most of the measures also extend into the negative 
domain, thus potentially allowing for individual under-confidence, this applied to only 
one respondent, while for the remainder of the sample non-negative values for the 
individual confidence level [ 10 ≤≤ a ] were observed. The distribution of the 
individual confidence scores is shown by the histogram in Figure 5.4. The neutral 
point (no over- or underconfidence) is set at zero, with overconfidence increasing 
along the horizontal axis.  
 
Figure 5.4: Histogram of individual confidence levels 
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Source: Own survey data, analysis in SPSS 
 
The distribution is clearly negatively skewed (-0.656): While some managers are only 
weakly overconfident, most of the participants are found to have medium to upper 
medium overconfidence levels, resulting in a median of 39.0=a . In spite of the 
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skewness, however, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test showed that the distribution of the 
individual confidence levels corresponds reasonably well to a normal distribution (p-
value of 0.42) so that further statistical analysis may justifiably employ methods that 
assume a normal distribution of individual confidence as an independent variable. 
Aversion to regret 
The second psychological bias investigated in this research is regret aversion. A central 
aim of the survey was to establish if regret aversion is of any relevance in the context 
of managerial capital investment decisions. I am not aware of any existing published 
research that would have attempted to measure the individual degree of regret aversion 
of managers. In the absence of guidance from any prior research, the approach taken 
here focused on establishing whether the emotion of regret is given any consideration 
by the targeted managers when they make capital investment decisions; I thus simply 
assume that once someone anticipates feeling regret, he will also be keen to avoid or 
minimize the expected disutility. As outlined in the presentation of the structure of the 
questionnaire in Chapter 4, the survey contained three questions in relation to the 
emotion of regret. 
Of particular interest are questions 21 and 22 because they represent the components of 
my calculation of the individual regret aversion score. In question 21, respondents 
indicated how much they would regret having foregone an investment and 
subsequently learning that it turned out to be very profitable. Even though it is quite 
normal to feel bad about having missed out on a good opportunity, such a feeling is not 
rational as it is derived from a hypothetical situation. Yet only two of the participating 
managers alleged that they would feel no regret at all if they found out that they had 
ignored a chance to increase shareholder value; most of the respondents acknowledged 
that they might feel some regret, even though only weakly so. Almost 12% even 
admitted that they would feel very strong regret (>0.75) upon learning that they had 
failed to take on a good investment. The corresponding alternative to failing to seize an 
investment opportunity is failure to reject a bad investment. The degree to which this 
decision outcome would be regretted was explored in question 22. Over half of the 
respondents indicated that in the case of having invested in a bad project, they would 
feel fairly strong regret (>0.6). The frequency diagrams of the grouped responses for 
the two scenarios are juxtaposed in Figure 5.5.  
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It is interesting to note the difference in the aggregate responses to the two questions; 
apparently, participants expect to suffer on average less from the regret of having 
failed to invest in a good project than from that of having invested in a bad project. 
This finding is consistent with research in psychology that argues that, at least in the 
short term, regret of having committed oneself to a failing course of action may be 
greater than regret of omission (Gilovich, 1995). Overall, however, the main finding to 
be retained is that the participating managers do consider potential regret when making 
capital investment decisions and that the extent to which they expect to experience this 
regret differs at the level of the individual. 
 
Figure 5.5: Bar chart of responses to question 21 and 22 
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Since the two variables (Q21 and Q22) are measures of the intensity to which 
respondents anticipate to feel regret, it is possible to calculate an individual regret 
aversion score as proposed in Chapter 4 by taking the mean of the individual responses 
to these two questions. This derived variable takes values from zero (no regret 
aversion) to one (maximum regret aversion). The distribution, shown by the histogram 
in Figure 5.7, is slightly negatively skewed (-0.387) and platykurtic (kurtosis of 0.524).  
A mean of [ 6.0≈r ] indicates that at least for this sample, the individual propensity to 
suffer from the pain of regret is relatively large. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
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conducted for the individual degree of regret aversion suggests that further analysis 
may reasonably assume this variable to be normally distributed. 
 
Figure 5.6: Histogram of individual regret aversion 
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Source: Own survey data, analysis with SPSS 
 
The third question relating to the extent to which managers are prone to experiencing 
regret in their capital investment decisions related to the time when the disutility of 
regret may be most intensely felt. In question 23, managers were asked to indicate their 
agreement on a five-point Likert scale with the notion that regret was greatest once a 
project was terminated with the total loss being realised. Mixed responses were 
received to this question. A cumulative 44% of participants agreed with the statement, 
yet about 28% stated some degree of disagreement. About a quarter of respondents 
were ambivalent (‘neither agree nor disagree’). How should these results be 
interpreted? At a general level, the responses show once again that regret does affect 
some managers’ investment decisions. Further, the finding that regret is not necessarily 
greatest when losses are realised could be interpreted as suggesting that regret is 
anticipated and thus unrelated to the concept of loss aversion. However, during the 
analysis of the responses, I also realised that this question is stated in a way that may 
be ambiguous to respondents. It must therefore be acknowledged that due to 
shortcomings in the design and formulation of question 23, which had not surfaced 
earlier, any interpretation of the responses is limited. 
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5.1.3 Capital investment decisions in practice 
Having established the existence of overconfidence and regret aversion among the 
managers who participated in my survey, it is now possible to take the analysis one 
step further by looking into the hypothesized interactions between psychological 
factors and capital investment decisions. This section thus focuses on evaluating some 
of the model predictions for the possible effects of individual overconfidence and 
regret aversion on project selection, effort and project evaluation decisions. For each of 
the three decision steps, it is first ascertained if indicated choices conform to the model 
predictions before discussing to which degree this behaviour may be explained by 
either overconfidence or regret aversion. 
Project selection 
The project selection decision was defined to involve the choice between accepting 
and rejecting an investment project. Optimal project selection means accepting only 
investments with a positive NPV and rejecting all investments with a negative NPV. 
My model proposes that both overconfidence and regret aversion may cause over-
investment; the main driver behind this is a systematic overestimation of the value of 
any investment: Overconfidence has this effect because of a biased perception of the 
degree to which effort can impact the chance of success; in turn, regret aversion leads 
to greater effort, and ultimately to a higher subjectively expected value for an 
investment because of an underestimation of the continuation value. A joint prediction 
for the two biases is thus that expected project values should be systematically biased, 
and this seems to be confirmed by the survey evidence. 
In response to question 7, the vast majority of the participating managers disclosed that 
their past forecasts have indeed on average tended to be too buoyant in retrospective. 
Only about 18% of respondents allegedly make forecasts that are typically more on the 
pessimistic side. Hence, at a descriptive level, the empirical evidence appears to be 
consistent with the model prediction of systematically biased valuations. On this basis, 
it is justified to test for the predicted association between project selection, and 
overconfidence and regret aversion, respectively. This analysis draws on the data 
obtained from questions 10 and 11. In question 10, participants were asked if they had 
ever accepted an investment with a negative NPV, while in question 11 they were 
asked if they had ever rejected an investment with a positive NPV. In the following, I 
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examine in turn the explanatory power of overconfidence and regret aversion regarding 
this evidence on project selection decisions.  
Project selection and overconfidence 
My model predicts that overconfidence should typically lead to an overestimation of 
the expected value of an investment, unless the effort-reducing effect of optimism is 
dominant; consequently, an overconfident manager may accept investments that 
should be rejected. In addition to the suggested response options in question 10, 
respondents were also given the opportunity to explain why they would accept an 
investment project that had been deemed to be value destroying. For the statistical 
analysis of the association of overconfidence with responses to question 10, it is 
necessary to group and recode the different obtained explanations. Broadly, these can 
be subsumed under four headings: Regulatory requirements (environmental or legal), 
strategic benefits, IT projects, and use of a different appraisal technique. Not all of 
these explanations are necessarily valid reasons for inefficient project selection 
decisions, though, and a closer inspection is appropriate. 
For instance, it would seem that an investment that was undertaken because of its fit 
with corporate strategy should still only be accepted if it is expected to yield a positive 
net present value (NPV), as it is unlikely that any corporate strategy would imply value 
destruction. Therefore, I argue that managers who try to excuse the decision to accept 
an investment with a negative NPV for 'strategic reasons' are providing an invalid67 
rationale for their decision; the same argument applies to accepting of allegedly 
'necessary' investments in information technology that have a negative expected NPV. 
Consequently, these respondents are counted towards the group that would accept a 
bad investment (response group 'yes'). In contrast, respondents who had said they had 
never accepted a negative NPV project, or had only done so very exceptionally and 
with a compelling reason68, were counted in a second response group ('no'). Data 
                                                 
67 Such behaviour fits better with the overconfidence hypothesis: Too convinced by his personal beliefs, 
the overconfident manager ignores result of the quantitative appraisal and purports a vague concept such 
as strategy to go ahead with the project. Exemplary of this behaviour is one manager’s comment on why 
he would accept an investment despite its negative NPV: “sometimes you know it just makes business 
sense”. 
68 Following the preceding discussion, explanations relating to IT or corporate strategy were not 
accepted as genuine. 
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which could not be attributed69 to either condition was omitted, resulting in a reduced 
data set of n=30. For these two groups, the difference in mean individual confidence 
score [ a ] will be used to test the null hypothesis against the alternative hypothesis:  
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The bar chart on the left in Figure 5.7 illustrates the mean individual confidence score 
for each group. As the diagram shows, the average individual confidence level is 
greater for those who said they had accepted an investment with a negative NPV 
('yes'). An independent samples t-test on the difference between the mean 
overconfidence scores for the two groups shows that this difference just fails to be 
significant at the 95% confidence level with a value of p = 0.092. Yet although the 
null-hypothesis of no association thus cannot be rejected, it should be noted that the 
direction of the difference is consistent with the proposition that overconfidence may 
be positively associated with overinvestment. 
 
Figure 5.7: Overconfidence and project selection decisions 
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69 This included mainly respondents who stated that they used some other method (except those using 
IRR, which is related to NPV and should thus in most cases lead to the same decision). 
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Question 11 addressed the opposite potential decision error of deliberately not 
accepting an investment that had been forecast (by an unbiased individual) to deliver a 
positive net present value. At first glance, it must be noted that a considerable number 
of participants said that they had indeed rejected a good project for one or the other 
reason. Besides a lack of strategic fit, another frequently given explanation for 
knowingly foregoing a good investment relates once again to the use of different 
appraisal techniques. For example, one respondent explained that he would reject a 
project that had a positive NPV if it did not meet his requirements in terms of payback. 
In addition, participants named financing constraints as a reason why they would reject 
an investment with a positive NPV. For the purpose of analysing the role of 
overconfidence, it is once again necessary to separate valid from less convincing 
arguments.  
In this context, not accepting an investment that does not fit corporate strategy is quite 
reasonable. There are numerous investment opportunities in reality, and clearly only 
relevant ones should be considered. Respondents who named strategic fit as the only 
reason why they would not pursue a profitable investment are thus considered to have 
a valid excuse. In contrast, when it was claimed that an investment had been rejected 
for a lack of internal funding, it is suggested that this is not a valid reason; funding can, 
at least in theory, be obtained externally70. Respondents who said that they did not use 
the NPV method were excluded from the analysis consistent with the approach used 
for grouping open responses to question 10. Hence, following this reasoning, all 
respondents who replied to question 11 with open text were attributed to either one of 
the two groups. 
A comparison of the mean individual confidence scores between the two groups 
showed that they are almost71 identical. However, this is not surprising since potential 
underinvestment with overconfidence is in my model more likely for overconfidence 
regarding the state of nature (optimistic overconfidence) alone. In order to explore this 
aspect of the model, I calculated a mean optimism score (as the mean of the two 
optimism components [ 1OPT ] and [ 2OPT ] of the overconfidence measure) for the 
two groups, illustrated by the bar chart on the right in Figure 5.7. The diagram shows a 
                                                 
70 See also Heaton (2002) who predicts that a high cash flow sensitivity of corporate investment may be 
indicative of managerial overconfidence.  
71 The mean individual confidence score for those who said they had not rejected an investment with a 
positive NPV ('no') is 0.37 and that of the other group ('yes') is 0.34. 
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higher mean individual degree of optimism for those respondents who admitted that 
they had foregone a good project. Whilst this finding appears to support my model, the 
difference in optimism between the two groups is not large enough to be statistically 
significant (t-test, 95%, p=0.475).  
Project selection and regret aversion 
Concerning the effect of regret aversion, my model predicts that it may lead to either 
over- or underinvestment since the effect on the expected value of an investment 
depends on the specific parameters of an investment. To shed some light on this 
proposition, I compared the mean individual regret aversion score for the two 
respondent groups derived from the responses to questions 10 and 11, respectively. 
The hypotheses to be investigated in this analysis can be stated with reference to the 
mean individual regret aversion score [ r ] as: 
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The two diagrams in Figure 5.8 present graphically the calculated difference in mean 
individual regret aversion for the groups of questions 10 and 11. In the diagram on the 
left (Q10), the mean regret aversion is greater for those respondents who claimed to 
never have accepted an investment with a negative NPV. However, this difference is 
not statistically significant. 
 As for the diagram on the right (Q11), it is apparent that there is almost no difference 
in the mean individual regret aversion scores for the two groups. Consequently, the 
null hypothesis of no difference cannot be rejected. Given that the model predictions 
for the effect of regret aversion on project selection depend to a large extent on specific 
values for the expected cash flows as well as the cost of effort of a given investment, 
the lack of a significant association for this data does not weaken the model either. 
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Figure 5.8: Regret aversion and selection groups  
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Managerial effort 
Since managerial effort in the management of an investment project is somewhat 
difficult to measure72, the construct of effort was proxied for in the questionnaire by 
the notion of collecting information about an investment project in order to make 
informed decisions (Q9). Responses to question 9 were expressed in terms of 
agreement (on a five-point preference scale) with the notion of typically exerting high 
information search effort. In the absence of neutral answers, it is possible to group 
respondents in either one of two groups. Those who disagreed or strongly disagreed 
with the idea of high effort ('No') can thus be contrasted against those who agreed or 
strongly agreed ('Yes') with the view stated in question 9.   
I find that most of the participating managers (70%) expressed agreement with their 
generally requiring a lot of information search effort. Given the social desirability of 
effort, these responses might particularly be criticised as inaccurate. However, in 
approximating the potential role of the ‘social desirability’ bias, it is worth noting that 
responses to other investment decision related questions demonstrate that survey 
participants were not shy of admitting to theoretically sub-optimal behaviour at all. It 
                                                 
72 See section 4.3.3 for the presentation of question 9. 
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is thus assumed here that the recorded responses are largely reflective of actual 
behaviour, and that the complete anonymity guaranteed to participants may have been 
effective in mitigating the effect of the ‘social desirability’ bias. 
 
Using normatively optimal behaviour in its descriptive form as a benchmark again, 
individual confidence levels should not affect the effort level decision (null 
hypothesis). Regarding overconfidence, my model predicts that it should lead to higher 
effort unless the effort-reducing effect of optimism is very strong. For managerial 
regret aversion, the prediction is that it should unambiguously induce higher effort. 
The set of hypotheses can hence be written as: 
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To investigate these propositions, I compared the grouped responses to question 9 with 
regard to their mean individual confidence and mean individual regret aversion scores, 
respectively. The results of this comparison are illustrated in Figure 5.9.  
 
Figure 5.9: Effort with overconfidence and with regret aversion 
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The apparent difference in mean individual confidence for the two effort level groups 
depicted by the bar chart on the right in Figure 5.9 is consistent with the notion that 
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overconfidence should be associated with greater effort. Yet once again this difference 
is not large enough to be statistically significant (p=0.124). 
With respect to the mean degree of individual regret aversion, the diagram on the right 
in Figure 5.9 clearly shows that there is virtually no difference between the two 
groups. The null hypotheses for the effort level thus cannot be formally rejected.  
Project evaluation 
The third step of the capital investment decision process studied by this research is the 
project evaluation decision. Here, the assumption is that an investment has turned out 
to be loss making and the decision maker therefore needs to assess whether a turn-
around on the investment is feasible. Based on a comparison of the NPV of either of 
the two options, the manager must decide whether to continue or to abandon the 
investment project. In reality, such an evaluation decision involves significant 
uncertainty and is largely based on expectations, which is why one may assume a 
strong influence of psychological biases. My model predicts that overconfidence 
should induce an overestimation of the value of the investment if it were to be 
continued, and thus potentially lead to late abandonment. In contrast, regret aversion 
should have the directly opposite effect, (inefficient) early termination. 
Empirical evidence to investigate these propositions was collected in the survey by 
asking participants if they were aware of their continuing investing when early 
abandonment would have been cheaper (Q13). Somewhat surprisingly, about 60% of 
the respondents admitted that they had continued to invest in a project that – at least 
with hindsight – ought to have been abandoned. Hence, well over half of the survey 
participants stated that they had taken the very type of sub-optimal decision that is 
predicted for overconfidence by my model. I thus propose to investigate the following 
hypotheses: 
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The comparison of the two mean individual confidence levels for the two project 
evaluation groups yields the rather unexpected result that mean overconfidence is 
greater for those who claim not to have ever kept investing in a failing project than for 
those who admit that they have (see Figure 5.10). In other words, those managers who 
said they had continued an investment in the past for too long are on average less 
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overconfident that those who claim to have never made this decision error. This 
finding is significant (p=0.041, 95%) but conflicts with the prediction of the model; 
according to the model, the relationship should be the exact opposite as greater 
overconfidence is predicted to potentially cause over-investment. 
 
Figure 5.10: Overconfidence and project evaluation 
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Source: Own survey data, analysis with SPSS 
 
How may this result be explained? Aside from the general limitations of the survey 
findings due to sample size or methodology, a simple explanation could be that 
managers who feel more confident are less concerned about making a difficult 
decision; perhaps so because due to their excessive confidence in their own ability, 
they genuinely do not view anything to be their fault but more readily find the blame 
elsewhere.  
However, this is mere speculation and not substantiated by the interpretation and 
modelling of overconfidence in the present work. Future research, however, may 
benefit from considering these observations in developing an advanced understanding 
of the different facets and effects of overconfidence.  
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5.2 Evidence from Experiment 1: Overconfidence in project selection 
and effort choice 
In this section, I present and analyse the observations from my experiment on project 
selection and effort level decision behaviour with individual overconfidence. 
Regarding these two choice problems, my model predicts that overconfidence should 
lead to (i) inefficiently high effort and (ii) inefficient overinvestment. Limited support 
for these propositions was received by the survey data; the experiment reported here 
was conducted to investigate further these hypothesized relationships by observing 
individual effort and project selection decisions in conjunction with individual 
overconfidence levels in a relatively controlled environment. The main task for 
subjects in this experiment was to decide how much to invest of a fixed budget, and if 
so, whether to allocate some of that money to 'effort' or not. These choices were made 
under uncertainty because related cash flows depended73 effectively on an individual 
subject's own (unknown) score in a knowledge quiz relative to the (also unknown) 
results of all other participants.   
The data reported here was collected during three experimental sessions, although the 
bulk of the observations was made during a session conducted at the end of a lecture in 
Corporate Finance at the School of Management of the University of Bath on 12 May 
2005 for which attendance was voluntary. Subjects were students at Master’s level 
who had attended corporate finance lectures in the past, and who should thus be 
assumed to be familiar with the concept of investment appraisal and the net present 
value method. There were a total of thirty-six participants, of whom 26 were female 
and 10 male. Thirty-three correctly and fully completed response forms were retained 
from this first session. In order to increase that number, a repetition of the experiment 
was conducted74, at which an additional eleven individuals participated, resulting in a 
total of forty-four observations of individual effort and project selection decision 
making overall.   
                                                 
73 This method of inducing uncertainty by means of skill-dependent success probabilities was adopted 
from Camerer et al. (1999). 
74 Two sessions were held on 2 and 3 November 2005. Participants had been recruited via an invitation 
sent by email to students and selected staff at the University of Bath School of Management, who can 
thus be assumed to have a reasonably good understanding of the different concepts involved in this task.  
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An initial look at the data shows that the behaviour of most participants is inconsistent 
with how decisions should be taken, so that the observations are in conflict with what 
one would descriptively expect if traditional normative decision rules were adhered to. 
Under the set-up of the experiment, only the top quartile of participants can expect75 a 
positive NPV from investing. To maximize their expected pay-offs, these individuals 
must choose to exert effort by making a one-off payment, and then invest all remaining 
funds by selecting four projects. For all other subjects, the expected net value of 
investing (with or without effort) is negative, and consequently they should not invest 
(nor exert effort). Hence, if subjects were well calibrated, it would be expected that (i) 
the proportion of subjects who choose effort as well as (ii) the proportion of subjects 
who invest are equal to one quarter.  
However, the observed choices are substantially different from this optimal behaviour. 
Only six out of the initial thirty-three subjects, and only two out of the eleven 
participants from the second experiment did not invest. Just one third of those who 
invested also followed the maximisation strategy by selecting four projects, and not all 
investment decisions were accompanied by effort. These findings are illustrated in 
Figure 5.11. 
 
Figure 5.11: Effort and project selection choices in the experiment  
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75 Assuming risk-neutrality or risk-aversion. A simple risk profiling of the subjects shows that 45% were 
risk-averse, 27% risk-neutral, and a further 27% risk loving. 
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The data thus show over-investment in the sense that many subjects invested although 
they only stood to lose money. Quite obviously, these decisions were sub-optimal 
assuming that subjects were interested in maximising their pay-off, had understood the 
task and were taking the experiment seriously. Since the experiment was designed in 
such a way that investing and exerting effort only made sense for someone who had 
done better than at least three quarters of all others in the quiz, the most plausible76 
explanation for the observed behaviour is that over 80% of the subjects must have 
believed themselves to be among the top quartile of test performers. At an aggregate 
level thus, the experiment has achieved to demonstrate that overconfidence can lead to 
overinvestment. Furthermore, given that only 20% of participants chose not to exert 
effort although it was not worthwhile for the entire bottom 75% of quiz performers, 
there is also evidence of general excess effort. These findings are also consistent with 
what is predicted for overconfidence by my effort model. 
A stronger test of the predicted effect of overconfidence on individual effort and 
project selection choices, however, must consider the strength of association between 
the individual observations for the different variables. The independent variable in this 
analysis is individual confidence, which was captured by two different measures, one 
inferred from subjective confidence intervals [ 1S ] and the other from the mean 
accuracy77 of the self-perceived absolute and relative performance [ 2S ]. A highly 
significant positive correlation between these two confidence measures was found. 
Therefore, for the ensuing analysis, individual confidence levels are calculated as the 
mean individual values of the two measures. The unbiased level of confidence that a 
well-calibrated agent with good meta-knowledge would have is defined as zero. A 
score greater than zero indicates overconfidence and a score lower than zero under-
confidence. The distribution of the data, (Figure 5.12) can be assumed in the further 
analysis to be approximately normally distributed according to a Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test. 
                                                 
76 Individual risk preferences were also recorded in this experiment (Q4.4). About half of the 
participants were found to be risk-averse, and about one quarter each  risk-averse and risk-seeking. 
Hence, risk-seeking behaviour could not fully explain the observed overinvestment. 
77 Accuracy of self-perceived absolute performance was found to be positively correlated with accuracy 
of self-perceived relative performance (significant at the 0.01 level, 2-tailed test). 
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With a confidence score for each subject, it is possible to study the predicted 
relationship between individual overconfidence and effort as well as project selection 
decisions (dependent variables).  
 
Figure 5.12: Histogram of confidence levels in the experiment 
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Source: Own experimental data, analysis with SPSS 
 
In order to test for a potential effect of individual overconfidence on the effort 
decisions observed in this experiment, I divided the sample into two groups according 
to whether a subject had chosen effort or not. These groups can now be compared 
based on their mean individual confidence scores. Under the null hypothesis (no effect 
of overconfidence), overconfidence should be randomly distributed so that the mean 
individual confidence level is about the same in each group. In contrast, the alternative 
hypothesis is derived from my model and predicts that there should be a difference in 
mean individual confidence, and that in particular, those subjects who chose effort 
should be more overconfident. The hypotheses to be investigated can thus be stated: 
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Since underconfidence is not covered by my model, all underconfident subjects were 
excluded from this analysis, so that the eventual comparison was carried out for a 
reduced sample of thirty-nine individuals.  
The calculation of the mean individual confidence score reveals that there is indeed a 
difference between the groups; the effort-group has a mean of 40.0=efforta , which 
compares to that of the no-effort-group given by 32.0=effortnoa . This finding is 
illustrated in the diagram on the left in Figure 5.13. Yet, even though consistent with 
the prediction of my model, this difference does not show up as statistically significant 
for an independent samples t-test (95% level of confidence, t=-1.185, p=0.243). 
Consequently, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected as the data fail to provide 
sufficient support for the alternative hypothesis.  
 
The second decision for which observations were delivered by this experiment was the 
number of projects invested in by a subject. Under the assumptions of my model, the 
mean confidence score for those who chose to invest should be greater (indicating 
overconfidence) than for those who did not invest. Under the null hypothesis, 
confidence levels should not have affected decision behaviour and hence there should 
be no significant difference in the mean individual confidence scores for the two 
groups. As the analysis of the experimental data78 reveals, mean overconfidence for 
subjects who did not invest (0.34) is slightly lower than that of subjects who chose one 
or more projects (0.39). Despite its tendency to support the model prediction for the 
effect of overconfidence on investment project selection, this difference fails to be 
statistically79 significant, though.  
However, there is also another way to analysing the role of overconfidence in project 
selection: In an alternative approach, I divided the sample into two groups based on 
their individual confidence scores and calculated the mean number of projects invested 
in [μ ] per group. For splitting the sample, I simply chose the mid-point of the 
overconfidence range. If overconfidence had no effect on project selection, the mean 
number of projects invested in should be about the same for each group (null 
hypothesis); however, if the prediction of my model holds that overconfidence may 
                                                 
78 Excluding underconfident subjects. 
79 The independent samples t-test yields a t-statistic of -0.235 at a 95% level of confidence (p=0.815). 
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lead to overinvestment, the high-overconfidence group should have investment in more 
projects on average than the low-overconfidence group. Formally, 
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The difference in the mean number of projects invested is illustrated by the bar chart 
on the right in Figure 5.13. As this diagram shows, subjects of low to medium 
overconfidence invested on average in fewer (2.37) projects than subjects with 
stronger overconfidence (3.22). Furthermore, an independent samples T-test shows 
that this difference is statistically significant80 (p=0.015) at a 95% level of confidence 
with a t-statistic of -2.55. Therefore, based on this analysis, the null hypothesis that 
there is no significant difference between the two groups regarding the mean number 
of projects invested in is rejected. In contrast, the experimental data regarding project 
selection with overconfidence seem to lend support to my model, and the notion that 
different confidence levels may be associated with different behaviour, namely the 
tendency to over-invest. 
 
Figure 5.13: Association of overconfidence with effort and project selection 
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80 Assuming different variances (Levene's p=0.000). 
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By way of summary, the presented analysis of the experimental evidence on the role of 
overconfidence in project selection and individual effort level decisions has thus 
provided only partial formal support for my model in that project selection decisions 
were found to be associated with my measure of overconfidence. A further conclusion 
based on the tendency of the data to support also the model prediction regarding the 
effect of overconfidence on effort is not warranted, as the difference in confidence 
between the two groups is not statistically significant. I now turn to Experiment 2 as I 
present my findings on the role of regret aversion in project evaluation decisions in the 
following section. 
5.3 Evidence from Experiment 2: Regret aversion in project 
evaluation decisions 
The role of regret aversion in project evaluation was already considered earlier in this 
chapter using the survey data, but no significant variable relationship could be 
identified then. Given the limitations of ex-post measuring of regret by means of a 
survey questionnaire, it was felt that further empirical research on the impact of regret 
aversion on the project evaluation decision using a different approach might prove 
fruitful. Given the conditionality of regret upon the availability of a comparable 
alternative outcome, an experiment in which the independent variable could be 
controlled and isolated appeared to be ideal. A modified version of the experiment by 
Zeelenberg & Beattie (1996) as outlined in Chapter 4 was thus conducted to determine 
if regret aversion really had no impact on the project evaluation decision. 
The experiment was conducted at the end of an undergraduate lecture in accounting 
and finance at the University of Bath’s School of Management on 9 December 2005. 
Participation was voluntary and no participation incentive payments were made. 
However, to induce a motivation for optimal and sincere decision-making, it was 
announced that there would be prizes for five ‘winners’ in the form of telephone cards 
or book vouchers. A total of 57 students stayed on after the lecture to participate in the 
experiment. Of these, about half were female (nf = 27). All subjects were enrolled in an 
economics or management related degree programme and were thus assumed to 
understand the concepts related to the decision task such as expected values. 
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The main experimental task required subjects to decide whether to continue or 
abandon a single investment project based on the information provided to them in the 
instruction handouts (Appendix C). The instructions manipulated the expected 
visibility of the alternative outcome such that the treatment group should anticipate 
regret for project abandonment (see Section 4.4.2 for details), and should hence have a 
relative preference for project continuation. However, under the null hypothesis, which 
assumes that the treatment (inducing regret aversion) has no effect, observed decision 
behaviour in terms of the ratio of projects continued to projects abandoned [φ ] should 
not differ between the experimental groups. The two competing hypotheses can thus 
formally be stated as: 
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Subjects were randomly81 assigned to one of the two experimental conditions82. The 
treatment group consisted of 21 subjects. Subjects choices were recorded and analysed 
using a 2 (conditions) x 2 (action choices) cross-tabulation. The table in Figure 5.14 
shows that there is indeed a difference in behaviour between the two groups. Over 
three-quarters (76%) of the participants chose project continuation which is the riskier 
of the two options. This behaviour is consistent with the predicted effect of regret 
aversion because project continuation was the regret-minimizing, albeit not risk-
minimizing, choice for the treatment group. However, a similar ratio of projects 
continued over projects abandoned was observed for the control group so that the 
overall picture does not seem to indicate a treatment effect. As a consequence, a 
general chi-square significance test fails to identify the deviation in behaviour of the 
treatment group as statistically significant. 
 
                                                 
81 The two different response sheets were distributed randomly among participants. 
82 A final count showed that there were 36 subjects in the control group, and 21 in the treatment group. 
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Figure 5.14: Project evaluation choices in the experiment 
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Source: Own experimental data, analysis with SPSS 
 
In order to gain a better understanding of what was driving subjects in the control 
group to choose the uncertain yet regret-minimizing option of project continuation to 
almost the same extent as the treatment group, I had analysed the two experimental 
groups with respect to individual risk preferences as proxied for in a simple gamble at 
the start of Experiment 2 (see Appendix F). Originally, I had assumed the risk 
preference type to be a random variable and thus equally distributed between the two 
groups. However, as the diagram in Figure 5.15 shows, this is not the case: In the 
control group, a total of 14 candidates (39%) were identified as risk-loving based on 
the initial risk-preference-type identification question; nine subjects (25%) were 
grouped as risk-neutral because they had shown no preference between a risky and a 
less risky gamble of identical expected values, and a further thirteen (36%) were 
classified as risk-averse. In contrast, there were only six (29%) out of the 21 candidates 
in the treatment group who could be judged as risk loving. Risk-neutrality was 
identified for four (19%), risk-aversion for eleven (52%) subjects in the treatment 
group.  
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Figure 5.15: Distribution of  risk preference types within the experimental groups 
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Source: Own experimental data, analysis with SPSS 
 
It can be seen from the pie charts in Figure 5.15 that even in the absence of any other 
factor, hence solely based on risk preferences, project continuation should be more 
favoured by the control group of Experiment 2 because it consists of surprisingly many 
risk-lovers; this should even more be the case for this experiment since the difference 
between the expected values used in the actual decision problem is relatively small. In 
contrast, the expectation for the treatment group regarding the project evaluation 
decision is more conservative given its higher proportion of risk-averse subjects. On 
the whole, thus, it is apparent that the two groups were not homogenous and any 
comparison of inter-group choice behaviour must account for risk preferences. 
Yet even on the basis that there are about 40% of risk-seekers in the control group, the 
finding that two-thirds of the subjects in the control group chose the uncertain project 
continuation option is surprising83. Hence, even though there was no treatment for the 
control group, behaviour inconsistent84 with the risk-type was observed. Specifically, 
thirteen of twenty-two risk-averse or risk-neutral subjects in the control group chose 
continuation, compared to ten out of the fifteen in the treatment group. In relative 
terms, out of character risk-seeking behaviour was displayed by 59% of subjects in the 
control group, and by 67% in the treatment group. Arguably, a small treatment effect 
                                                 
83 In fact, the difference between theoretical project evaluation choices based on risk preference types 
and actually observed continuation and abandonment decisions is statistically significant using Pearson's 
Chi Square (p=0.018). 
84 Assuming that individual risk types were determined accurately in the experiment. 
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might thus be stated; however, due to the large number of assumptions underlying such 
a conclusion, it will not be suggested here. 
A possible explanation for the observed risk-preference 'switching', however, may be 
found within Prospect Theory (Kahneman et al., 1979), namely the proposition that an 
individual’s utility curve is shaped like the letter ‘S’ because risk preferences are 
different in the domain for losses than in the domain of profits, so that the utility curve 
is convex for losses. Kahneman and Tversky found that whereas people typically 
display risk-averse behaviour for gambles with positive values, they seem to become 
risk loving when having to decide between a risky and a safe expected negative pay-
off (Kahneman et al., 1979:279). Since the outcomes for the choice options in this 
experiment were mainly negative values, it is quite possible that the shift towards the 
uncertain option observed for the control group may be attributable to the concepts of 
Prospect Theory. 
In conclusion, the experimental data presented in this section does not permit the 
rejection of the null hypothesis. Even though the behaviour of choosing the uncertain 
yet regret-minimizing continuation option predicted for the treatment group could be 
observed, the apparent heterogeneity of the two experimental groups with regard to 
risk preferences prohibits any test of difference in behaviour between the groups. 
Furthermore, the data analysis revealed the impact of some other factor that induced 
risk-seeking behaviour in both groups. 
5.4 Summary 
This chapter provided an overview of the empirical data collected in the survey and the 
two experiments, as well as my analysis of it. The data collection was aimed at 
delivering evidence by which answers to the following questions might be provided: 
Do overconfidence and regret aversion exist among practitioners who make capital 
investment decisions; can the behaviour predicted by the theoretical model be observed 
in reality; and does the empirical evidence support the hypothesized cause-effect 
relationships between the studied biases and the predicted / observed behaviour? The 
presented evidence has addressed these questions providing several interesting 
insights.  
The survey resulted in evidence that seems to support the central assumption of this 
research, namely that those managers within companies who are responsible for 
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making capital investment decisions may be subject to the studied psychological biases 
of overconfidence and regret aversion. In addition, it appears that these managers make 
the very sort of sub-optimal decisions that are predicted by the model: Inefficient 
overinvestment, inefficient effort as well as late and premature project termination. 
Even though analyses of the association between the psychometric data (independent 
variables) and the observed decision behaviour in most cases did not permit a clear 
rejection of the respective null hypotheses, the findings were generally consistent with 
the predictions of my model. Similar results were obtained from the analysis of the 
experimental data. Although effort appeared to be associated with greater 
overconfidence, this relationship fell short of statistical relevance. However, a 
significant association between mean individual overconfidence and the number of 
projects accepted in Experiment 1 was found. Regarding the hypothesized effect of 
regret aversion to bias project evaluation decisions to be made in a regret-minimizing 
fashion could not be confirmed, even though the treatment group in Experiment 2 
appeared to behave as predicted by the model.   
Overall, the empirical evidence was thus largely consistent with the model, but was not 
sufficiently strong to abolish the traditional theory that overconfidence and regret 
aversion do not affect capital investment decisions. However, whilst the collected data 
may not allow making strong inferences about the proposed constructs and variable 
relationships, the 'circumstantial' evidence presented in this chapter should be 
sufficient to justify further empirical research into the role overconfidence and regret 
aversion in capital investment decision making. 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND OUTLOOK 
Given the strong evidence in Psychology for the robustness and relevance of 
overconfidence and regret aversion in choice under uncertainty, yet the striking lack of 
recognition of these facts in corporate finance theory, my research sought to contribute 
to this apparent knowledge gap by advancing our understanding of how these studied 
biases may influence the capital investment decisions of individual managers. To this 
end, a formal model covering central choice problems of the investment decision 
process, namely investment selection (whether to accept or to reject a proposal), 
managerial effort and project evaluation (continuation / abandonment decision) was 
proposed. Overconfidence and regret aversion were integrated into this model in close 
adherence to the definition of the two biases in the literature, and predictions regarding 
their behavioural effects at the different decision steps were derived. 
In order to confront my model and its predictions with empirical data, I furthermore 
designed and conducted a survey and two experiments. The survey questionnaire was 
made available by invitation to over 350 managers who were believed to be involved 
professionally in corporate capital investment decisions via the internet. The 
questionnaire was designed to record a respondent's choice preferences for different 
decision scenarios in addition to measuring individual confidence and regret aversion 
levels. Complementing the survey data, experiments of how overconfidence may affect 
individual project selection and effort choice, as well as how regret aversion may 
influence decisions in a project evaluation context were designed and carried out. The 
statistical analysis of the data revealed findings that are largely consistent with the 
model assumptions and predictions, even if they mostly do not pass the hurdle of 
statistical significance. 
In the light of all of these findings, both theoretical and empirical, it is now possible to 
address the more general question regarding the relevance of this work in terms of its 
wider implications for practice and research. In this chapter, I thus begin by drawing 
attention to possible limitations of my findings. Bearing these in mind, I proceed with 
a discussion of the extent to which having overconfident or regret averse managers 
making capital investment decisions should be a concern to shareholders, and what 
might be done about this in terms of corporate governance. The chapter concludes with 
some suggestions for future research.   
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6.1 Limitations of the research and findings 
Prior to discussing the relevance of the implications of the research in a wider context, 
it is important to outline the main limitations that may affect the predictions of the 
model and the interpretation of the empirical findings. 
6.1.1 Limitations of the theoretical model 
Any theoretical model must make simplifying assumptions, which result in limitations 
to the accuracy of the model predictions. Some of the assumptions I made in my 
model, like the risk-neutrality of the decision maker, were already discussed. Other 
assumptions should be made explicit at this point in light of the empirical data analysis 
and findings. In particular, I propose that the predictions of the model largely hinge on 
three factors.  
First, much depends obviously on the ways in which overconfidence and regret 
aversion are modelled. The prediction that overconfidence in ability leads to an 
increase in managerial effort is based on the fact that overconfidence is modelled as an 
overestimation of the perceived impact of effort [ y ] compared to the cost of effort. If 
modelled differently, for instance by arguing that since [ )1( aoc qq
−= ] it follows that 
[ )1()1()1()( aaaoc eyeyp
−−− ⋅=⋅=  ], low to medium overconfidence would be predicted 
to be associated with higher, but at extreme levels with lower effort. Similarly, the 
behavioural effects predicted for the aversion to regret depend to a great extent on the 
fact that the disutility of regret is specified in this research according to the definition 
by Bell (1982). Assuming the actual pain of regret to be a fixed disutility independent 
of the value foregone would for example predict project continuation instead of project 
abandonment.  
Second, in the model, the termination value was assumed to be known with certainty 
[ LTV = ]. It is, however, quite possible that this is not the case in reality. If an 
investment is abandoned, this will free resources, which would have been used for 
continuation, employable in a different venture such that new options for value 
creation are opened up. As a result, the value of the choice option 'abandonment' is in 
practice not always as certain as the model proposes. This in turn may lead to quite 
different behavioural predictions, particularly for regret aversion, and as a result, for 
the joint effect of two biases. 
Capital investment decisions with managerial overconfidence and regret aversion 
- 155 - 
The third factor that has a significant impact on the predictions of the model is the use 
of the backward induction approach in solving the decision tree. It may be 
unreasonable to assume on the one hand that the decision maker has cognitive 
limitations and biases yet that he is also cognitively able (or willing) to conduct such 
lengthy analysis prior to making a decision. An alternative, more 'behavioural' 
modelling approach might thus consider each decision step in isolation, and in the 
order that the decisions are taken, to reflect the potential ad-hoc nature of managerial 
decision-making.  
6.1.2 Limitations of the empirical data 
The empirical data showed that managers can be prone to overconfidence as well as to 
regret aversion, and as a result, may make inefficient capital investment decisions; this 
analysis relied on measuring either bias in isolation, which is likely to deliver artificial 
results. The data also delivered some support for possible causal associations between 
the studied biases and the observed decision behaviour; although it was often not 
possible to reject the null hypothesis of no association between the variables. Overall, 
the findings are encouraging, as they appear to support the model predictions, and 
certainly support the notion that overconfidence and regret-aversion are pervasive 
among the target group. However, empirical findings should always be viewed with 
caution, as there are several ways in which their interpretation can be limited. For one, 
there are limitations arising from the choice of method, as discussed in Chapter 4. In 
addition, there are limitations that can only be pointed out once the data has been 
collected and analysed. Such limitations typically are due to specific circumstances of 
the conducted research.  
Concerning the survey data, a fundamental limitation is the low number of completed 
responses. Several avenues as described previously were pursued to increase the 
response rate, but only with limited success; perhaps the inclusion, or at least the 
formulation, of some psychometric questions prevented stronger participation. 
Whatever the reasons, as a result of the low number of respondents, it is questionable 
whether the participating managers are representative of the population of capital 
investment decision makers. It could for instance be possible that only managers with 
certain psychological predispositions such as extraversion were willing to participate 
and respond to what may have been perceived as personal or even threatening 
questions. A further concern might relate to the findings on managerial optimism: It is 
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for instance reasonable to assume that any manager who might have thought that the 
prospects of his company were well below average (Q16) would already have left that 
company. As a result, the responses of managers still working at their companies – and 
thus being able to participate in the survey – should be skewed towards optimism85. 
Moreover, as some respondents may not have considered each question in detail, the 
recorded choices would pertain to the target group, but would not be representative of 
how decisions are really made in practice. Although this is a problem of surveys in 
general, particularly when the respondents complete the questions themselves, its 
negative impact might be stronger for a small sample. 
Concerning the experiments, an interpretation of the data may be limited because of 
the small number of observations, but also the limited performance incentives paid to 
participants. It is furthermore possible that the observed choices have alternative 
explanations and may not be driven by individual confidence or regret aversion. For 
instance, in the project selection experiment, it is imaginable that subjects perceived 
the task as a portfolio choice of allocating resources between a risky and a non-risky 
asset, such that decisions were made based on individual risk preferences. This 
argument would be consistent with the observation that there were many different 
levels of investment even though partial investment was a dominated strategy under all 
conditions. With regard to the project evaluation experiment, it must be noted again for 
the interpretation of the results that the experimental set-up was not identical to the 
choice problem analysed in the model. While it was made clear previously that this 
was an intentional and necessary aspect of the design of the experiment, the 
consequence is that the observation for that experiment may not directly relate to the 
model. 
Finally, a limitation that was particularly manifest in the project evaluation experiment 
is caused by the potential interaction of other psychological influences. The theoretical 
model illustrated the possible interaction effects of overconfidence and regret aversion, 
and even though these interactions were not considered in the further empirical 
analysis, they may very well have played a role; moreover, since many more 
psychological biases may be relevant in any of the studied scenarios, there are 
numerous factors that may also affect behaviour. In experiments, however, the 
                                                 
85 Arguably, however, this does not affect the validity of the observation that these individuals are 
overly optimistic. 
Capital investment decisions with managerial overconfidence and regret aversion 
- 157 - 
simultaneous interference of such external factors is not necessarily a problem, and 
may even be desirable for better external validity, but only if the control and the 
treatment group are affected similarly by these factors. In the project evaluation 
experiment, it was discovered that subjects differed substantially in terms of risk 
preferences, but only because risk preference was measured. Yet the two groups may 
also have differed in many other aspects, which were not and cannot be entirely 
accounted for. The only way to minimize the effects from such 'noise factors' is by 
using large samples. As the samples in the research reported here were rather small, it 
is likely that there were other differences between the experimental groups besides the 
treatment condition that may affect the interpretation of the findings. 
Despite these potentially limiting factors, I propose that my theoretical and empirical 
results provide a sufficient basis for reflection on the implications of overconfidence 
and regret aversion in a capital investment decision, and more generally, a corporate 
finance context. Prior to considering implications of my research, however, the next 
section makes a logical first step of evaluating the studied biases from a shareholder 
value perspective, based on my findings and existing related research from the 
literature.  
6.2 Assessment of the role of overconfidence and regret aversion  
The traditional view in finance theory assumes rational behaviour to describe optimal 
decision making in the pursuit of utility or value maximization. The presented research 
has placed a question mark on the descriptive accuracy of this view and proposed a 
framework of how two well-established drivers of human behaviour, overconfidence 
and regret aversion, affect managerial capital investment decisions. The model 
predictions regarding the effects of each of the two biases on the selection of an 
investment, managerial effort and the project evaluation decision are largely consistent 
with what the (limited) empirical research has discovered. Results from the survey and 
the experiments support the suggestion that managers who make corporate capital 
investment choices, which are quite important for a company's future profitability, are 
prone to overconfidence and regret aversion, and that these biases are likely to affect 
decision choices. In particular, the research has argued that overconfidence and regret 
aversion may individually cause managers to make a number of inefficient decisions, 
such as late abandonment of failing investment projects or overinvestment.  
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Since such behavioural effects represent deviations from normatively optimal choices, 
the interference of psychological biases is frequently seen as undesirable. In fact, 
traditional wisdom in our culture portrays the influences of human psychology as 
generally detrimental. There is for example Shakespeare's Romeo, who in an 
emotional overreaction decides to terminate his life upon receiving bad news about 
Juliet's well-being86, or the overconfident Icaros who flew too close to the sun, so that 
the wax in his self-constructed wings melted, causing him to drown in the 
Mediterranean Sea. Unsurprisingly perhaps given this cultural endowment, Psychology 
has for a long time portrayed human biases as a deficiency of the brain. The term 
“irrational” was used to describe behaviour that was not consistent with the axioms of 
rational choice. In the words of Kuehberger (2002:439), individuals were considered 
“as the easy prey of a wealth of cognitive illusions”.  
Avoiding an overly philosophical debate, the more relevant question to be asked here 
is how desirable overconfidence and regret aversion are in a corporate finance context 
What are the potential costs associated with overconfidence and regret aversion, and if 
any what benefits of these two biases may there be? The following discussion reviews 
some of the arguments on the desirability of the studied biases as a logical step 
towards determining possible action implications for companies.  
6.2.1 Potential costs of overconfidence and regret aversion 
One result of my theoretical analysis is that overconfidence as well as regret aversion 
may lead to inefficient decisions. This proposition, to some extent backed by the 
empirical data, is also the conclusion of much of the existing literature in the field. 
Overconfident stock market investors tend to trade too much, leading to lower 
performance and lower profits (Barber et al., 2000; Biais et al., 2002). Systematic 
overestimation of the validity of private information due to overconfidence was found 
to explain patterns of over- and under-reaction in stock markets (Odean, 1998b; Daniel 
et al., 1998), a behaviour that should theoretically be ruinous to traders. George Soros 
is reported to having actively tried to fight feelings of overconfidence in order to 
remain successful (Pixley, 2002:48). In the paper by Roll (1983), managerial 
overconfidence is the reason why shareholders are made to overpay in corporate 
                                                 
86 As the reader will recall, Juliet was not really dead initially. Hence, it might be argued that 
information asymmetries also contributed to Romeo’s decision. 
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acquisitions. Brocas et al. (2004) find that entrepreneurs overconfidently forego free 
information. In Zacharakis et al. (2001), overconfidence causes venture capitalists to 
overestimate the probability of an investment being successful. In the model proposed 
by the present research, overconfidence is also found to promote decision behaviour 
that is not in the best interests of the shareholders. Given this non-exhaustive list, it 
seems fair to suggest that theoretical academic research generally argues that there 
may be large costs to managerial overconfidence. 
This view, however, is not only taken by theorists. There is evidence that 
psychological biases are also perceived as detrimental to wealth by practitioners. Large 
international consultancies such as McKinsey & Company are cautioning their clients: 
“The twin problems of overconfidence and over-optimism can have dangerous 
consequences when it comes to developing strategies” (Roxburgh, 2003:29). The 
perhaps most spectacular example of just how fatal such consequences can be is the 
collapse of Barings, the merchant bank, in 1995: Apparently, unfounded optimism 
about the market performance, and a feeling of knowing better than all the others were 
important factors in this bankruptcy. In his detailed analysis of the case, Paul Stonham 
(1996b) notes 
 “[Leeson’s] bullish view [on the Nikkei Index] was curious in the light of the current 
macroeconomic position of Japan […]. Also, the attitude of the markets was almost 
entirely the opposite…” (Stonham, 1996b:270). 
Regarding the aversion to regret, Shefrin et al. (1985) proposes that the disposition 
effect observable with stock market traders may be partly attributed to this bias. This 
effect is then adapted to a corporate finance context by Statman et al. (1987) who 
argue that regret aversion is a cause of sub-optimal continuation of failing corporate 
investments. More recently, Fisher et al. (2003) find that regret aversion may cause 
managers to constantly shift between different hedging strategies, thinking that the 
other strategy might have been better. Due to associated transaction costs, regret 
aversion should therefore also destroy some shareholder value in that model. Overall, 
alongside other biases, regret aversion is clearly perceived to be generally undesirable 
from a shareholder value point of view. This dominant negative view of psychological 
biases in financial decisions is reflected in Shefrin (2002:2) defining "behavioural 
costs" as "the loss in value associated with errors that managers make because of 
cognitive imperfections and emotional influences".  
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6.2.2 Potential benefits of overconfidence and regret aversion 
In contrast to most of the literature, which argues that overconfidence and regret 
aversion should best be eliminated, there are, circumstances under which the two 
biases may be of avail. In fact, overconfidence87 and regret aversion can be argued to 
have certain benefits at each of the three stages of the capital investment decision 
process.  
The prediction of my model for overconfidence in project selection was that it will 
lead to the overestimation of the value of an investment. In my model, this bias was 
potentially inefficient because the manager was assumed to have preferences identical 
to shareholders. However, with a variation to this assumption, this conclusion could 
change. This idea is modelled by Gervais et al. (2003): Assuming a risk-averse 
manager acting on behalf of well-diversified and thus risk-neutral shareholders, the 
authors show in a formal model how managerial overconfidence may be useful in 
aligning88 these different risk preferences. Gervais et al. (2003) suggest that in such a 
scenario, “moderately overconfident managers make decisions that are in the better 
interest of well-diversified shareholders than do rational managers” (Gervais et al., 
2003:2). In the model by Gervais et al. (2003), the moderately overconfident manager 
accepts projects more quickly, which can be valuable if a good project would 
otherwise expire or be lost in the case of a rational but more hesitant decision maker 
(p.13). A similar argument could also be made for regret aversion.  
Concerning the effort level choice, the model presented in this thesis suggested that 
both overconfidence and regret aversion lead to greater effort. Effort beyond the 
optimal level was deemed to be excessive because the proposed model assumed that 
shareholders are directly affected by the cost of managerial effort. Yet it is also 
conceivable that the cost of effort only reduces the manager's utility or pay-off, if the 
decision is modelled in a principal-agent framework. If the cost of effort does not 
reduce shareholder value, the level of effort that is optimal from the shareholders' 
perspective will be greater than what the (unbiased) manager would view as optimal. 
Consequently, if overconfidence makes the manager work harder, the bias can have a 
                                                 
87 For review of why self-confidence is valuable, generally and in an economic context, see Bénabou & 
Tirole (2001) 
88 Overconfidence is seen as potentially beneficial due to its risk-shifting property by Kahnemann et al. 
(2000). 
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positive value effect by counteracting any moral hazard costs. This point is formally 
made in a recent paper by Richard Fairchild. Analysing the capital structure decision, 
Fairchild (2005) shows that overconfidence may entice the manager to choose 
excessive leverage. Despite the associated increased default risk, the expected financial 
distress costs may be offset by the positive effect on firm value89 of the overconfident 
manager’s extra effort (Fairchild, 2005:15). 
Finally, overconfidence and regret aversion may also be beneficial at the project 
evaluation stage. In the model presented here, overconfidence may bring about sub-
optimal continuation of a failing investment. Yet even if the rationally expected 
continuation value is lower than the termination value, and the objective probability of 
success is minimal, it is still possible that the investment may be turned around against 
all odds. To illustrate this potential positive effect of overconfidence, Kahneman & 
Tversky (2000) invoke the analogy of competitive sports, where leaving the field 
prematurely in the face of difficulty is not a viable option, such that “the hope of 
victory increases effort, commitment, and persistence in the face of difficulty or a 
threat of failure, and thereby raises the chances of success” (p.477). In contrast, the 
aversion to regret was predicted to result in overly cautious behaviour and premature 
termination of investments.  
Given that there are not only costs but also latent benefits to managerial 
overconfidence and regret aversion, a condemnation of these biases can only be made 
under certain restrictions. A final conclusion on the net effect of overconfidence and 
regret aversion shall thus remain a challenge for future research. However, in terms of 
a preliminary judgment, and in the light of present knowledge the model predictions, it 
would appear that there are more downsides than upsides to having an overconfident or 
regret-averse manager. This view is also endorsed by researchers who have been at the 
forefront of studying these decision biases for years. For example, Griffin et al. 
(1992:432) “doubt that that the benefits of overconfidence outweigh its costs". In the 
next section, I therefore present different ways in which corporate governance policy 
might attend to these concerns. 
 
                                                 
89 Another interesting feature of this model is that even though shareholder value may increase due to 
managerial overconfidence, overall welfare may be lower as creditors are worse off due to the increased 
default risk. 
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6.3 Corporate governance implications  
In the past, corporate governance suggestions such as those of the 'Combined Code' of 
the year 2003 were mainly concerned with the alignment of interests of managers with 
those of shareholders (Rayton & Cheng, 2004:5). In light of the findings on the role of 
managerial biases like overconfidence and regret aversion, it might be useful to pay 
explicit attention to such non-rational drivers of behaviour, too. The model presented 
here intentionally abstracted from the effects of a misalignment of interests; yet on the 
basis of the insights offered on the two studied biases, it would seem that common 
incentive systems as proposed for the alignment of interests in the principal-agent 
literature are not likely to be an appropriate way of addressing the identified 
behavioural biases. Although the role of psychological biases in economic decisions is 
considerably under-researched, the literature offers several recommendations on how 
to correct for individual overconfidence and regret aversion. With overconfidence 
having received more attention, some of the 'remedies' were made with reference to 
this bias only; other suggestions, however, are more general and may thus apply to 
both overconfidence and regret aversion. The different propositions are presented next. 
6.3.1 How to remedy psychological biases 
With respect to overconfidence alone, two approaches for correction, each targeting a 
different possible source of overconfidence, can be distinguished. Blanton, Pelham et 
al. (2001) assume that overconfidence is caused by the motivation to protect self-
esteem that prevents an individual from admitting to himself the limits of his 
knowledge. The authors suggest that overconfidence may thus be reduced by boosting 
feelings of self-worth in some other domain, or by reducing the risks at stake in the 
decision task (dissonance reduction, Blanton et al., 2001:383). In practice, this may 
imply creating a corporate culture where an error is not punished harshly but viewed as 
a lesson that increases experience and human capital of the decision maker. 
In contrast to this motivational perspective, Griffin et al. (1992) argue that 
overconfidence originates from cognitive processes, in particular from the tendency of 
individuals to evaluate arguments for and against a given hypothesis by giving too 
little regard to the weight of these arguments. Consequently, one way to reduce 
overconfidence, termed counter-argumentation, is to require managers to think of 
reasons challenging their favoured choice option (Russo et al., 1992). Based on 
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evidence that overconfidence may be reduced with experience through learning, Russo 
et al. (1992) furthermore propose that receiving feedback faster and more often could 
help biased managers.  
Concerning psychological biases more generally, including regret aversion and 
overconfidence, three broad strategies for corrective action are distinguished. Of these, 
the one most frequently mentioned in the literature is creating awareness among 
decision makers of the existence and likely effects of psychological biases. Fenton-
O'Creevy et al. (2003) and Neale & Bazerman (1985:46) suggest formal training for 
key employees to that effect. Russo et al. (1992) propose that if managers knew more 
about how their minds work, this would already be an important and perhaps even 
sufficient step as it would allow managers to come up with their own techniques to 
control their decisions. 
One such technique, recommended by Ricciardi & Simon (2000), is for managers to 
keep a written record of what motivated their decision. This record could then help 
them become aware of potential non-rational influences on their decisions. In this 
spirit, as argued by Zacharakis et al. (2001:18), it might also be helpful to quantify any 
decision as much as possible. In this context, sophisticated appraisal methods such as 
the net present value method, which requires detailed forecasts, might be of value. On 
the other hand, it could also be argued that quantification leads to a false sense of 
control, thereby fostering overconfidence. 
It has also been suggested that delegating important decisions to groups may reduce 
the impact of cognitive biases (Russo et al., 1992). In fact, some90 organisations have 
set up so-called investment committees. Yet research on stock market investment clubs 
in the US reveals that the majority of them underperformed compared to the 
benchmark index (Odean et al., 2000), thus one may ask if investment decisions are 
indeed better when taken by groups. An interesting paper by Payne & Wood (2002) 
deals with this question. A central finding of their research is that nearly two-thirds of 
surveyed investment committee members believe that groups are better at making good 
decisions (Payne et al., 2002:96). However, regarding the project evaluation decision, 
research is cited which showed that commitment to a failing project does not decrease 
but increase in groups (p.97).  
                                                 
90 Examples of Finance and Investment committees are Roche, the Swiss global pharmaceutical and 
diagnostics company, (http://www.roche.com/de/home/company/com_gov/com_gov_com.htm) and 
Transport for London (http://www.tfl.gov.uk/tfl/pensions/investment_committee.asp).  
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Payne et al. (2002) therefore challenge the ability of groups to reduce psychological 
biases:  
“…do not count on groups to correct for systematic bias. If you want to correct for 
systematic bias, my suggestion is to concentrate on training individuals […] If you try 
to wait for the group to correct judgment bias, that’s not going to happen” (p.101).  
According to Payne et al. (2002:95), an important reason for the existence of groups is 
that in the case of a bad decision, there is not just on single individual who will be 
blamed. Arguably, though, this should reduce anticipated regret. 
A further strategy to make decisions that are more rational consists in somehow 
inducing an automatism for the actual decision in order to make it more objective. 
Ricciardi et al. (2000) propose setting in advance fixed criteria by which abandonment 
decisions are made. However, my models did already assume such external decision 
rules based on the expected net present values of the choice options. This did nothing 
to align decisions under regret aversion or overconfidence with optimal decision 
behaviour, though, because the cognitive biases affected the valuation of the decision 
options. 
A more effective solution to introduce the desired objectiveness may be to delegate 
important decisions. Statman et al. (1987), who consider the effect of regret aversion 
together with framing on project termination decisions, recommend that companies set 
formal frameworks such that evaluation decisions are not taken by the project manager 
but by someone more neutral instead (p.12). This is where Statman et al. (1987) see a 
key role for finance managers – as long as they are otherwise disengaged91 from the 
investment project – and for external consultants (p.13). This idea of division of 
responsibility can also be found in Russo et al.’s (1992) proposal to distinguish 
between project management action, where biases are more likely to be beneficial, and 
decision making, which should best be done free of biases.  
When the project selection decision is not taken by the same person who developed the 
forecasts and championed the investment, the forecaster's biases could be left 
unchanged so long as the decision maker is made aware of these biases and can adjust 
forecasts for the purpose of his decision accordingly. This strategy is recommended in 
                                                 
91 It should be noted, however, that my research largely targeted finance managers and still found 
evidence of overconfidence, regret aversion as well as inefficient investment decision making. 
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the Green Book92 for UK government offices’ capital budgeting. The UK Treasury 
alerts the different government offices of a “demonstrated systematic tendency for 
project appraisers to be overly optimistic” in formulating forecasts for investment 
projects. To address that problem, the responsible project appraisers are advised to 
make “explicit, empirically based adjustments to the estimates of a project’s costs, 
benefits, and duration” (Green Book, H.M. Treasury, 2003, Annexe 4: 1). 
Such an adjustment might even be based on a measurement of the individual degree to 
which an individual is prone to different biases identified as relevant. Fenton-O'Creevy 
et al. (2003:65) proposes to implement psychometric measures to collect such 
information already at the recruitment stage. An eventual weakness of any such 
downward adjustment, though, is that it could lead to project champions intentionally 
making an upward adjustment in any forecasts they submit so as to ensure that an 
eventual discount would still see the investment, of which they are absolutely 
convinced that it is worth undertaking, accepted.  
The presented approaches to correcting for psychological biases in capital investment 
decisions were made based on the understanding that each of them may lead to sub-
optimal decisions. Assuming biases in isolation is not very realistic, though, and hence 
of limited use in formulating real corporate governance policy. My model has 
demonstrated, that if combined, overconfidence and regret aversion can be useful as 
they are offsetting in some cases. From this insight also emerges a potential for 
application of the presented model in controlling for certain undesirable behavioural 
effects of a given bias. For instance, extreme overconfidence may be restrained by 
creating conditions for decision making under which regret aversion is strengthened. 
There are also implications for the management of human resources in that it may be 
useful to assess employees' psychological predispositions towards certain biases, and 
to take individualized action by promoting the respective opposite drivers of 
behaviour. However, given the existence and interaction of a range of psychological 
biases in addition to overconfidence and regret aversion, the question arises as to what 
implications correction might have. Specifically, as any such correction of 
psychological biases can only be partial and thus imperfect given our limited 
understanding of the psychological drivers of human decision making under 
uncertainty, would it not perhaps be better not to interfere? 
                                                 
92 H.M. Treasury, The Green Book (2003), Annexe 4, p.1. 
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6.3.2 Should individual psychological biases be corrected for? 
In practice, there are a large number of factors affecting decisions under uncertainty 
that no theory can fully capture. Even if there were certainty that the existence of one 
or more psychological biases is undesirable, and given the possibility to eliminate 
these biases, it would still be difficult to know exactly what effects such partially 
unbiased behaviour might have; and even if behaviour could be 'freed' of all biases to 
leave a perfectly rational decision maker, there can still be no guarantee that this would 
lead to the optimal outcome. 'There is nothing as disastrous as a rational investment 
policy in an irrational world' is a quote commonly attributed to John Maynard Keynes 
that nicely summarizes this argument. An example of a situation where rational 
behaviour will inevitably fail to achieve the optimal outcome is the famous Prisoner's 
Dilemma, as Camerer (1997) points out. In this game, there are two alternative course 
of action to choose for each of the two players, ‘defect’ and ‘cooperate’. Individual 
pay-offs vary as a function of the combined strategies. Yet, as neither player can 
observe the choice of the other, there is uncertainty about the final pay-off. The 
rational, self-interested solution to this game is to defect for each player, yet the 
obtained equilibrium is not Pareto-optimal. Both players would be better off if they 
cooperated. 
A central insight to be considered in devising methods to correct for biases is hence 
that neither regret aversion, nor overconfidence, nor any other bias for that matter, is 
likely to influence decisions in isolation. Hence, even if for overconfidence alone the 
advantages do not make up for the costs as Griffin et al. (1992) claim, in a larger 
picture of several psychological processes interacting, one specific bias may have an 
important role by controlling another bias. For example, Besharov (2002) proposes a 
theoretical model in which overconfidence and regret aversion offset the effect of 
hyperbolic discounting. Hyperbolic-discounting (Akerlof, 1991) describes the finding 
that human discounting of future costs and benefits is time-inconsistent (not constant 
over time). As a result, individuals value future, discounted gains less than equal-size 
present gains (Besharov, 2002:6). In Besharov’s model, hyperbolic discounting leads 
to sub-optimally low effort, but this is offset93 by the effort-increasing effects of 
                                                 
93 As Besharov also notes, the analysis of the opposing behavioural effects does not imply that the 
different biases exist because they counteract each other (p.5). 
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overconfidence and regret aversion (p.10). Besharov (2002:14) thus cautions that 
reducing just one bias may have "ambiguous welfare properties". 
Implicit in these arguments is the view of psychological biases as a system of checks 
and balances that may be rather useful and efficient in dealing with the anomalies of 
life outside the world of econometric models. There seems thus to be link to 
Gigerenzer & Selten's (2001) 'adaptive toolbox' of mental heuristics as far as the larger 
view of the role of human psychology in decision making under uncertainty is 
concerned. However, in the case of capital investment decisions, it would appear that 
in reality the different biases might not always balance out, as there are many instances 
of sub-optimal decision making which are consistent with some of the predictions of 
the model proposed here. Although elimination of certain biases like overconfidence or 
regret aversion may be a double-edged sword, it is argued here that ignoring the role of 
psychological biases in capital investment decisions and a complete laissez-faire 
approach are not the ideal recipe either.  
In identifying the optimal strategy for addressing the potential costs associated with 
capital investment decisions that are driven by overconfidence or regret aversion, one 
should not ignore the possibility that practitioners are ahead of academics and already 
have relevant systems in place. Surveys like the one conducted for this research 
typically observe that managers rely on a range of theoretically flawed decision rules 
for project selection such as the payback method. It has been proposed that this 
behaviour may be explainable as a means of reducing moral hazard problems 
(Berkovitch & Israel, 1998; Marino et al., 2005:320). However, it may also be the case 
that managers prefer unsophisticated appraisal methods because they require fewer 
forecasts than the net present value technique, and are therefore less exposed to any 
uncertainty-induced bias. 
This section has tried to show that the theoretical and empirical contribution to 
knowledge of the presented research should be relevant to practitioners and be 
considered in the development of corporate governance policies. Given the 
considerable gaps in the body of theory relating to the precise workings and 
interactions of the many psychological phenomena that exist alongside overconfidence 
and regret aversion, and how these might affect capital investment decisions, the 
presented research should in particular be seen as a pioneering effort highlighting the 
need for academics to further advance understanding in this field. Some potential 
avenues for such future research are offered in the next section. 
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6.4 Suggestions for future research 
Given that the presented research is fairly novel and adds to a field of research that is 
largely unexplored, there are many highly interesting directions that future research 
could pursue. Behavioural corporate finance is one of the most rapidly developing and 
exciting fields in Finance as the impact of psychological biases and emotions on 
economic decision-making is only beginning to be viewed as the norm rather than the 
exception. Given their importance and shared features with stock investments, the 
decisions related to corporate capital expenditure offer a great potential for future 
research. At a first level, it may thus be worthwhile to extend the research reported 
here. This may be done in a number of ways.  
With respect to the theoretical model, one possible extension would be to introduce a 
second strategic player in the form of shareholders. The analysis could then take into 
consideration potential information asymmetries, in the spirit of Richard Fairchild's 
(2005) capital structure model. Additionally, an inter-temporal dimension could be 
added to my model to make it more dynamic. This could also entail a discussion of 
how accurately individuals are able to forecast future emotions, since there is evidence 
that, related to the concept of hyperbolic discounting, people display a present-oriented 
bias (O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999). As a result, future regret may seem less painful 
than current regret so that regret aversion would tend to favour project continuation 
instead of abandonment. In addition, given the insights from the questionnaire on 
situationally different intensities of regret aversion, improved predictions may be 
obtained by assuming different parameters of individual regret aversion depending on 
whether the particular decision option represents 'inaction' or 'action'. 
Regarding the experimental data collection, it would perhaps be interesting to replicate 
the experiments on a larger scale (more subjects, higher financial incentives) which 
may render some of the observations more significant, and allow for stronger testing of 
the model. In order to untangle the effect of regret aversion from the possible influence 
of inconsistent risk preferences over losses in Experiment 2, it may be preferable for 
the experimental outcomes of the project evaluation decision problem to remain in the 
positive domain. In addition, an alternative experimental design to investigate regret 
aversion might be employed; Appendix F contains an outline. Very exciting 
possibilities for studying the influence of the human brain in an economic setting also 
arise from the use of magnet resonance imaging in recent research in the relatively 
young field of neuro-economics (e.g. Kenning & Plassmann, 2005).   
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As for the field data, managerial overconfidence may be better assessed using the 
presented measures in a survey that is not anonymous. Alternatively, Malmendier & 
Tate (2005) propose a new methodology for determining if a CEO is overconfident 
involving newspaper reports and corporate publications. The ultimate challenge would 
then consist of being able to attribute managerial confidence levels to specific 
companies, and to analyse firm level data on investment decisions, but also on other 
corporate finance problems jointly with the overconfidence data. With respect to regret 
aversion, the key issues to be resolved are developing a more sophisticated way of 
measuring the extent to which individuals are concerned by regret, and gaining a better 
understanding of which outcomes lead to the greatest regret. With stronger and more 
significant data than could be obtained for the reported research, an analysis of the 
joint effect of overconfidence and regret aversion with behaviour may also prove to be 
valuable. Finally, it would furthermore be interesting to consider whether individual 
overconfidence and regret aversion are indeed independent of each other, or if there is 
some link between these, and potentially other, psychological biases. Future research 
on human cognition might thus wish to further explore the interdependence of biases, 
as well as the related potential existence of certain 'personality types' with regard to 
phenomena such as overconfidence and regret aversion.  
6.5 Summary 
In this final chapter, the research was considered from an ex-post, disengaged 
perspective. First, some of the more important limitations of the model and the 
empirical data were outlined. With changes to some assumptions such as ex-post 
outcome observability or the interpretation of overconfidence and regret aversion, the 
model could lead to different predictions. Although the derived propositions somewhat 
tend to be supported by the survey and experimental data, a significant limitation of the 
empirical results is that they are mostly not statistically significant and thus do not 
qualify for formally assessing the model. However, evidence of overconfidence was 
found across the different methods used, and there are some indications that these 
biases do affect decision-making. On the basis of this result, the benefits and costs of 
overconfidence and regret aversion based on the conducted research and relevant other 
research was discussed and it was concluded that, at least in a capital investment 
decision scenario, these biases appear to be detrimental to shareholder value. It is thus 
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reasonable for shareholders to consider controlling for overconfidence and regret 
aversion in a corporate governance context, and several approaches of how this might 
be done were pointed out. On the other hand, given potential interaction effects of 
psychological biases and the fact that they may most of the time do a good job dealing 
with the imperfections of reality, even for investment decisions it remains questionable 
how to address phenomena like managerial overconfidence and regret aversion without 
ending up with an even worse result. In view of these uncertainties on the part of 
academics due to deficient knowledge, and the relevance of the topic to practitioners, 
the chapter closed with a call and some suggestions for future research.  
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CONCLUSION 
Capital investments are of fundamental importance in the value creation process of 
companies. In order to maximize shareholder value, managers should only accept 
investments that have a positive NPV, allocate the optimal account of resources by 
trading off associated benefits and costs, and terminate any investment for which the 
continuation value is exceeded by what could be obtained with immediate 
abandonment. Yet due to fundamental uncertainty, these decisions need to be made 
based on forecasts and expectations. Research in psychology has shown that under 
such conditions, the information processing of the human mind, and thus decision 
behaviour, can be affected by a range of biases arising for cognitive, emotional or 
motivational reasons. Two of the most robust biases are overconfidence and the 
aversion to regret. 
Overconfident individuals systematically overestimate their chances of success 
because they believe they know better, have better ability, and feel in control. The 
phenomenon of regret aversion describes the tendency of people to imagine prior to 
taking a decision what possible regret they might feel for each possible outcome, and 
then to make their decision in order to minimize regret. In the presented research, these 
two biases were formally integrated into a model of the capital investment decision 
process, consisting of project selection, managerial effort, and project evaluation. 
Solving this model by backward induction revealed systematic deviations from 
normatively optimal behaviour at all three studied decision steps. Specifically, the 
model predicted that overconfidence and regret aversion might lead to over-investment 
and excess effort; further, while overconfidence was shown to potentially cause sub-
optimal project continuation, regret aversion may lead to premature abandonment of an 
investment. 
The survey of managers from the largest UK public companies exposed widespread 
overconfidence as well as regret aversion, with individual differences in both biases. In 
addition, these managers were found to commit the very decision errors predicted by 
the model. The inferential statistical analysis delivered indicative evidence of the 
hypothesized relationships between the psychological biases and the reported choice 
behaviour, which largely failed to be statistically significant, however. To complement 
these observations, two experiments were conducted. The first experiment showed that 
overconfidence was positively associated with the amount invested, while the observed 
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excess effort could not clearly be attributed to either experimental condition. In the 
second experiment, inducing regret aversion resulted in the predicted effect but due to 
considerable differences in risk-preferences between the experimental groups and a 
limited sample, no significant effect could be found. 
Despite some limitations to the interpretation of the model predictions and the 
findings, and on the basis of having observed both, overconfidence and regret aversion, 
as well as the predicted behaviour, and limited empirical support for the predicted 
association between these variables, the final chapter discussed the implications of the 
work. A discussion of the benefits and costs of the studied biases concludes that they 
are indeed likely to be detrimental to shareholder value on average. However, the 
presented implications for corporate governance policy must be applied with care, as 
the complexity of the subject does not permit predictions about the effects of partial 
control of psychological biases. Given this limited understanding, yet the considerable 
importance of the topic, further research in both Psychology and Finance has a great 
potential to provide valuable new insights.   
The presented research contributes to the existing body of literature in Behavioural 
Corporate Finance in several ways. For one, very little work only has so far been 
conducted on the effects of the psychological biases of managers on corporate finance 
decisions. None of this research has looked formally at the interaction effects of 
overconfidence and regret aversion in the presented corporate capital investment 
decisions context. Finally, my research also contributes to the existing literature by 
suggesting practical ways in which the role of the two studied phenomena can be 
empirically investigated. 
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APPENDIX A: PROJECT EVALUATION WITH REGRET 
AND TOTAL OUTCOME OBSERVABILITY  
In this case, it is assumed that the manager can observe the state of nature realization 
even if he chose abandonment in addition to knowing the termination value with 
certainty under either strategy. Consequently, each strategy is associated with potential 
regret (Figure A1). Consistent with my definition of regret, which was adopted from 
Bell (1982), the regret anticipated for continuation and subsequent realization of the 
bad state of nature is given by  
(1) LCVR lct −=  
In the alternative case, when the investment is abandoned, the decision maker will 
experience regret if it turns out that continuation would have been better, thus   
(2) hab CVLR −=    
 
Figure A1: Anticipated regret in project evaluation (total observability) 
  Chosen strategy 
  Continuation Abandonment 
Good No regret; hCV  realized Regret = abR  State of nature Bad Regret = ctR  No regret; lCVL >  realized 
 
 
Assuming zero overconfidence [ 0=b ], the continuation value for a given level of 
managerial regret aversion [ r ] is hence  
(3) )()1( ctlhra RrCVqCVqCV ⋅+⋅−+⋅= . 
Due to uncertainty about the continuation value, the abandonment option is also 
associated with potential regret, so that the expected value of terminating the 
investment can be stated as 
(4) LqRrLqTV abra ⋅−+⋅+⋅= )1()(   (total outcome observability) 
Note that regret in abandonment occurs with probability [ q ] because it is associated 
with the good state occurring, and having failed to continue the investment. 
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The regret-averse manager will consequently abandon an investment if rara CVTV > : 
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As can be seen in the last line of this transformation, the decision rule for a regret 
averse but otherwise unbiased manager in the project evaluation decision assuming 
total outcome observability is identical to the normatively optimal decision rule. 
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APPENDIX B: FORMAL PROOF FOR EQUATION 3.15 
Identifying the critical level of overconfidence [ 'b ] for a given level of managerial 
regret aversion [ r ] for which the effects of the two biases exactly offset by equating 
(Eq-3.14) and (Eq-3.15) such that uCVrbbCV == );'( : 
(Eq-3.14) )()1( )1()1( ctl
b
h
b rRCVqCVqCV +⋅−+= −− . 
(Eq-3.15) lhu CVqqCVCV )1( −+= . 
;'1
)(
)(
log
,log
;
)(
)(
;)()(
);()1()1(
)'1(
)'1(
)'1()'1(
b
rRCVCV
rRCVCVq
xbnxSince
rRCVCV
rRCVCVq
q
rRCVrRCVCVqCVCVCVq
rRCVqCVqCVqqCV
ctlh
ctlh
q
n
b
ctlh
ctlhb
ctlctlh
b
llh
ctl
b
h
b
lh
−=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−−
−−
=↔=
−−
−−=
++−−=+−
+⋅−+=−+
−
−
−−
 
and hence   
(Eq-3.16) .
)(
)(log1' ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−−
−−−=
ctlh
ctlh
q rRCVCV
rRCVCVqb  . 
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APPENDIX C: CREATION AND LAUNCHING OF THE 
INTERNET BASED QUESTIONNAIRE 
Once the type of questions and their order was determined, the questionnaire was 
placed on the internet. Compared to a physical questionnaire, the overall cost was thus 
significantly lower due to savings on printing, and on postage for the return envelopes. 
There are different possibilities of how such an online questionnaire can be created. 
Following an analysis of the various costs and benefits involved, I decided to employ 
the services of a company specialised in the hosting of surveys. The associated fees 
were outweighed by the reliability of the web site in terms of availability, as well as 
the greater efficiency in administration of the questionnaire.  
In addition, by providing a basic toolbox for the development of the questionnaire, the 
web site was very convenient. Although all questions had to be entered manually, it 
was possible to choose between different standard types of questions (open or closed, 
multiple choice or rating scale) for which then a mask with all required entry fields 
opened. At the same time, a coding could be assigned to the responses. Furthermore, it 
was possible to define ‘compulsory’ questions that had to be answered in order to be 
able to submit the questionnaire. Although this could arguably reduce participation 
numbers when compared to a pen-and-paper survey, it would also ensure that only 
fully completed questionnaires were received. Once the questionnaire was saved and 
launched, it was available via a unique internet address that could be linked to from 
any other web site. 
Initially, I placed the link to the survey on my personal homepage on the University’s 
server. Yet following the pilot survey, it was felt that a more ‘professional’ appearance 
could be beneficial for the response rate. In response, I set up the site 
www.investment-decisions-survey.net as a dedicated point of entry to the 
questionnaire. This first page was designed to reassure participants of the authenticity 
of the survey and contained my contact information and the logo of the School of 
Management (Figure F1).  
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Figure C1: Online survey starting page 
 
 
By clicking on a link to continue participants then reached a page where they were 
required to enter a password and username to access the questionnaire (Figure F2). The 
log-in information had been provided in the invitation letters, and was the same for the 
entire sample. The sole purpose of this secured access was to control who could 
respond and thus avoid uninvited responses that might lower the quality of the data. 
 
Figure C2: Online survey password access page 
 
 
 
Upon posting the correct log-in data, participants were given some brief instructions as 
to the aims of the survey on a page that contained a button to start the questionnaire at 
the bottom of the page (Figure F3). Each participant who clicked on that button was 
counted by survey hosting company as a visitor to the questionnaire. This value 
compares to the number of questionnaires submitted to show how many participants 
had shown initial interest in the survey but had eventually decided not to submit any 
responses.  A further advantage of using the professional hosting service provider was 
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that responses to the questionnaires would be saved reliably and were then available 
for download in a MS Excel or an SPSS data file format. Not only was this convenient, 
but it also eliminated the possibility for errors that could arise when manually 
transferring the data from the questionnaire to the computer. 
 
Figure C3: Online survey – Instructions page 
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APPENDIX D: THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
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APPENDIX E: INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXPERIMENT 1 
(PROJECT SELECTION AND EFFORT) 
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APPENDIX F: INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXPERIMENT 2 
(PROJECT EVALUATION) 
Instructions for treatment group 
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Instructions for control group 
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APPENDIX G: ALTERNATIVE PROJECT EVALUATION 
EXPERIMENT (PROPOSED OUTLINE) 
The basic set-up of this experiment follows Zanibbi & Pike (1996) in that subjects 
receive information about several different investment projects. However, there is 
considerable uncertainty about the final pay-off from each investment if it is 
continued: This uncertainty is induced following Heath (1996): There are two 
probability distributions but subjects do not know which one will materialize for which 
investment. Subjects only know the pay-offs under the good and bad states of nature, 
and the two probability distributions. Based on this information, subjects need to 
decide whether to abandon or to continue each single project.  
 
The proposed sequence of events is thus as follows. 
 
• Subjects’ risk preferences are established in a simple gamble. This is necessary to 
distinguish later on between risk-averse and regret-averse behaviour. 
 
• Subjects receive the instructions and are told that the there is a reward for the top (in 
terms of value maximization) 5 participants  
 
• The treatment to induce regret aversion in one group may follow the proposed 
approach presented in Section 4.4.2 following Zeelenberg et al. (1996).  
 
• Subjects receive a list of investments, detailing the termination value, as well as the 
pay-offs under the different states of the world. Given the prediction of my model that 
regret aversion should lead to early abandonment, the financial parameters of the 
presented investments should be such that even a moderately risk-averse but unbiased 
decision maker would choose to continue them. 
 
